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Abstract 
The 1980s has given rise to a new area of Finance, namely Behavioral Finance, which 
challenged the so far dominance of the Neoclassical Finance. Particularly, this new 
area introduced concepts from cognitive psychology in order to explain investors’ 
behavior at the collective level. Two of the most known faucets of collective 
investors’ behavior are herding and feedback trading. The first one is the 
phenomenon where investors copy the actions of the other investors, often 
disregarding their own beliefs, whereas the second one involves the chase of trends 
on behalf of the investors. 
Our thesis first examines the relationship between style investing and institutional 
herding under the context of a concentrated market. Style investing has been found 
to promote herding in numerous studies; however, given that these studies have 
been carried out in large markets, there has not been examined what is the impact 
of market concentration over this relationship, as a concentrated market may 
produce different trading dynamics than those in large markets. What is next is to 
examine the impact of the introduction of the Exchanged Traded Funds over noise 
trading; these relatively new financial products have special characteristics that can 
make them appealing to the investors and they could positively contribute towards 
markets’ completion. Finally, our research focuses on the issue whether institutional 
investors herd intentionally at the industry level; this issue has never been explored, 
to our knowledge, before and we will try examine this by using the interaction of 
institutional herding with various market and sector conditions. 
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As a result, our research makes a contribution to the research on herding and 
feedback trading, examining important issues that have not been addressed before.  
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Chapter 1 
 
1. Introduction  
Since the 1970s and the introduction of the concept of the Efficient Market hypothesis 
by Fama (1970) there has been an overwhelming research trying to either support or 
challenge its principles. It was during the 1980s where concepts from cognitive 
psychology were used to explain investors’ behavior giving birth to what is known 
today as Behavioral Finance. The latter tried to shed light on investors’ behavior by 
using concepts from cognitive psychology, as mentioned above, related to biases and 
heuristics found in human behavior. In addition, Behavioral Finance extended the 
study of human behavior from the individual perspective to the collective behavior of 
investors in the market. Perhaps two of the most known forms of collective behavior 
in capital markets are herding and feedback trading. Herding refers to the 
phenomenon when investors copy the actions of their peers, often disregarding their 
own informational sets. Feedback trading is the phenomenon when investors try to 
realize gains by riding on trends of stock prices. Feedback trading may be “positive”, 
where investors buy (sell) stocks when prices rise (fall) as well as “negative” where 
investors buy (sell) stocks when prices fall (rise). Both the above mentioned trading 
patterns can be driven by rational as well as behavioral reasons and they may lead to 
destabilizing effects, driving prices away from their fundamental values. Given the 
impact these two facets of collective behavior may have on asset prices, there has 
been a great amount of research, both theoretical and empirical, regarding these two 
topics. 
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Starting with herding, the seminal works that related this phenomenon to the 
investors’ behavior were those of Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992); the 
authors suggested several professional/career and psychological considerations as 
being the possible sources of this phenomenon. In addition, on the following years, a 
wealth of researches have empirically tested for the presence of herding in a set of 
various markets across the world, both at the individual investor perspective, using 
macro-models, and the institutional investor perspective, using micro-models, as well. 
In the first case, researchers used aggregate market data [Christie and Huang (1995), 
Chang et al. (2000), Hwang and Salmon (2004)] and in the latter case, researchers 
used micro-level data [Lakonishok et al. (1992), Wermers (1999), Kim and Wei 
(2002a), Kim and Wei (2002b), Sias (2004), Choi and Sias (2009), Holmes et al. 
(2011)]. The concept of  feedback trading was initially introduced by De Long et al. 
(1990a) at the theoretical level and then was empirically tested by numerous 
researches across the world and various classes of assets, such as stocks, options, 
futures, etc. [Sentana and Wadhwani (1992), Koutmos (1997), Koutmos and Saidi 
(2001), Antoniou et al. (2005), Bohl and Reitz (2006), Chau et al. (2008), Salm and 
Schuppli (2010)]. It is worth noting here that feedback trading was associated with 
various trading strategies such as momentum, contrarian and technical analysis. 
Given the extensive research in those two areas, we identified specific gaps in the 
literature, which we believe are of great importance to both the investment 
community and the regulatory authorities as well. As such, the first research question 
of our thesis that we will try to answer is whether market concentration has an impact 
over the relationship between style investing and herding.  The relevant literature has 
identified a relationship between style investing and herding [Grinblatt et al. (1995), 
Wermers (1999)], however all these researches have been carried out in the context of 
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large developed markets; the issue has not been addressed in the context of a small 
and concentrated market (which is the case for the majority of world financial 
markets). To that end, we test for this relationship in Portugal, which is characterized 
by high levels of concentration both in its equity market and its funds’ industry. In 
order to test for the relationship between style investing and herding and how this is 
affected by the level of market concentration, we apply six different style indicators; 
those are analysts’ recommendations, market value (size), momentum, value/growth, 
volatility and volume. In addition, we divide our sample period into two sub-periods, 
pre and post Euronext to account for any effects of the merger of the Portuguese 
Stock Exchange into Euronext and then we further break the post-Euronext period 
into pre and post crisis, trying to gauge any effect the credit crisis that broke out in 
2008 had over our estimations. 
The next issue we address is the impact of the Exchange Traded Funds’ introduction 
over noise trading. Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) constitute a relatively new 
financial innovation, which combines the advantages of open-end funds with those of 
close-end funds into one product. Given that ETFs are attractive to both rational and 
retail investors and taking into consideration that the latter are the prime candidates 
for noise trading [Barber et al. (2009)], the issue arising is what is the impact of the 
ETFs’ introduction over market dynamics. In other words, what we want to examine 
is whether the introduction of the ETFs promotes market efficiency and depresses 
noise trading. To test our hypothesis, we use a sample of eight European countries, 
also controlling for the current financial crisis. In addition, we test for the noise 
traders’ migration hypothesis, i.e. whether noise traders migrate from the spot market 
to the ETF segment. We believe our research will be of particular interest for market 
regulators and policy makers as it will provide evidence on whether ETFs could 
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enhance the efficiency of the markets and contribute towards their completeness. In 
addition, there are important implications for the investment community; since the 
ETFs are efficiently priced and do not have any destabilizing effect on the spot prices, 
they can be used as a hedging tool on behalf of investors.   
The third research question we try to answer is whether institutional investors herd 
intentionally at the industry level. Institutional investors have been found to 
significantly herd when investing in industries [Voronkova and Bohl (2005), Choi and 
Sias (2009), Chen et al. (2012)], nevertheless the issue whether their herd behavior is 
driven by intent or not, at this level, has not been explored before. The only research, 
to our knowledge, so far to address this issue is that of Holmes et al. (2011) in the 
context of the Portuguese fund industry. However, the authors examined the 
interaction of herding with a series of market conditions at the aggregate market level. 
In our research, we expand this approach by testing whether fund managers herd 
intentionally at the industry level and by using both market and sector conditions, we 
identify whether it is the market or the sector conditions that affect this intent. To do 
so, we use quarterly portfolio holdings of Spanish mutual funds for the June 1995-
December 2008 period.  
Our thesis begins with a detailed literature review in Chapter 2 and the evolution from 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis to Behavioral Finance. In addition, we present in 
great detail the relevant theoretical and empirical work carried out for the concepts 
examined in this thesis, namely herding and feedback trading. 
In Chapter 3 we examine the relationship between style investing and herding in the 
context of a concentrated market, namely Portugal. We first start by discussing the 
relative literature that establishes the link between style investing and herding and 
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then elaborate on how market concentration can affect this relationship. The rationale 
behind this is that since high market concentration can produce different trading 
dynamics than those produced in large markets, this could have an impact over the 
relationship between style investing and herding. For example, in a concentrated 
market institutional investors can monitor their peers easier and as it is more likely 
that fund managers know each other, it will be more difficult for them to deviate from 
the market consensus [Do et al. (2008)]. Furthermore, since there are less investment 
options in a concentrated market than in less concentrated markets, then it could be 
more difficult for fund managers to apply investing styles. As such, given the above 
characteristics of the highly concentrated markets, style investing could have a limited 
impact over institutional herding. To test our hypothesis, we apply six different style 
indicators (analysts’ recommendations, market value (size), momentum, 
value/growth, volatility and volume) and will control for the merger of the Portuguese 
market into the Euronext platform. In addition, we control for the credit crisis that 
broke out in 2008 by breaking the post-Euronext period into pre and post crisis. The 
methodological approach we use for testing our hypothesis is that of Sias (2004) 
which directly tests the extent to which institutions follow each other over adjacent 
time periods.  Our results support our hypothesis that style investing is of limited 
importance to herding when it comes to highly concentrated markets. Particularly, we 
find that the institutional demand over time in the Portuguese market is primarily due 
to funds following the trades of others (herding) and its significance is not affected 
when we control for a series of investing styles. What is more, we find that style 
investing is not a common practice in highly concentrated markets and that it does not 
have any impact over the significance of herding among fund managers in such 
market environments. 
17 
 
What is next in chapter 4 is the examination of whether the introduction of ETFs had 
an impact over noise trading. We first begin with the discussion about the findings on 
noise trading, its sources and its primary candidates. Moving forward, we provide a 
detailed description of ETFs and their special characteristics that make them more 
appealing to rational or retail investors. To test our hypothesis we use the established 
methodology of Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) which assumes two types of traders, 
namely rational and feedback traders, into a span of developed markets (i.e. eight 
European markets). The rationale behind our research question is that if ETFs are 
more appealing to rational investors, this could have a beneficial role towards the 
improvement of market efficiency, depressing noise trading. On the other hand, if 
ETFs are more appealing to retail investors, this could possibly amplify noise trading; 
hence constituting a destabilizing factor for asset prices. Our results provide 
supporting evidence to the view that ETFs depress noise trading, since in the entire 
sample examined, the significance of feedback trading was found to dissipate after the 
launch of ETFs. What is more, the segment of ETFs appears to primarily be in the 
hands of rational investors. As such, since Exchange Traded Funds are less prone to 
noise trader risk, they can be more efficiently priced.  To that end, ETFs can promote 
efficiency in the spot markets they have been introduced to.  
In Chapter 5, we test whether institutional investors herd significantly at the industry 
level and whether this behavior is driven by intent or not, by examining the 
interaction of herding with a series of market and sector conditions (returns, volatility, 
volume, concentration of trading). Firstly we provide the theoretical background on 
the motivations that drive herding, be they intentional or unintentional; then we 
provide a description of the specific issues related to industry herding. In order to test 
our hypothesis, we use quarterly portfolio holdings from the Spanish fund industry for 
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the June 1995-September 2008 period and we apply the Sias (2004) methodology. 
The rationale behind our hypothesis is that if institutional investors herd intentionally 
at the industry level, then this would be reflected through differences in the 
significance of their herding across different market/sector conditions. On the other 
hand, if institutional investors’ herding at the industry level is not intentional, then 
difference in the market/sector conditions would have no impact over the significance 
of herding. Our results provide supporting evidence to the research of Holmes et al. 
(2011), who found that institutional investors herd intentionally at the market level, as 
this was reflected through differences in various market conditions examined; this 
herd behavior being driven by professional and informational reasons. In our case, our 
study takes a further step finding that fund managers intentionally industry herd in 
most of the sectors examined and this intent is affected by both market and sector 
conditions. 
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes our thesis by providing a summary of our findings, and it 
also outlines the implications these may have for the investment community and the 
regulatory authorities. 
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Chapter 2 
 
2.1 Introduction                   
 
Agora (Αγορά) in Ancient Greece was a place in which traders were exchanging ideas 
as well as products; in other words agora was the progenitor of today’s capital 
markets. Over the centuries, markets have kept developing and evolving. It was no 
earlier than in 1602 that the first official stock market was established in Amsterdam 
and the Dutch East India Company’s issuing of shares (the world’s first officially 
documented initial public offering) took place. The underlying exchanged assets in 
stock markets are securities, be they stocks, bonds, options or other complex financial 
products. However, the main issue arising among the stock market participants is how 
these securities should be priced. In other words, how can investors ensure that prices 
are reflective of their true value?  
A first attempt to address the above mentioned question was made by the 
“Neoclassical” school of thought. One of the buildings blocks of this approach 
postulated that securities’ prices “fully reflected” all available information. Moreover, 
if a security has a higher return than another it should bear a higher risk; security 
prices reflect the risk of the asset and their returns exhibit a positive relationship with 
it. Additionally, no excess returns or predictions regarding future returns of an asset 
could take place with the available information; prices should randomly change upon 
the arrival of new information. In other words, the trading decisions of investors are 
information-based, adjusting to changes of companies’ fundamentals. The other 
building block of the neoclassical approach postulated that investors were “rational”. 
Upon the arrival of new information, they adjust their decisions in a rational way, 
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following Bayes’ law. In case of any irrational actors being active, there were 
assumed to be other rational investors, known as “arbitrageurs”, who would restore 
balance and bring prices back to their fair value. So, either way, prices would always 
be “rationally” priced under the tenets of this approach.  
The problem with this approach, however, is that it relies heavily on the assumption 
of relative homogeneity in the market, with investors conjectured to be “rational”. 
This issue was picked up by researchers from the so-called behavioral finance camp 
which contrary to the neoclassical school, and based on tenets emanating from 
cognitive psychology, suggested that investors cannot be considered as consistently 
rational, thus throwing the purported homogeneity argument mentioned previously in 
doubt. 
To illustrate its argument, behavioral finance drew heavily upon findings from 
cognitive psychology related to heuristics and biases in human behavior. The term 
“heuristics” refers to rules of thumb employed by people when having to take 
decisions characterized by complexity of uncertainty. Biases are the obstacles that 
block people from correctly perceiving or interpreting information. Together, biases 
and heuristics imply a less-than-perfectly rational state for investors’ behavior and it 
is on their premises that behavioral finance research has hinged upon to develop its 
counter-position(s) to the rational paradigm. Put it simple, whereas the latter implied 
that investors were ad hoc “rational”, behavioral finance claims that rationality 
constitutes only one of multiple possible states of behavior; as Statman (1999) argued, 
people are “normal” rather than “rational”.  
Additionally, behavioral finance extended the study of human behavior from an 
individual’s perspective to the collective behavior of individuals in the market, and 
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tried to identify the outcomes stemming from their interaction. With investors viewed 
as being subject to psychological impediments (biases) and prone to using heuristics, 
the make-up of their ranks is expected to be anything but homogeneous, thus 
contributing further to the complexity of the market environment. The rationale 
behind this is based on the fact that investors differ among themselves with regards to 
numerous factors such as their level of education, risk preferences and information. 
Moreover, the depicted heuristics and biases that affect human behavior bear a 
differential impact on each investor individually. Thus, contrary to the rational 
paradigm where investors’ homogeneity pointed towards clearer anticipated 
outcomes, heterogeneity can give rise to multiple possible outcomes, not necessarily 
motivated through or characterized by rationality exclusively.      
Perhaps the two most widely researched modes of collective trading conduct in capital 
markets are herding and feedback trading. Herding occurs when investors blindly 
follow other investors’ actions, often disregarding their own informational sets. 
Feedback trading is associated with investors trying to succeed gains by riding on 
trends of stock prices. Feedback trading may be “positive”, where investors buy (sell) 
stocks when prices rise (fall) as well as “negative” where investors buy (sell) stocks 
when prices fall (rise). Both the above mentioned trading patterns can be motivated 
through rational as well as behavioral reasons and if their practice proliferates, they 
are capable of conferring a destabilizing effect, driving prices away from their 
fundamental values. Whether these patterns’ motivations and outcomes can best be 
explained through rational or behavioral interpretations constitutes the crux of this 
thesis and will preoccupy us in the next chapters.   
Before we expand on these two modes of behavioral conduct, we consider it prudent 
to begin from the roots underlying them as issues. In the next section of this chapter, 
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we therefore provide a critical comparison of the Neoclassical and Behavioral schools 
of thought in finance. More specifically, we analyze in depth the crux of the 
neoclassical approach, namely the efficient market hypothesis, and the challenges 
arisen against it. Later on, we elaborate on the arguments put forward by Behavioral 
Finance and the proposed models it suggested, as well as their shortcomings.    
 
2.2 From the Efficient Markets Hypothesis to Behavioral Finance 
The main pillar of the Neoclassical camp is considered to be the Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis (EMH hereafter), as coined by Fama (1970). According to it, asset prices 
“fully reflect” all information available and they change randomly over time upon the 
arrival of new information, adjusting to the new fundamentals. Therefore, they follow 
a random walk, as Samuelson (1965) stated in his “Random Walk Hypothesis”, and 
there are no patterns that investors can exploit in order to realize abnormal returns; in 
case any excess returns are indeed achieved, these should be attributed to luck or 
considered as compensation for the excess risk incurred. In other words, investors 
cannot “beat” the market (at least systematically). Furthermore, Fama (1970; 1991) 
suggested there existed a “joint hypothesis problem” according to which the 
efficiency of a market can only be tested in conjunction with a given capital asset 
pricing model, such as the CAPM of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Black (1972), 
thus drawing a line between the informational efficiency of asset prices and the 
predicting power of the asset pricing models. So, if asset prices do not represent the 
fundamental values, it is either due to market inefficiency or due to misspecification 
of the asset pricing model. The assumptions underlying EMH were the absence of 
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transaction and informational costs in the market, as well as the homogeneity of 
markets’ agents in terms of rationality. 
Rationality is the other pillar of the neoclassical approach to finance. It implies that 
upon the arrival of new information in the market, investors make decisions following 
the Bayes’ law and their choices made are in accordance to Subjective Expected 
Utility [Barberis and Thaler (2003)]. The later implies that when people make 
decisions under uncertainty, they choose the one whose outcome has the greatest 
subjectively expected utility. Yet, although rationality is considered to be granted, this 
does not necessarily mean that all investors act rationally. There can be cases where 
investors overreact or under-react to news’ arrival; however, these irrational acts take 
place randomly and cancel each other in the long run (Fama, 1998).  
Moreover, in case any investors engage in irrational actions, there are always assumed 
to be rational investors in the market ready to intervene, arbitrage away the mispricing 
and force prices back to their intrinsic value. The role of arbitrage in maintaining 
prices in line with fundamentals can best be shown through the following example. 
Suppose that the price, representing the fundamental value, of company A is £50. A 
group of investors, acting irrationally, presumes that this company will not perform 
well in the future and start selling their shares pushing the price down to £35. Then 
arbitrageurs, identifying the mispricing of the stock and the opportunity to make 
profit, will buy stocks of company A and at the same time hedge their bets by going 
short on a company (call it company B) with characteristics similar to those of 
company A. So at the end, the buying interest from the arbitrageurs will drive the 
price of company A back to the fundamental value of £50. 
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Fama (1970) suggested that there are three forms of market efficiency and various 
tests have been carried out in order to confirm the EMH. To begin with, there is the 
weak form according to which, all past price movements are reflected in securities’ 
prices and investors cannot gain excess returns (higher than those predicted by an 
asset pricing model) through technical analysis, i.e. past information. In order to test 
for the weak form of market efficiency, studies using technical analysis were 
employed. More specifically, researches such as those of  Fama and Blume (1966), 
Seelenfreund et al. (1968) and James (1968) examined whether investors using 
trading rules based on past stock prices could gain higher profits than randomly 
chosen stocks. Their results could not provide any evidence that the use of historical 
prices could offer investors any higher profits. Therefore, these tests proved to be in 
favor of the weak form of market efficiency.  
The semi-strong form, according to which, all public information about companies is 
reflected on their prices and investors cannot obtain excess returns using fundamental 
analysis, i.e. past and present information. Event studies have been carried out to test 
the semi-strong from of market efficiency. These studies test how fast new 
information is incorporated in prices. Ball and Brown (1968) examined the impact of 
earnings announcements and Fama et al. (1969) examined the impact of stock splits 
on stock prices. They found that the announcement of stock splits had a positive 
impact on stock prices and more interestingly found evidence that the anticipation of 
the stock split was two years before the actual split of the stock.  Furthermore, 
Johnson et al. (1985) found that the sudden death of a company’s CEO had a negative 
and prompt impact on the stock price of the company. 
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Finally, the strong form of market efficiency states that stock prices reflect all 
available information, be that public or private, and investors cannot enjoy any 
abnormal gains even if they possess inside information. In order to test for the strong 
form of market efficiency, tests on the performance of professional fund managers 
have been carried out, such as that of Jensen (1968). He argued that, after taking into 
consideration the transaction costs, fund managers did not enjoy any particularly high 
excess returns, thus providing evidence in favor of the EMH.  
However after the mid-1970s, there appeared a surge in research challenging the 
EMH and its supporting evidence. More specifically, many researchers found that 
stock prices tended to exhibit some patterns that could not be explained by the then 
established asset pricing models, arguing that their presence indicated either that 
markets were inefficient or the models used were misspecified. These patterns were 
dubbed as “anomalies”. One of the best documented anomalies is the size effect, 
which purports that smaller capitalization firms tend to outperform larger ones. 
Among the first researches about this anomaly was that of Banz (1981), who, upon 
examining the relationship between the return and the market value of common stocks 
in NYSE for the period 1926-1975, showed that smaller firms recorded higher returns 
than those predicted by the CAPM. Moreover, his empirical results showed that a 
portfolio consisting of small firms outperformed a portfolio of larger firms. The initial 
findings of Banz (1981) were later confirmed by evidence produced by Reinganum 
(1981), Keim (1983) and Lamoureux and Sanger (1989) to mention only a few. The 
two most likely explanations given by researchers regarding the size effect are the 
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tax-loss hypothesis
1
 [Keim (1983), Reinganum (1983)] and the higher transaction 
costs
2
 for small firms [Stoll and Whaley (1983), Schultz (1983)]. 
A particular subset of anomalies came to be known as “seasonal” (or “calendar”) 
anomalies, with seasonality here taken to imply the regular presence of abnormal 
returns during specific periods of time.  However, since their identification, more and 
more investors have been trying to exploit them, thus resulting in these anomalies’ 
gradual decay over the years. The best known calendar anomaly is the January effect, 
first documented by Wachtel (1942). The underlying theory of this anomaly as its 
name suggests, is that stocks tend to exhibit higher returns in January compared to the 
other months of the year. There have been quite a few researches providing evidence 
in support of this market anomaly, namely these of Rozeff and Kinney (1976), Keim 
(1983), Reinganum (1983) and Roll (1983). Some of the possible explanations 
proposed for the existence of the January seasonal are the tax-loss hypothesis 
[Reinganum (1983), Roll (1983) and Ritter (1988)], the expansionary phase of the 
business cycles
3
 [Kramer (1994)], window-dressing
4
 [Haugen and Lakonishok 
(1987)] and the higher volume in markets during January
5
 [Ligon (1997)]. 
                                                          
1
 The size effect was related to a January seasonal and the tax-loss hypothesis states that due to 
income tax reasons, investors sell their stocks in order to exhibit capital losses. Thus stock prices fall 
during December and recover at the beginning of January. 
2
 Transaction costs beard by investors are usually higher in small stocks because as the latter being 
low priced stocks their liquidity is higher and investors must trade more often in them in order to 
achieve a gain. Additionally, it is more costly to gain information or monitor small firms in relation to 
larger ones. 
3
 This hypothesis states that the January effect was found to exist during the expansionary phases of 
economy’s business cycles, whereas during the contraction phases it was undetectable. 
4
 Window-dressing hypothesis suggests that the January effect is caused by professionals’ portfolio 
rebalancing in order to influence their performance based remuneration. Thus, professionals want to 
lock on their profits and sell their risky assets at the end of the year, buying again at the beginning of 
the year. 
5
 Usually, there is high liquidity in the market at the first days of January (people get their bonuses, 
pension contributions, etc.), thus people intend to trade more during these days. 
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Similar calendar anomalies were identified through the 1980s, including the weekend 
effect [French (1980)], according to which stock returns were found to be lower from 
Fridays through Mondays. This phenomenon was attributed to the fact that people 
tend to be in better mood in Fridays than in Mondays [Keim and Stambaugh (1984)]. 
Additionally, the holiday effect [Ariel (1990)] implies that stock returns are higher 
prior to holidays, due to the better mood people enjoy before leaving for holidays. 
Finally, another calendar anomaly documented is the intraday effect [Smirlock and 
Starks (1986), Harris (1986)] according to which stocks tend to have abnormally 
higher returns in specific time intervals during the trading day. 
Further market anomalies that have been identified over the years are the value effect 
and the IPO effect. The first one indicates that stocks with high price in relation to 
earnings, dividends, book value or other measures of value give abnormal higher 
returns. It was firstly identified by Basu (1983) and supporting evidence was found by 
Fama and French (1992) and Lakonishok et al. (1994). The authors suggested that this 
phenomenon could be attributed to the fact that investors pay too much attention into 
glamour stocks in relation to value stocks. Finally, the IPO effect, firstly introduced 
by Ritter (1991) and supported by Loughran and Ritter (1995), suggests that Initial 
Public Offerings are underperforming in the short run and this could be due to the 
high expectations investors have about the perspectives of the newly issued 
companies.  
The discovery of market anomalies during the 1980s was the first major challenge to 
the EMH, since these stock price patterns could not be predicted by an asset pricing 
model. Yet, although predictability is not the key assumption of the EMH, market 
anomalies acted as the kick start for a voluminous research that questioned the 
assumption of investors’ homogeneous rationality, the key assumption of EMH. A lot 
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of research that culminated in what came to be known later as Behavioral Finance, 
started drawing upon issues from cognitive psychology in order to support their 
argument that human behavior cannot be considered as strictly rational [recall the 
statement of Statman (1999); people are “normal”, rather than “rational” (p.20)]. 
Psychological impediments (“biases”) that greatly influence the behavior of humans 
and help them deviate from rational judgments have been documented. However, 
these biases which will be discussed shortly do not affect all people and if they do, 
they do not affect them at the same level; thus people, in our case investors, differ 
relative to each other in the way of perceiving, interpreting information and making 
investment decisions. The latter essentially poses a strong challenge to the first pillar 
of behavioral finance: neither can the market be considered strictly homogeneous, nor 
investors strictly rational. 
One of the biases that have been found to affect human behavior is conservatism 
[Edwards (1968)]. This phenomenon implies that people tend to react very slowly on 
newly arrived information. As an example, consider an investor who has invested into 
the shares of company A, the latter having been quite profitable for the last four years. 
Suppose that in the last quarter the earnings announcements of company A are 
negative; then the investor might disregard this news when updating his beliefs since 
his chosen investment performed quite well during the past years and decides to hold 
onto the stocks. Now, imagine that in the next quarter the company still has negative 
results; then the investor starts reassessing his beliefs, thinking whether it might be 
better for him to sell his stocks or not. It is this late reaction to new information that 
causes the conservatism bias.  
Another important bias affecting human behavior is the overconfidence bias. Investors 
tend to be very optimistic about their decisions and think very highly of their 
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investing skills; as a result overconfident investors trade more and more, increasing 
both market volatility and trading volume [Gervais and Odean (2001)] which often 
leads them to endure severe losses.  Hirshleifer (2001) relates overconfidence to two 
other biases, self-attribution (which posits that investors attribute all the successful 
decisions on their own skills whereas any negative results that might come up are 
attributed to bad luck or other factors [Daniel et al. (1998)]), and self-deception 
(which argues that people tend to think that they are better than they really are 
[Trivers (1991)]).   
The disposition effect, firstly mentioned by Shefrin and Statman (1985) and 
empirically supported by Odean (1998) and Weber and Camerer (1998), describes the 
phenomenon where investors are reluctant to sell past losers and more willing to sell 
recent winners. In fact the opposite should be the case: if investors invested in the 
wrong stock they should let it go and keep their right choices. A possible explanation 
of this effect lies in the belief that investors do not want to admit that they made a 
wrong decision; thus they keep holding their losing stocks, whereas when they sell 
their winners they can show to others that they are successful and picked the “right” 
stocks. 
The presence of these biases and the heterogeneity of investors increase the 
complexity of the market. To make sense of such a complex environment, investors 
resort to mental tools, or else rules of thumb, known as heuristics. Research on the 
latter was largely motivated through the findings from earlier psychological 
experiments conducted by Tversky and Kahneman (1974). By conducting 
experiments, the two scientists found that the existence of certain biases and heuristics 
leads human behavior to deviate from rationality. More specifically, they mentioned 
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three heuristics, namely representativeness, availability, and adjustment from 
anchoring.  
The representativeness heuristic drives investors’ decision-making merely based on 
the description of an event or the most recent information they posses about it, rather 
than acting according to the principles of statistical science; as Kahneman and 
Tversky (1973) posit “people predict the outcome that appears more representative 
of the evidence”. Moreover, it can lead to several biases in human behavior such as 
the base rate neglect, or base rate fallacy. The latter occurs when people underweight 
the probability of the base rate when calculating the conditional probability of an 
event, given a representative statement. An example of the above could be depicted 
from the work of Tversky and Kahneman (1983) and goes as follows: “Bill is 34 
years old. He is intelligent, but unimaginative, compulsive, and generally lifeless. In 
school, he was strong in mathematics but weak in social studies and humanities.” 
When the persons involved in the experiment were asked to rank the following 
statements A: “Bill plays Jazz for a hobby” and B: “Bill is an accountant who plays 
Jazz for a hobby” they ranked statement B higher than statement A, even though B 
constitutes a subset of A. The explanation underlying the outcome was that since the 
description given was more representative of an accountant, the subjects over 
weighted the description (representativeness) and underweighted the base rate which 
was statement A; statistically speaking it is more possible for a man to play Jazz than 
being an accountant and playing Jazz.  
Another bias that can be caused from representativeness is the sample size neglect 
which implies that people tend not to take into consideration the size of the samples 
compared when evaluating different datasets and their outcomes (“law of small 
numbers”). [Tversky and Kahneman (1971)] stated that people often regard a small 
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sample of a population to be equally representative and more reliable compared to a 
larger sample of the same population. Related to the latter, two other phenomena have 
been identified known as the “gambler’s fallacy” and the “hot hands” phenomena 
which will be explained through some examples. The first one can be seen when a 
gambler is betting in a casino’s roulette; if the outcomes were eight reds in a row, then 
the gambler will most likely think that black will be next, in order to balance the large 
number of reds. The second example draws from sports, where if a basketball player 
scores five shots in a row, the fans will believe that this player is in a good shape and 
will score again. A similar example drawing from financial markets: if a company has 
been performing well the last three years it is highly likely that investors believe it 
will continue to do so during the fourth year also; thus this effect can create some 
trends in stock prices.  
The availability heuristic suggests that people tend to perceive more recent and salient 
events as more probable to occur than others; people may perceive the danger of a 
nuclear accident higher after the recent (2011) catastrophe in Japan. The third 
heuristic underlined by Tversky and Kahneman (1974)  is the adjustment from 
anchoring. According to it, people when making decisions usually have some starting 
points, (“anchors”), which they adjust over time upon arrival of new information, 
though most of the times this adjustment is insufficient due to the heavy reliance 
people exhibit on the starting point. 
The main issue arising from financial research at that point is how investors make 
their decisions under uncertainty. EMH posits that they follow Bayes’ law and 
maximize their expected utility [Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)]. However, 
the behavioral camp, drawing again upon the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
and their famous prospect theory, argued that investors do not always make decisions 
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under the Expected Utility (EU hereafter) Maximization theory. The prospect theory 
suggested that people, when making risky decisions, depend heavily on gains and 
losses in terms of some reference points, rather than final wealth levels as the EU 
theory suggested.  Moreover, what differentiates prospect theory from EU is the shape 
of the utility function which in the case of prospect theory varies according to whether 
it lies in the domain of gains or losses. As the authors argued, this loss aversion shows 
that people are more risk averse when they deal with gains and more risk seeking 
when dealing with losses. The advantage of prospect theory is that it appears more 
realistic in real life than the Expected Utility Theory. Accordingly, many researchers 
provided supporting evidence in favor of the prospect theory. For instance, Barberis et 
al. (2001) incorporating prospect theory’s loss aversion in their model were able to 
explain the high volatility and the high mean of stock returns as well as their 
predictability. 
The identification of the role of psychology in investing and the high complexity of 
the market gave birth to a novel type of investor, known as the “noise” trader. 
Contrary to the EMH which stated that investors trade on fundamentals, Black (1986) 
defined noise trading as the behavior of investors trading on non-fundamental 
information, or information they think is relative but in fact is not; as the author stated 
“people sometimes trade on noise as if it were information”. In addition, Barber et al. 
(2009) went one step further by identifying noise traders with retail investors, stating 
that it is their trading that increases liquidity and makes markets possible. However, 
noise traders, by trading not only on fundamentals, cause certain mispricing on stock 
prices; this mispricing is to be corrected by the ‘informed traders” (arbitrageurs) who 
intervene in the market to exploit the mispricing and profit from it. 
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This is where the second pillar of Behavioral Finance comes in; in the presence of 
noise traders, there are certain limits to arbitrage, the latter being neither unlimited nor 
riskless. If we recall from EMH, arbitrageurs appear to be strictly rational and in case 
of any mispricing will drive prices back to their fundamental values; however, as we 
will see below, rational investors may not always be able or willing to do so. The 
concept of “noise trader risk” was first coined by De Long et al. (1990b) who 
illustrated it through the following example: supposedly some irrational investors are 
very pessimistic about a stock; then the arbitrageurs come into the market and buy the 
stock in order to take advantage of the mispricing. However, in case the irrational 
investors feel even more pessimistic, they drive the price even lower; then the 
arbitrageurs suffer a loss if they must sell the stock before its price regains its fair 
value. In other words, it is the risk of further destabilization by noise traders that 
motivates the noise trader risk. If the arbitrageurs have a short run investment horizon 
it might be in their best interest not to intervene in certain mispricing acts. Further 
supporting evidence was provided by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) who introduced 
another dimension of arbitrage, presenting it as a principal-agent issue. Usually 
arbitrageurs are a small group of highly skilled, informed professionals who manage 
other people’s money (e.g. fund managers). If their assessment is based on their 
performance, they might be reluctant to undertake additional risk in order to exploit 
an extreme mispricing. So, it might not always be the case that arbitrageurs will drive 
prices back to efficient levels; such an action can often entail a high level of risk that 
is not in the arbitrageurs’ best interest to undertake.  
With investors therefore being subject to psychological forces (biases; heuristics) and 
mispricing not always readily tackled by rational traders, the possibility of 
disproportionate reaction to news cannot be ruled out. Two ways this can be 
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manifested through are overreaction and under reaction. More specifically, 
overreaction occurs when the reaction of stock prices upon the arrival of new 
information is higher than normal, leading them to deviate from their true values but 
gradually reverting to them at a later stage; overreaction is linked with negative 
autocorrelation in stock returns. The phenomenon was first identified by DeBondt and 
Thaler (1985) whose empirical findings showed that a portfolio of prior losers 
outperformed a portfolio of prior winners by almost 25%. As a primary source of 
overreaction the authors proposed the representativeness heuristic, which leads 
investors to overweight recent news; for example stocks with a record of good news 
tend to be overvalued upon news arrival, though they gradually revert to their true 
value. A way of exploiting this pattern is the use of contrarian trading strategies. The 
latter suggest that investors could gain abnormal returns by investing in prior losers 
and selling prior winners. Supporting evidence for the profitability of such strategies 
are provided, among others, by DeBondt and Thaler (1987) and Antoniou et al. 
(2005). In accordance with overreaction, under reaction implies that stock prices do 
not react as much as they should upon the arrival of new information; and is linked to 
positive autocorrelation in stock returns. Again, in line with overreaction’s possible 
explanations, concepts from cognitive psychology were employed by researchers to 
explain the under reaction hypothesis; particularly, the conservatism bias and the 
anchoring heuristic. Given these concepts, investors rely heavily on past news or past 
performance and they do not adapt their judgments following the new information 
arriving. A trading strategy aiming at exploiting this pattern is the so called 
“momentum” strategy; that is buying previous winners and selling prior losers. 
Evidence in favor of this strategy is provided, among others, by Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) and Galariotis et al. (2007). The above mentioned evidence constitutes a 
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challenge to the EMH since investors, by using strategies based on stocks’ past 
performance, can enjoy abnormal returns. Supporters of the behavioral camp came 
along with proposed models that were able to explain investors’ overreaction and 
under reaction; notably Barberis et al. (1998) and Daniel et al. (1998). 
From the side of the neoclassical theory’s supporters, Fama (1998) argued that in an 
efficient market there will be events where prices sometimes overreact and sometimes 
under react to; however these events cancel each other out when randomly split in 
favor of EMH. Moreover, he argued that most of the “market anomalies” found by 
other researchers are due to misspecification of the model used and when a better 
methodology is applied these anomalies disappear. Particularly, he supported the view 
that a model which includes more risk factors than the CAPM, such as that of Fama 
and French (1993), could explain many of the reported patterns in stock prices. 
Furthermore, he referred to the importance of the statistical methods used on 
measuring stock returns, i.e. return metrics, and that these different methods can 
provide different results (Average Abnormal Returns vs. Buy and Hold Average 
Returns, Equal Weight Returns vs. Value Weight Returns, etc.). Finally, he attacked 
the behavioral models of Barberis et al. (1998) and Daniel et al. (1998) on the 
grounds that these models explain only the anomalies which they were designed to 
explain and otherwise perform poorly when trying to explain other anomalies. 
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2.3 Herding Behavior 
2.3.1 Historical Overview 
Herding behavior, also known as “crowd behavior”, mainly prompts to the behavior 
of animals which are very often presented in nature in the form of herds; they 
relocate, hunt and eat in a collective way. However even in the very early humans’ 
organized societies, such as in ancient Athens, the power of controlling large amounts 
of people and manipulating their thoughts has been well documented; as the great 
ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle said “man is by nature a social animal”, pointing 
out the need of people to interact and observe each other. 
At the end of the 19
th
 century, the French psychologist and sociologist Gustave Le 
Bon (1895) studied the psychology of crowds and reached up to some very interesting 
conclusions. According to him, there are three characteristics attributed to people 
when these become members of a crowd; absence of responsibility, contagion and 
suggestibility. The first one implies that when an individual becomes part of a crowd, 
the feeling of responsibility that controls the behavior of an individual disappears; as a 
result, being a member of a crowd, the individual makes actions he would otherwise 
not have chosen to. Secondly, contagion implies that an individual when being a part 
of a crowd disregards his personal beliefs and interests and adapts to those of the 
crowd; the formed belief of the crowd spreads contagiously among its members. 
Thirdly, suggestibility implies that the crowd induces some characteristics into its 
members; otherwise the latter would not have as individuals and very often these 
characteristics may be contrary to their interest. 
Herding is said to be one of the main causes for the creation of bubbles in the 
markets; Galbraith (1994) mentioned four cases of economic bubbles where herding 
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behavior played a significant role into their creation. The first one was the “tulip 
mania”, one of the first “bubbles” in economic history, which took place in the 
Netherlands in 1637; the mania of people regarding tulip bulbs skyrocketed their 
contract prices in the first place before seeing them eventually collapsing. The second 
case, the South Seas’ bubble, took place in England in 1720 and was about a joint 
stock company that gained the monopoly of trading between England and its South 
American colonies in return for accumulating the debt of England created during the 
war; extreme speculation on the stock of the company raised its price to extremely 
high levels before also seeing it collapsing causing severe losses to its shareholders. 
Thirdly it was the Mississippi bubble which burst in 1720 as well. Speculation on the 
stock of the Mississippi Company led the company to spread its profits to its 
shareholders in forms of paper money. However, the excess supply of banknotes in 
relation to the gold and silver reserves led to the sharp decrease of the stock price.  
Last but not least was the famous crash in 1929 where the economic euphoria of the 
previous years had lead to an enormous rise in stock market prices; the latter sharply 
dropped, driving many investors to insanity and poverty. 
 
2.3.2 Definition and Sources of Herding 
As we discussed in the previous section, individuals, when becoming members of a 
crowd, change their attitude and often act completely differently than they would if 
they were to act individually; the driving factors of this phenomenon are the 
interaction and observation among members of a society. The phenomenon of herding 
in financial markets has been well documented over the years; financial markets are 
places where investors interact and observe each other. Moreover, investors are 
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overwhelmed with large amounts of information regarding companies, stock markets 
and other investors’ decisions that can easily mislead or manipulate them and follow 
wrong trading strategies. According to Hwang and Salmon (2004), “herding arises 
when investors decide to imitate the observed decisions of others or movements in the 
market rather than follow their own beliefs and information”. There are two different 
kinds of herding, spurious and intentional [Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001)]. The 
first one implies that investors act in the same way not because of imitation of each 
other but because of the common beliefs they have upon certain events or 
information, i.e. a decrease in interest rates will make deposits less attractive and 
investors will prefer investing their money in stock markets. In this case investors are 
sharing common information about an event which leads to a certain behavior; the 
latter can be considered as expected. On the contrary, what grabbed the attention of 
researchers was investors’ intentional imitation of other investors’ actions; in this 
case, investors often disregard their own beliefs and information and copy the actions 
of other investors. The possible explanations of this behavior span across a variety of 
factors ranging from behavioral to informational and agency ones among others. 
As behavioral finance theory posits, investors’ behavior is to a large extent influenced 
by certain psychological biases and heuristics. Prast (2000) suggested, for example, 
that herd behavior is highly related with cognitive dissonance; the latter defined by 
Festinger (1957) as “Two cognitive elements are in a dissonant relation if, considering 
these two alone, the obverse of one element follows from the other”. In a financial 
markets’ context, cognitive dissonance could explain the imitating behavior of 
investors since the latter feel more comfortable when they know that other investors 
have made the same choices as they did; thus they herd on their peers’ previous 
behavior and, if the choices made were wrong, they prefer belonging to a group that 
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did the same mistake rather than being alone.  Additionally, Prast (2000) suggested 
congruity as a bias inducing herding in investors’ behavior. Congruity implies that 
investors react to new information in a biased way; if the new information arrived is 
not in line with investors’ previous beliefs about the information source (this could be 
a fund manager or an analyst), investors either adjust their decisions towards the 
information source or the new information itself. Practically, it could be the case that 
an analyst who made good picks in the past, will keep doing so disregarding new 
information that would allow him to deviate from his previous choices; a deviating 
bad choice has a higher cost to the analyst rather than a choice similar to those that 
performed well in the past, and eventually did not.  
One of the most important aspects of herding is the contagion of investors’ behavior 
and decisions; this contagion is often driven by the contagion of media information 
and the beliefs of other investors. As such, investors feel more comfortable when  
observing others and performing the same actions as they do; Hirshleifer (2001) 
described this phenomenon as conformity. Moreover, a key characteristic of crowd 
members is their slow adaptation towards newly arriving information; this 
phenomenon known as the conservatism bias
6
 is not met only in herding but in other 
behaviorally driven patterns of investors such as that of under reaction [Barberis et al. 
(1998)]. Barberis et al. (1998) also suggested the representativeness heuristic
7
 as a 
driving factor for investors’ behavioral patterns; this heuristic can induce herding in 
investors’ behavior when they extrapolate from limited and recent events to imagine 
patterns that do not exist. What is more, Feng and Seasholes (2004) suggested that 
investors tend to be more willing to invest into familiar companies in terms of 
geographical location providing evidence in support of the home bias; the latter can 
                                                          
6
 Recall our discussion and the example given in the previous section. 
7
 Recall again this heuristic’s detailed description in the previous section. 
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affect investors’ behavior and drive them  into similar decisions. Conducting their 
research using data from China, the authors came up with some interesting findings 
regarding the link of location and correlated trading. Firstly, correlation among 
investors’ trading is more significant when investors are in same location. Secondly, 
they identify an information asymmetry among investors with those of living closer to 
a firm’s headquarter being able to receive more accurate information regarding the 
company. Concluding, the authors pointed out the importance of public information 
upon investors’ decisions and suggested that more weight should be given on it when 
explaining the trading actions of investors.  
Herd behavior can also be driven by the rumor-heuristic [Buckner (1965)]. Investors, 
through their interaction with others or through media coverage, are very often 
affected by rumors, the latter in most of the cases being inaccurate. Individual 
investors are usually more vulnerable to rumors, especially during crises when panic 
prevails, whereas professionals being better informed often take advantage (or even 
spread) the rumors and realize gains from them [Schindler (2007)]; there has been 
much criticism on hedge funds’ speculative actions and their destabilizing role in the 
markets [Fung and Hsieh (2000)]. Finally, there is the phenomenon of limited 
attention in which investors even though they are exposed to a large amount of 
information, they pay attention to the more familiar and salient events. Particularly, 
they tend to overweight certain factors when making investment decisions, such as an 
analyst’s fame, and ignore other more important information [Daniel et al. (2002), 
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003)].    
In the highly competitive context of financial markets, information is most probably 
the most important ingredient for a successful investment; though many times the 
gathering of accurate information is both time- and money-consuming for investors. 
41 
 
The latter, particularly those who do not possess sufficient information, may choose to 
copy the decisions of other investors who are considered to be better informed. 
Moreover, even investors who do hold their own informational sets often prefer to 
follow other investors when they feel these have better information than theirs. The 
choice of investors to free-ride on other investors’ decisions eventually leads to a 
pattern of correlated trading among investors. Researchers have identified this 
informational asymmetry among investors as a possible source for herd behavior and 
defined it as informational cascading. An informational cascade occurs when an 
investor decides to disregard his own informational set and trade based on other 
investors’ informational sets, the latter reflected through their actions. However, 
informational cascades often play a negative role towards market efficiency. As we 
already discussed previously, in an efficient market, prices reflect all available 
information. But since investors ignore their own information, this is not reflected 
neither on their actions, nor on asset prices. As Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) posited, 
this phenomenon causes information blockages since not all investors’ information is 
conveyed to the market. To better understand how informational cascades work let us 
provide an example of the real world, as mentioned by Banerjee (1992). Suppose 
there are two restaurants next to each other, namely A and B, and one hundred 
persons as possible clients awaiting to dine. Ninety nine of them have an information 
signal that restaurant B is better than restaurant A and only one’s signal indicates the 
opposite. However, let us suppose that this person gets to arrive first and walks into 
restaurant A as his signal suggests. The second person arriving will face a dilemma; 
on the one hand lies the informational signal of the first person suggesting restaurant 
A being better and on the other hand there is his own signal of preferring restaurant B. 
These two signals eventually cancel each other out and the rational choice for the 
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second person would be to choose restaurant B. Now up to this point only the 
information of the first person is conveyed to the population; the second person 
decided to disregard his own informational set and follow the signal of the first 
person. The arrival of the third person will end up into the same outcome of the 
second person. Not knowing that the second person ignored his own signal, he will 
assume that both previous persons had a signal that restaurant A is better than B. 
Consequently, he will also end up having his dinner at restaurant A. In the end, 
everyone will end up at restaurant A event though the aggregate information of the 
population suggests that restaurant B is better. This example is reflective of how 
informational cascades work and the informational blockages that arise in the 
population. As illustrated, at the end only the signal of the first person is aggregated in 
the population, whereas the signals of the other persons are kept hidden. Imagine now, 
that the second person follows his own signal and chooses restaurant B. Upon the 
arrival of the third person both informational sets of the previous persons are 
aggregated in the population. In this case it is certain that the third person would end 
up in restaurant B since his signal would coincide with that of the second person and 
in the same way the remaining of the persons would choose restaurant B. 
Summarizing with this example, the key person is the second one; if he decides to 
follow his own signal and share his information with the rest of population, the latter 
will also use their own signals. Otherwise if the second person ignores his own signal, 
an informational cascade arises and a herd is created. 
It is worth trying to understand why these informational cascades occur among 
investors. Firstly, it might be the case that an investor simply knows his information is 
not accurate or good enough and free rides on others’ information which he perceives 
as better. Welch (2000) found that the recommendation of an analyst affects the next 
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two analysts’ recommendations. Furthermore, he suggests that the lower information 
aggregation and the higher level of herding that prevail in bullish markets make the 
later more vulnerable to crashes (increased euphoria in the markets eventually leads to 
sudden drops in prices). Secondly, it might be too costly to gain accurate information 
rather than to just follow what others do, which is costless.  Calvo and Mendoza 
(1997), Calvo and Mendoza (2000) studying investors’ diversification, found that it is 
less costly for them to “herd” on other investors’ decisions than acquiring their own 
information. In their argument, the researchers used the example of the Mexican crisis 
in 1994 where similar countries as Mexico such as Chile, Brazil, etc. were severely 
impacted by investors’ herd behavior. More specifically, investors instead of studying 
each country’s specific characteristics and fundamentals, they simply assumed that 
countries similar to Mexico, i.e. Latin countries, would follow; as a result after the 
sharp devaluation of the Mexican peso, the currencies of these countries were also 
devaluated. Alike then, someone could identify a similar case in the very recent 
European debt crisis. Following Greece’s entrance to the European stability 
mechanism (ESM hereafter) and the international monetary fund (IMF hereafter) 
investors assumed that all south European countries would follow this path. The result 
was the spreads of all South European countries had a huge increase and eventually 
lead some other members of the E.U., namely Ireland and Portugal, into the ESM. 
The intuition behind this is that investors’ actions were driven by imitating each other 
rather than by examining each country’s specific characteristics.  
Apart from the informational reasons underlying herd behavior, an important role to 
the formation of this behavior is played by the principal-agency problem between the 
market professionals (fund managers) and their employers (asset management 
companies). Relative research, supporting the source of professional reasons 
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regarding herd behavior, suggests that fund managers may be reluctant to deviate 
from the market consensus in order to protect their own interests, even though this 
reluctance is against their clients’ best interest. More specifically, it is very often the 
case that investment managers are evaluated according to their performance; the latter 
measured in comparison to the performance of their peers. If the fund manager 
realizes some losses which are shared with the rest of the market, then “bad luck” or 
other factors can be blamed by him. Thus, it seems more secure for some 
professionals not to deviate from the market consensus, even though their private 
information indicates they should. To make it clearer, as Scharfstein and Stein (1990) 
suggested, it might be the case that less capable managers often copy the decisions of 
their peers considered as “good” in order to update their status to those of the “good” 
ones. The “good” professionals, in turn, may also herd in order to protect their high 
status; as mentioned previously following the market trend is safer than deviating 
from it since the impact of a possible loss when acting alone is higher than the gain 
deriving from it. 
Similarly, an additional source of herd behavior is also considered to be reputational 
reasons. In their seminal paper, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) stated that professionals 
often ignore their own information and copy each other due to reputational reasons. 
To make their argument clearer, the provided an example referring to the bull market 
during the mid 1980’s. Back then, the majority of the fund managers believed that 
stock prices were already too high and that the market’s chances to go down were 
substantially more than those of going up. Nevertheless, very few of these 
professionals were willing to sell their stocks because of the small chance of the 
prices going up and be let alone missing the ride; as the researchers suggested, 
professionals are willing to realize losses if the rest of their peers do the same than 
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being the ones who might lose a possible ride on prices. Evidence in support to the 
previous statement was provided by Graham (1999) who showed that analysts are 
more than willing to sacrifice some future gains in order to protect their reputation. As 
Welch (2000) posits, analysts are significantly influenced by each other and herd, 
especially during upwards markets, towards the market consensus. In addition, 
Trueman (1994) examining analysts’ forecasts found that analysts herd in their 
estimates about future returns and this could be due to reputational incentives 
implying that it is better for them to make forecasts that meet the market’s prior 
beliefs and expectations. This behavior creates a bias on analysts’ forecasts affecting 
the price changes upon earnings announcements.     
Contrary to the assumption of the behavioral finance camp regarding investors’ 
heterogeneity in terms of rationality, another interesting opinion regarding the 
possible sources of herd behavior is considered to be the relative homogeneity of the 
investors. However, the homogeneity implied by this view regards the professional 
investors, i.e. fund managers. The latter share some common characteristics that may 
lead them to a convergent behavior. Let us take for example the investment 
professionals, the majority of them being graduates of business schools; they have 
been taught to evaluate investment opportunities in a similar way or to use the same 
tools and techniques in order to apply their trading strategies. In addition, as 
mentioned before, fund manager’s performance-based compensations may drive them 
to act in the same way.  
Another view that regards professionals again is that the latter often prefer to trade on 
stocks with certain characteristics; this phenomenon is known as “characteristic 
herding”. More specifically, this view supports that investors are attracted by stocks 
with certain features such as size, industry or past performance [Falkenstein (1996)]. 
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Holmes et al. (2011) suggested that the last two sources of herding described above 
are related to unintentional herding, in the sense that they give rise to parallel 
behaviour, yet not due to intent. 
 
2.3.3 Empirical Findings on Herding 
Research on herd behavior can be divided into two areas. On the one hand is the 
research area examining herding using micro-level data (using portfolio accounts e.g. 
of mutual funds or individual investors) and on the other hand is the area examining 
herd behavior at the aggregate market level (using aggregate indicators, such as 
prices). Starting with the first one, the seminal paper was that of Lakonishok et al. 
(1992) examining the behavior of institutional investors, in terms of herding, and its 
impact upon stock prices. More specifically, the researchers applied their own 
methodology (LSV) using quarterly data from 1985 till 1989 from 769 US tax-exempt 
funds (mainly pension funds), the latter managed by 341 fund managers. Their 
findings indicated some evidence of herding in small capitalization stocks whereas in 
larger stocks (which accounted for 95% of the stocks traded by pension funds) the 
level of herding was significantly lower. Similarly, Grinblatt et al. (1995) also 
examined the US fund market and found evidence in support of herd behavior’s 
existence in that market. Particularly, their sample consisted of quarterly data for 155 
mutual funds for the period between 1974 and 1984. In addition to the presence of 
herding, the researchers also found evidence of momentum trading from the fund 
managers. Moreover, herding was predominantly stronger in growth and income 
funds; this implies that growth funds hold limited information about their stocks, the 
latter being relatively small, and as such they have more incentives to herd. Similarly, 
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income funds demonstrate a tendency to hold large stocks (value stocks); as such they 
tend to herd on that kind of stocks.  
Wermers (1999) examining again the U.S fund industry found supporting evidence to 
the existence of herd behavior. More specifically, for a period of 20 years (1974-
1994) it was found that herding was stronger in stocks of small firms and stocks that 
had high past returns. In line with Grinblatt et al. (1995), he also found higher level of 
herding in growth funds. Further research by Nofsinger and Sias (1999) on the U.S 
market found herding to be present. Testing for herding on behalf of institutional and 
individual investors in the New York stock exchange for a twenty-year period (1977-
1996), the authors found evidence of herding; however the impact of institutional 
herding upon stock prices was higher than that of individual herding due to their 
higher leverage in the volume. 
Being concentrated into the U.S. market so far, relevant research on emerging markets 
has also provided supporting evidence relative to the existence of herd behavior. For 
instance, Choe et al. (1999) examined the impact of foreign investors upon the 
Korean market during the 1997 Asian Crisis. More specifically, they used data of 
foreign investors’ holdings on 414 stocks for the period 1996-1997. They found that 
investors significantly herded before the crisis, whereas there was little evidence of 
herding during the crisis. Furthermore, Kim and Wei (2002a) also examined the 
behavior of foreign institutional and individual investors in the Korean market. In 
their paper, the authors examined data from 1996 till 1998, capturing the Asian Crisis 
of 1997. Their unique database contained important information for each stock listed 
in the Korean Stock Exchange; particularly, it contained the month-end holding in 
each stock, the nationality of the investors holding each stock, whether an investor 
was domestic or foreign and also the type of the investor (individual or institutional). 
48 
 
The investors, 2594 in total (735 individuals and 1859 institutions), were classified as 
domestic institutional investors, foreign institutional investors, domestic individual 
investors and foreign individual investors. Their findings reveal evidence of 
significant herding among all categories of investors with the exception of domestic 
institutional investors. In addition, foreign investors (both individual and institutional) 
were found to always herd more than their domestic counterparts. Finally, their results 
indicate that individual investors herded more than institutional investors. Kim and 
Wei (2002b) reached similar conclusions by comparing the behavior of offshore funds 
and onshore funds; the researchers found that both types of funds did indeed herd 
around and during the Asian crisis in the Korean market.  
Sias (2004) examined the U.S market once again; however he used a new 
methodology in contrast to the previous studies that used the LSV measure. This time, 
by using quarterly data of 894 institutional investors for the period 1983-1997, the 
author found that institutions do herd indeed and that they exhibit momentum trading 
tendencies, with the latter though not being the driving force behind herding.  
Voronkova and Bohl (2005) examined the behavior of pension fund managers in 
another emerging market, namely Poland. More specifically, the authors used semi-
annual data from 1999 to 2002 for 17 pension funds (the small number of pension 
funds indicates the high level of concentration in this pension fund market). After 
classifying the stocks according to size, past performance and industry, the authors 
found significant herding among pension fund managers, particularly for stocks of 
small size and specific industries. The study about U.K. fund managers by Wylie 
(2005) also provided evidence in support of herd behavior. More specifically, the 
author used semi-annual data for 268 U.K. mutual funds for the period 1986-1993.  
His results indicate that level of herding in the U.K market is similar to that of the U.S 
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and that it is more prominent for larger and smaller firms. Furthermore, U.K. fund 
managers were found to exhibit contrarian trading strategies in contrast with their 
counterparts in the U.S. who were found to be momentum traders in previous studies. 
Kim and Nofsinger (2005) examined institutional herding in Japan, in which many 
firms are members of intra-firm business networks (keiretsu). The authors posited that 
herding found in their empirical results was lower than that indicated for the U.S. 
market in similar studies; however the impact of herding upon stock prices was 
substantially higher in Japan than in the U.S. and especially for keiretsu firms. What 
is more, their empirical evidence suggests that keiretsu firms have better information 
(inside information due to its interrelationships among each other) than individual 
firms and trade based on their information signals rather than on past performance. To 
that end, keiretsu firms were found to herd less than non keiretsu firms.  
An interesting study for the Taiwanese market is that of Chen and Hong (2006), 
which examines the behavior of institutional investors contingent upon analysts’ 
earnings’ announcements. What distinguishes their study from others for the specific 
country is that it uses high frequency (daily) data of institutional holdings for the 
period 2001-2003. What the authors found was that during the event period 
institutional investors were more prone to “buy” herd in large firms and “sell” herd 
out of small stocks. Furthermore, there was more herding in stocks with certain 
characteristics (high beta, high return-on-equity ratio, high liquidity and volatility). 
Additionally, they found that the changes of institutional ownership that were taking 
place during the day were due to herding. Finally, the authors posited that institutional 
investors appeared to be informative when buying stocks but not when selling them. 
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Walter and Weber (2006) examined the behavior of German mutual fund managers 
for the 1998-2002 period with a database consisting of semi-annual portfolio holdings 
of 60 mutual funds. The researchers found significant levels of herding for the 
German market, notably higher than those found for the U.S and the U.K. markets 
from previous researches. Furthermore,  Do et al. (2008) tested for herding in the 
Finnish market with their database involving ownership records (from both domestic 
and international investors – institutional as well as individual ones) of 176 stocks for 
the  1995-2004 period. The researchers found that institutional investors exhibited 
herding and that domestic investors (both institutional and individual) herd more than  
their international counterparts.  
Another research by Lin and Swanson (2008) examined the behavior of foreign 
investors (from 38 emerging and developed countries in total) in the U.S market for 
the period between 1990 and 2003. Applying both the LSV and the Sias (2004) 
methodologies, they found weak evidence of herding from foreign investors buying or 
selling stocks within a month; however, they did find that foreign investors, taken at 
the country-level, follow each other into the examined market over adjacent periods. 
Moreover, Choi and Sias (2009) using quarterly data for the 1983-2005 period found 
that fund managers significantly herded over industries in the U.S. market and that 
they also style-herd among each other.   
Using quarterly data for the 1999-2005 period from the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges, Zhou and Li (2009) found evidence in favor of herd behavior among 
Chinese institutional investors. Hung et al. (2010) using quarterly data of Taiwanese 
mutual funds from 1995 till 2006 came to two conclusions. First, fund managers in 
Taiwan do herd and secondly the authors posit that the fund managers in this specific 
market tend to pick illiquid stocks of small firms with low B/M ratio and low past 
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returns.  Another research for Taiwan by Chang (2010) revealed similar findings. 
Using weekly order flow data for the 2000-2005 period, he found evidence of herding 
on behalf of both individual and institutional traders. 
Jeon and Moffett (2010) used data for Korean firms for the 1992-2003 period to 
examine the behavior of foreign investors in the Korean market. Their findings 
indicate a strong relationship among Korean stock returns and changes in foreign 
ownership of stocks. Additionally, foreign institutional investors were found to 
buy/sell stocks which domestic investors were selling/buying. 
A more recent study about the U.S. market by Liao et al. (2011) used monthly data of 
770 funds and 527 stocks for the 2003-2007 period to examine the link between 
investor sentiment and herding. The results indicated that investor sentiment can 
explain institutional herding, especially on the sell-side. Finally, a research by Holmes 
et al. (2011) tested for the herd behavior of institutional investors in Portugal (which 
is a very concentrated market). Their data consisted of monthly portfolio holdings for 
45 institutional investors and 80 stocks for the 1998-2005 time period. Their findings 
indicate significant herding among Portuguese fund managers, which was found to be 
intentional in nature and driven predominantly by reputational considerations, while 
interacting with window-dressing. 
All the relevant studies using micro-level data provide us with some very interesting 
findings regarding the herd behavior of institutional investors. First of all, empirical 
evidence suggests that herding is more prominent among larger and smaller sized 
firms. In the first case, this could be due to the fact that institutional investors most 
likely trade on large cap stocks. Many times, institutional investors are required from 
regional regulatory frameworks to invest in firms with specific characteristics. For 
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example Voronkova and Bohl (2005), as well as Olivares (2008), outline that Polish 
and Chilean pension funds respectively are obliged from the countries’ legislations to 
exhibit a minimum rate of return; as a result pension fund managers would invest in 
more secure stocks, these mostly being the large stocks (“blue chips”), in order to 
meet this requirement. Hence, the imposed regulatory restrictions can grandfather 
herding among pension fund managers since the latter choose to trade in stocks with 
similar profiles. Additionally, it is often the case that many funds are linked to 
specific market indices and assessed using these indices as benchmarks; being this the 
case it goes without saying that their fund managers will mostly trade on the stocks 
more related to this index (e.g. if a fund is linked to the DAX index, it is most likely 
that the fund will load its portfolio heavily towards DAX-stocks). So, the intuition 
behind this is that since the fund managers are assessed through an index benchmark, 
they will hold an index mimicking portfolio of stocks, the latter usually being the 
largest ones (for blue-chip indices).    
In the second case, that of small stocks, this could be due to the lack of sufficient 
amount of information regarding these stocks. It is often very expensive and time 
consuming for investors, or even the media, to monitor these companies; as a result 
this lack of information could induce herding among investors on these specific firms. 
Moreover, the low liquidity of small stocks makes them more vulnerable to 
mispricing and as Wermers (1999) suggested, institutional investors, when trading in 
small firms, are more willing to ignore their private information and follow the herd.     
Information asymmetries could also be the reason why herding is found to be stronger 
in emerging markets than developed ones, like the U.S. and their Western European 
counterparts. Since these markets often lack an efficient regulatory framework, it is 
often the case that the quality of information in these countries will be very low. It is 
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the lack of credibility in the market environment of emerging countries that 
discourages institutional investors from basing their trading on the information 
available and leads them to herd; in the end, if institutional investors cannot trust the 
market environment of these countries, why should they trust their information?  
Apart from the research based on micro-level data, there also has been substantial 
amount of research based on the aggregate level of markets examining herd behavior. 
Christie and Huang (1995) were the first researchers to do so by examining the U.S 
market. Their database consisted of daily data for the period between 1962 and 1988 
and monthly data for the period between 1925 and 1988 for US firms.  To examine 
investors’ herd behavior, the authors used the cross-sectional standard deviation of 
returns; their empirical results however did not indicate any herding across all 
industries examined both at the daily and the monthly frequency. Chang et al. (2000) 
investigated the presence of herding in five markets [U.S.(1963-1997), Hong 
Kong(1981-1995), Japan(1976-1995), South Korea(1978-1995) and Taiwan(1976-
1995)]. The authors using their own methodology, based on that of Christie and 
Huang (1995) but allowing for market non-linearities, found mixed evidence of 
herding. More specifically, in the developed markets of their sample (US; Hong 
Kong; Japan) there was no evidence of herd behavior; however in South Korea and 
Taiwan there was strong evidence of herding during both extreme positive and 
extreme negative market conditions. In addition, Hwang and Salmon (2004) in their 
turn proposed their own methodology that captures factors such as changes in 
fundamentals and time series volatility among others and tested for herding in the U.S 
and the South Korean markets for the period between 1993 and 2002. According to 
their empirical results, there is significant herding in both the U.S and the Korean 
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markets; what is more, herding appeared to be more prominent in periods before and 
after crises than during them. 
In the case of the Italian market, Caparrelli et al. (2004) examined the presence of 
herding during the period between 1988 and 2001. By using both methodologies of 
Christie and Huang (1995) and Chang et al. (2000) the authors found the second 
model fits better the Italian market and explains the presence of herd behavior during 
extreme market conditions. Feng and Seasholes (2004) examined investors’ behavior 
in the Chinese market for the 1999-2000 period and found that herding is highly 
related to the location of investors. Hence, the trades of investors living close to a 
firm’s headquarters bear higher correlation when new information regarding this firm 
arrives in the market; thus implying that herding is caused, to a high degree, by the 
home-bias. In another study for the Chinese market by Demirer and Lien (2005), it 
was found that herding is more prominent during up-markets than down-markets, with 
the exception of Financials. Additionally, Demirer and Kutan (2006) examined 375 
Chinese stocks for the 1999-2002  period and found no evidence of herding. 
Henker et al. (2006) were the first to examine the presence of herding at the intraday 
level, besides the daily level. The market tested was Australia and the data used 
covered the 2000-2001 period for the 200 largest shares of the Australian Stock 
Exchange. After applying both methodologies of Christie and Huang (1995) and 
Chang et al. (2000), the authors concluded that there was no herding at the market 
wide level or across industries. Moreover, Tan et al. (2008) by further examining the 
Chinese market and by using daily, weekly and monthly data from the Shenzhen and 
Shanghai Stock exchanges for the total amount of stocks listed in them and a time 
period of approximately nine years (1994-2003) found strong evidence of herding. In 
particular, their findings suggest that herding is a short-run phenomenon since it was 
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stronger at the daily level than at lower frequencies. Blasco and Ferreruela (2008) 
examined the presence of herding behavior in an international context (the markets 
examined were France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Spain, the U.S. and the U.K.). The 
authors used daily data for the 10 most traded stocks of each market from 1998 to 
2004 and applied a modified version of the Christie and Huang (1995) methodology. 
Their results indicated significant evidence of herding only for Spain, whose 
significance persists throughout both turbulent and non-turbulent market conditions.  
Caporale et al. (2008) examined the Greek market for herding in respect with the 
stock market crash which occurred in 1999. Using daily, weekly and monthly data for 
the 1998-2007 period and applying the herding measures of Christie and Huang 
(1995) and Chang et al. (2000), the authors found significant herding in the Greek 
market for the whole sample period. Furthermore, herding was stronger at the daily 
level than for lower frequencies, indicating that herding is a short-run phenomenon. 
What is more, herding was found to be more prominent during up-markets and was 
also present before and during the crisis of 1999, decaying since 2002 due to the 
changes of the regulatory framework in the Greek stock market.  
Dorn et al. (2008) examined the presence of herding in the German market by using 
data from one of the country’s three largest brokerage firms. More specifically, their 
sample consisted of 37.000 client-accounts for the 1998-2000 period; their results 
provided evidence of herding among Germany’s retail investors. 
Goodfellow et al. (2009) using daily data from 1996 till 2000 examined the presence 
of herding in the Polish market. One of the features of this market is the existence of 
two trading platforms in its stock exchange; one of them is dominated by institutional 
investors and the other by the individual ones. This allowed the authors to distinguish 
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the trades of each group and reach to conclusions for each group separately. What was 
found was that the platform primarily used by the individuals was more volatile and 
that there was significant herding in it. According to the authors, this was due to the 
informational asymmetries of the Polish market, with the individual investors being 
more heterogeneous and less informed than the institutional investors. Additionally, 
the herd behavior found was more prominent during down-markets rather than up-
markets and the authors attributed this phenomenon to investors’ sentiment; implying 
that investors are more confident on their own beliefs when prices rise. Chiang et al. 
(2010) examined herd behavior across 156 industries in five countries (the U.S, the 
U.K, Japan, Hong Kong and Germany) from 1987 till 2007 at the daily frequency by 
applying the Chang et al. (2000) herding measure. In all markets examined, the 
authors found significant evidence of herding. Another research by Demirer et al. 
(2010) examined the Taiwanese market for the existence of herd behavior using daily 
data of 689 stocks classified in sectors, for the period 1995-2006. By applying three 
different methodologies, namely these suggested by Christie and Huang (1995), 
Chang et al. (2000) and Hwang and Salmon (2004), they found significant evidence 
of herding. However, the first methodology used failed to provide evidence of herding 
across all sectors but that of Electronics. However, the following two methodologies 
suggested that herding was present across all sectors examined. Their findings 
provided further support to the view that the assumption of the linear relationship 
between the dispersion of the returns and the market returns does not hold and that the 
models that account for non-linearities in the returns are more successful in capturing 
herd behavior.  Fu (2010) using the methodologies of Christie and Huang (1995) and 
Chang et al. (2000) examined monthly data of Chinese companies for the period 
2004-2009. Their results indicated weak evidence of herding with the latter being 
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more present for low-turnover stocks. In addition, investors were found to herd more 
during down-market conditions. 
Summarizing the findings of the research regarding herding at the aggregate level, 
there are three important issues arising from it. One of them is the absence of herding 
during extreme market conditions; investors seem reluctant to herd when there is 
turbulence in the market. Studying the methodologies used for the examination of 
herding, we can see that the method of Christie and Huang (1995) is by construction 
restricted to measuring herding only during periods of market stress; leaving outside 
non-extreme market states. In contrast, Hwang and Salmon (2004) argued that 
herding is more prominent during calm markets. The intuition behind this is that 
during periods of extreme market conditions, the high volatility that prevails in the 
market prevents investors from seeing clearly the direction of the market; hence it is 
very difficult for them to herd towards the market direction and this is the reason why 
the empirical results do not provide strong evidence of herding during extreme market 
conditions. On the contrary, during tranquil states of the market investors have better 
insight of the market direction and as such can more easily herd towards it.  
Another important finding for the relevant research on herding is that the models 
accounting for non-linearities between the dispersion of returns and the market returns 
perform better in explaining herd behavior than the models following the efficient 
paradigm in finance and assuming a linear relationship between them instead. The 
presence of non-linearities in the market could be due to market microstructure 
reasons (short sale constraints, information disclosure policies, etc.) [Antoniou et al. 
(1997)]. Another possible explanation for the non-linearities could be the overreaction 
and under reaction of the market to news [DeBondt and Thaler (1985)] and how the 
market prices are corrected; it s more likely that the complex environment of the 
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market imposes a non linear behavior on asset prices. Market imperfections are also 
relevant here; for example, the presence of high transaction costs in the market  may 
prevent investors from trading, hence information is not conveyed into the market 
efficiently and since herding is primarily an informational issue it can be affected by 
the market’s non-linearities. Additionally, non-linearities could take place if the 
frequency of important information (earning announcements) is lower than the 
frequency of the prices used [Antoniou et al. (1997)]. Finally, empirical evidence 
suggests that the assumed rationality of investors portrayed by the traditional 
paradigm of Finance does not hold, and if this is the case the linear relationship 
between risk and return which linear models use may not be efficient [Antoniou et al. 
(1997)]. In the case of examining herd behavior, empirical evidence reinforces the 
above mentioned views since the studies using non-linear models such as that of 
Chang et al. (2000) provide more accurate results than the studies using the linear 
model of Christie and Huang (1995). 
Finally, relevant research has indicated that herding is more prone in emerging 
markets [Chang et al. (2000), Goodfellow et al. (2009) and Demirer et al. (2010) 
among others) than developed ones. As mentioned previously, this could be due to 
informational asymmetries and the lack of an efficient regulatory framework in 
developing markets. However, another reason could be thin trading; by this term we 
define the phenomenon where stocks with low volume of trading do not see their 
prices changing for several days and this could lead into spurious results when 
performing econometric work, as thin trading can induce serial correlation in returns 
[Antoniou et al. (1997)]. Empirical evidence on the relationship between herding and 
thin trading reveals that the latter does indeed impact upon the former. Evidence in 
support of this view is provided by the studies of Kallinterakis and Kratunova (2007) 
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and Andronikidi and Kallinterakis (2010) for the Bulgarian and Israeli market 
respectively. In both cases, the authors found that correcting for thin trading had an 
impact on both the significance and the structure of the level of herding. 
2.4 Feedback Trading 
2.4.1 Definition and Sources of Feedback Trading 
Feedback trading constitutes a celebration against the weak form of market efficiency; 
the latter assumes that there can be no abnormal gains by using historical prices of 
stocks. More specifically, what is all about feedback trading is that investors engaging 
in such behavior follow past trends of stock prices in order to achieve profit from 
them. Investors usually involve themselves in such behavior because they believe that 
past stock prices reveal information not yet reflected in prices. Feedback trading can 
be positive, where investors buy/sell when stock prices rise/drop, or it can be negative 
in which case, investors buy/sell when stock prices drop/rise.  
The engagement of investors in feedback trading can usually be motivated through 
technical analysis, a tool for identifying hidden information in past prices and 
discovering patterns that can be used to achieve profit. In addition, investors who use 
technical analysis may have an informational disadvantage relative to their peers or it 
might be difficult for them to monitor other investors’ actions; so technical analysis 
allows them to monitor the actions of other investors, reflected through stock prices, 
at the aggregate level. Relevant research documented evidence for the profitability of 
trading strategies based on technical analysis; more specifically the studies by Brock 
et al. (1992), Antoniou et al. (1997), Fernández-Rodríguez et al. (2000) and Wong et 
al. (2003), among others, indicated that the use of historical prices can, in certain 
cases, be a profitable technique for trading in stock markets. 
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Additionally, positive feedback trading is associated with some trading strategies, one 
of them being “momentum trading”. The latter suggests that it can be more profitable 
for investors to buy stocks that have previously performed well and sell the stocks that 
have performed the worst. Momentum trading is linked with the under-reaction 
hypothesis of DeBondt and Thaler (1985) and empirical evidence of its profitability  
has been provided by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Grinblatt et al. (1995) and 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001). 
Another trading strategy, this time associated with negative feedback trading, is the 
“contrarian strategy”. The latter is linked with the “overreaction” hypothesis 
developed by DeBondt and Thaler (1985) who found in their seminal paper that past 
(3-5 years) losers were outperforming past (3-5 years) winners in the following 1-3 
year period. Relevant research by Mun et al. (1999) and Galariotis et al. (2007) 
provided evidence in support of contrarian strategies’ profitability. 
The possible sources of feedback trading include behavioral biases and heuristics, as 
in the case of herd behavior previously discussed, and informational reasons. Starting 
with the behavioral elements that can lead investors to feedback trade, two of them 
are the representativeness heuristic introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1973) and 
the conservatism bias of Edwards (1968), both of them having been linked to 
feedback trading by Barberis et al. (1998). Since feedback trading involves trend 
chasing, the representativeness heuristic can lead investors to perceive price patterns 
as trends and ride on them. Inversely, the conservatism bias causes investors to be 
reluctant in updating their beliefs according to recent news, thus leading prices to 
underreact.  
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Shefrin and Statman (1985)’s disposition effect is another candidate for explaining 
feedback trading behavior, and particularly negative feedback trading. As discussed 
previously, the disposition effect is the tendency of investors to sell previous winners 
and hold onto past losers. This phenomenon is highly linked to the prospect theory of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and how people perceive their gains and losses, with 
investors being reluctant (suffer more) in realizing any losses (loss aversion). 
Relevant to the disposition effect is also mental accounting, a term discussed by 
Shefrin and Statman (1985) suggesting that investors prefer to hold onto past losing 
stocks since if they keep them they do not get to realize losses as would have been the 
case of selling them.  
Another bias linked to positive feedback trading is overconfidence [Odean (1998)] 
which suggests that investors tend to overvalue their own knowledge and skills even 
though there might be signals in the market indicating that they are wrong. It is 
usually the case than an overconfident investor trades more than others - having high 
confidence in his skills and private signals [Odean (1998)] - and his overconfidence 
can lead them to overreact to their signals. With prices moving in the direction of his 
trades, this further boosts his overconfidence - and his overreaction to forthcoming 
signals arriving at the market – as he attributes any gains to his own skills 
disproportionately [Daniel et al. (2002)]. 
Apart from the behaviorally driven reasons leading to the use of feedback trading by 
investors, there also are reasons whose source is based upon an informational point of 
view. We will try to address this issue by examining it using two cases; the case of 
informational superiority and the case of informational inferiority. 
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In the first case, we consider professional investors, i.e. fund managers, to lie in this 
category; these investors are perceived to have a superior informational set that allows 
them to better foresee the market direction than the simple individual investors. Recall 
now what the Efficient Market Hypothesis postulates regarding these investors; 
according to it, these investors are the “arbitrageurs” who will drive prices back to 
their fundamental values in case of any mispricing. However, as relevant research has 
shown this might not be the case since it is not always to the arbitrageurs’ best interest 
to intervene in the market. De Long et al. (1990b) suggested that the increased risk 
induced by the actions of noise traders bounds rational arbitrageurs from taking 
actions to correct prices since they are unwilling to undertake the additional risk  and 
the higher underlying cost.  In fact exactly the opposite can also be true; De Long et 
al. (1990a) explained how the better informed investors, “rational speculators”, can 
actually strengthen the positive feedback trading behavior of the uninformed investors 
(“noise investors”). The superior information that rational speculators possess allows 
them to realize which stocks are possible candidates for positive feedback trading and 
take early positions on them. This action increases the prices of the chosen stocks and 
creates a trend and noise investors in their turn ride the trend and further increase the 
stock prices. At the end, due to their superior information rational speculators sell 
their stocks at their peak and realize their profits; stock prices begin to fall and noise 
traders suffer their losses. To better explain the previous argument and how this works 
in the real market suppose that a rational speculator knows some information about a 
company will come on time (t) and buys its stock at time (t-1). This action increases 
the price and noise traders follow the trend buying stocks as well and further pumping 
the price; when information arrives in the market at (t) prices have already 
overreacted and the rational speculator knowing the real value of the stock starts 
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selling his stocks and at the same time he takes a “short” position on it in order to 
achieve additional gains from the upcoming drop of the price. Noise investors in their 
turn, thinking that the trend is over, start to sell their stocks and when the price reverts 
to its fair value the speculator enjoys his profit. This kind of behavior by rational 
speculators and particularly hedge funds has been blamed for the creation of bubbles 
in the market; for example, there has been a research by Brunnermeier and Nagel 
(2004) examining the behavior of hedge funds during the technology bubble 
(NASDAQ stocks) that took place in 1999. More specifically, the authors using data 
of hedge funds’ portfolio holdings for the 1998-2000 period found that the technology 
stocks amounted to a high percentage of the hedge funds’ portfolios prior to the burst 
of the bubble. During the latter, hedge funds were found to ride on it and just before 
the bubble burst they unloaded their stocks. What we can learn from this paradigm is 
that professional investors have the ability to time the market, and this could be due to 
their superior informational foresight. Andergassen (2005) also suggests that it is 
optimal for rational speculators to ride on the bubble since in this way they can 
maximize their profits. 
On the other hand, there are investors in the market that lie in the second case 
mentioned above, that of informational inferiority. As the meaning of the term 
implies, these investors do not have the quality of information or the access to it as 
their professional counterparts. In order to understand how this informational 
mismatch can induce feedback trading let us elaborate on the case of domestic and 
overseas investors. It is clear that the latter cannot possibly have the level of 
information that their domestic counterparts do; as such they can use the stock prices 
as a ruler for their investment decisions. In fact, Brennan and Cao (1997) posited that 
there is a positive relationship between international portfolio flows to a country with 
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that country’s stock returns. The authors by examining data from U.S investors’ 
purchases in four developed and sixteen emerging markets found that there was 
significant positive feedback trading strategies from the investors examined; investors 
were buying when stock prices in a market increased and they were selling when the 
prices were falling. The empirical results from this study showed that such kind of 
trading activity was more prone in emerging markets; nevertheless it was also present 
in developed countries as well. The intuition behind their results is that the investors 
investing in a foreign country have an informational gap in relation to their domestic 
counterparts and they are trying to fill this gap by observing the price patterns in order 
to translate them into informational signals. The previous mentioned research came to 
provide supporting evidence to another research, namely that of Shukla and van 
Inwegen (1995) who compared the performance of U.K. fund managers investing in 
the U.S. market with that of U.S fund managers investing domestically. Their results 
indicated that the U.S funds managers outperformed their U.K. counterparts for the 
1981-1993 period and the authors attributed this performance dissimilarity to the 
informational gap between the two parts. Moreover, another study by Shiller et al. 
(1996) examining the causes of the Nikkei crash in the early 1990s revealed a very 
important and relevant to our discussion finding; by comparing the earnings’ forecasts 
from both the Japanese and the U.S. analysts, they found that there was a significant 
variation between them, signaling in this way the different level of informational sets 
the two parts possessed. 
A similar case where the informational inferiority of investors could lead to the use of 
feedback trading strategies is when they trade in stocks of small size firms. As 
discussed previously in this thesis, there is a significant difficulty and a higher cost 
involved when investors are trying to monitor small size firms as opposed to larger 
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firms. As such, it is often the case that investors cannot have the best quality of 
information regarding these companies and in their effort to do so, they often rely on 
the patterns of their stock prices to draw information from them. Here is where the 
feedback trading strategy enters the picture; investors often perceive the price of these 
stocks as informative of their fundamentals. If there are some investors buying a 
particular stock, then they must know something about the company that justifies the 
increase of the stock price - and in order to take advantage of the perceived 
information too they ride on the bandwagon even if there is no actual 
reason/information underlying the rise of a stock price. 
Investors may further resort to feedback trading due to reasons related to their 
observational learning. For the individual investor the market entails high complexity 
amplifying uncertainty in their mind; as uncertainty in the market grows, so does the 
need for tools to make sense out of this chaos. Feedback trading can function as such 
a tool (a “heuristic”), since prices constitute a noisy statistical summary [Hirshleifer 
and Teoh (2003)] of the underlying trading activity. Therefore, instead of having to 
observe their peers individually, investors can feedback trade if they believe prices to 
provide them with valuable information on the aggregate market activity [Vives 
(1993), Cao and Hirshleifer (1997)].  
2.4.2 Empirical findings on feedback trading 
In line with the relevant research on herding, feedback trading has been examined at 
both the micro (funds) and macro (aggregate market) levels. In fact, the two subjects 
appear to be somewhat interrelated since it is quite often the case that researchers test 
for herding and feedback trading at the same time. 
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Beginning with the empirical evidence of feedback trading at the micro level, the 
seminal paper was that of Lakonishok et al. (1992) examining the U.S. market for the 
1985-1989 period; using a sample of 769 pension funds (quarterly data) and their own 
methodology, they found weak evidence of positive feedback trading which was more 
prominent for small size stocks. Similarly, Grinblatt et al. (1995) using quarterly 
portfolio holdings from a sample of 274 U.S. mutual funds for a ten-year period 
(1974-1984) reported that there was evidence of momentum and contrarian trading 
techniques from the fund managers examined; however the level of feedback trading 
resulting from these techniques was quite low. Another research by Wermers (1999), 
using data from U.S. mutual funds for the 1975-1994 period, provided evidence that 
growth funds tended to exhibit more positive feedback trading compared to other 
fund-types; it is often the case that growth funds invest in stocks of small size 
companies, as such since they do not possess enough information on them they draw 
information on them through their price patterns. Nofsinger and Sias (1999) testing 
the behavior of U.S. mutual funds for a 20 year period (1977-1996) found evidence in 
support of institutions’ feedback trading through the use of momentum strategies. 
However,  contrary to the previous researches is that of Gompers and Metrick (2001) 
which used quarterly data of U.S. mutual funds for the 1980-1996 period and found 
no evidence of feedback trading by institutional investors when controlling for the 
size of the stocks. Testing for the U.S. market once again, Badrinath and Wahal 
(2002) used quarterly data of mutual funds’ portfolio holdings for the 1987-1995 
period to identify any possible feedback trading behavior; their results indicated that 
fund managers exhibited both momentum and contrarian strategies. More specifically, 
there was evidence in support of momentum trading when institutional investors 
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entered a stock whereas in the case of exiting a stock or adjusting their current 
holdings there was evidence of contrarian strategies. 
So far we mentioned the relevant research on feedback trading regarding the U.S. 
market. Nevertheless, there is also quite a lot of research regarding other markets as 
well, both developed and emerging ones. Brennan and Cao (1997) examined the 
behavior of U.S. investors when investing in four developed and sixteen emerging 
countries and found that there was significant positive feedback trading on behalf of 
them in the sample examined. Choe et al. (1999) examining the Korean market during 
1996-1997 found that foreign investors were involved in significant positive feedback 
trading before the Asian crisis in 1997; however during the crisis, the level of positive 
feedback trading was significantly lower. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) examined 
the Finnish market by using a unique database of daily institutional and individual 
holdings for the 1994-1996 period; their results produced some interesting findings. 
More specifically, foreign and domestic institutional investors (the “sophisticated” 
investors, as the authors suggested) exhibited momentum strategies whereas the 
domestic individual investors were more prone to contrarian strategies. Another 
research about the Korean market and the behavior of its investors during the Asian 
crisis’ period, this time by Kim and Wei (2002b), provided evidence regarding the use 
of feedback trading by offshore funds. First of all, the authors divided the sample 
period into three sub-periods; pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis. During the pre-crisis 
and crisis periods there was no feedback trading, either positive or negative, on behalf 
of offshore investors; however there was some evidence of contrarian strategies in the 
post-crisis period. Secondly, the authors found that funds from the U.S and the U.K. 
exhibited significant feedback trading in all sub-periods; in the pre- and post-crisis 
periods they were exhibiting contrarian strategies whereas during the crisis there was 
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significant positive feedback trading. What is more, the other Europeans funds 
exhibited similar behavior with their U.S/U.K. counterparts. Finally, the funds from 
Hong Kong and Singapore were found to pursue positive feedback trading strategies 
during the crisis; the latter are not obliged to pay capital gains taxes and as such this 
could lead to a more aggressive trading from their behalf.  
Kaminsky et al. (2004) examined the behavior of U.S. investors in a series of 
emerging markets; the period examined was from 1993 till 1999 and their database 
consisted of 13 funds investing in the Latin American markets. Their empirical 
findings revealed a strong tendency for momentum trading from all funds examined 
and in both crisis and non-crisis periods; however momentum trading was more 
significant during crisis-periods. Voronkova and Bohl (2005) examining the behavior 
of 17 pension funds from 1999 to 2002 for the Polish market found significant 
positive feedback trading with pension funds’ managers selling small size stocks that 
did not perform well previously and buying stocks of larger stocks that performed 
well in the previous quarter. Walter and Weber (2006) examined the German mutual 
fund market using a sample of 60 mutual funds for the 1997-2002 period; their results 
indicated that fund managers in Germany exhibited positive feedback trading in the 
short run. Another research by Do et al. (2008) for the Finnish market during the 
1995-2004 period, also provided evidence in support of feedback trading. More 
specifically, the authors found that overseas institutions investing in Finland were 
prominent in positive feedback trading. Finally, Jeon and Moffett (2010) also found 
significant levels of intra-year positive feedback trading on behalf of foreign investors 
in the Korean market for the 1992-2003 period. 
One issue arising from the research regarding feedback trading at the micro level is 
that feedback trading is more prominent in emerging markets than in developed ones. 
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This could be due to the lack of information that institutional investors possess about 
these countries. As in the case of herding discussed previously, the regulatory 
framework of these countries does not allow foreign investors to have the same 
quality of information with their domestic counterparts. As such, foreign investors 
resort in observing the patterns of stock prices in order to identify their informational 
content. Similarly, as relevant research suggests, feedback trading has been found to 
be stronger in stocks of small size firms than in larger ones. Again, due to the limited 
amount of information available for small firms, it is very difficult for large 
institutional investors to monitor them; as such since prices are indicative of 
information it is easier for them to follow the price patterns.    
So far we have discussed about the relevant research on feedback trading under the 
micro level perspective; however there is an overwhelming amount of research for the 
macro level as well. One of the pioneering research papers on feedback trading is 
considered to be that of Sentana and Wadhwani (1992); the authors by using daily 
returns of the Dow Jones index from 1885 till 1988 found significant evidence of 
positive feedback trading, which was higher during down market states. Koutmos 
(1997) examined the presence of feedback trading in an international context using 
daily data from six countries (Australia, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Japan and the 
U.K.); his empirical results showed that in all six countries examined there was 
significant evidence of positive feedback trading and in four out of the six countries of 
the sample, positive feedback trading was stronger during down market conditions. 
Another study examining feedback trading in international foreign exchange markets 
is that by Aguirre and Saidi (1999) who used data from eighteen developed and 
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emerging countries
8
. However the authors did not find significant evidence of 
feedback trading in these countries; and in case where evidence of feedback trading 
was present, it was negative feedback trading that was prevailing.  
Säfvenblad (2000) examined the Swedish stock market by using daily data of 62 
stocks for the 1980-1995 period; he suggested that feedback trading strategies are the 
prime candidate for explaining the index return autocorrelation in the market of 
Sweden. Koutmos and Saidi (2001) using daily data for the 1990-1996 period from 
six emerging market in Asia, namely Hong Kong, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan and Thailand, found significant evidence of positive feedback trading during 
market declines but very weak evidence of it during upward markets. In addition, 
Watanabe (2002)  examining the Japanese market for a 20 year period (1979-1996) 
also found significant evidence of positive feedback trading and as in the previous 
researches’ findings this was stronger during market declines. What is more, the 
author found that positive feedback trading was highly related with the margin 
requirements and he concluded that much of positive trading found in Japan was due 
to margin trading. A research by Antoniou et al. (2005) using data from six developed 
countries (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S.) examined whether 
the introduction of futures has an impact on feedback trading; it is usually expected 
that the introduction of futures would attract more rational investors in the market 
who in their turn would make prices more efficient, informational wise, by applying 
the use of futures as an additional tool for risk management. Their results indicate that 
indeed upon the introduction of futures there was a decline on the impact of positive 
feedback trading upon prices. Bohl and Reitz (2006) examining the German stock 
                                                          
8
 The countries examined were: Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Ireland, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Taiwan, Thailand.   
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market for the 1998-2002 period provided evidence of significant positive feedback 
trading. Also, Chau et al. (2008) examined whether the introduction of universal stock 
futures (USF) had an impact on the level of feedback trading across a series of 
markets; although the level of feedback trading was rather low both before and after 
the introduction of the USFs,  there was a slight decrease on feedback trading level 
after their introduction. Finally, Salm and Schuppli (2010) examined the presence of 
feedback trading on the premises of stock index futures in 32 markets, both developed 
and emerging. Their results provided supporting evidence in favor of the existence of 
feedback trading strategies with positive feedback trading found to be stronger during 
market declines, as found in previous researches.  
The main issue that arises from the relevant research about feedback trading at the 
macro level is that it appears to be significantly stronger during declining markets. 
The primary explanation for this phenomenon seems to be the tendency of investors 
to evacuate the market during large declines in order to avoid any further losses. This 
could be done through stop loss orders with which investors set a limit to their losses 
and when this limit is reached they start liquidating their stock holdings. In turn these 
actions reinforce the trend of the stock prices and as such the level of feedback 
trading. Finally, as relevant research suggests, margin trading as well as portfolio 
insurance through the use of various hedging tools (derivatives) play an important role 
in explaining the feedback behavior of investors. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The present chapter has outlined in detail the key differences between the 
Neoclassical and the Behavioral schools of thought in modern finance theory. 
Contrary to the traditional view reflected through the efficient markets hypothesis, 
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investors are considered by the “behavioral” camp as being subject to a series of 
psychological impediments (biases) leading them to resort to non-rational tools 
(heuristics) to counter the complexity observed in capital markets. With the influence 
of psychological factors varying laterally (in terms of their numbers) as well as 
horizontally (across investors), it is evident that their presence only helps amplify the 
aforementioned complexity. The latter is expressed through a series of behavioral 
trading patterns, of which mention was made earlier in this chapter. Our research in 
the forthcoming empirical chapters shall focus on the behavioral strategies of herding 
and feedback trading which constitute facets of collective trading conduct; the choice 
of these patterns to study emanates from the gaps we managed to identify in the 
aftermath of our literature review.  
Our first empirical chapter raises an issue never explored before, namely that of the 
impact of market concentration over the relationship between style investing and herd 
behavior. Style has been found in a series of studies [Lakonishok et al. (1992), Sias 
(2004)] to produce a positive effect over herding. This is because the presence of a 
style implies that those following it adhere to a strategy with a common denominator, 
thus implying commonality in their trades. The identity of these “denominators”, i.e. 
the indicators upon which styles are based, is not important; what is important here is 
that they exist and drive people’s investment towards stocks with specific features 
(e.g. past winners for momentum strategies). Much work [Sias (2004)] has produced 
evidence in favor of style’s positive impact over herding in developed capital markets; 
in other words, style has been found to promote herding. However, the issue here is 
that there exists a multitude of markets across the world that are either of small size or 
still at their early stages of development and thus have a small universe of stocks 
listed on their board; put it simple, many markets internationally are typified by very 
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high concentration. The issue with concentration is that it bears an effect over the 
decision to invest in terms of both motivations (investors may find it easier to monitor 
each other, something particularly important when it comes to investment 
professionals due to performance assessment considerations) and choices (there are 
less stocks to choose from). As a result, we would expect the style-herding 
relationship to be affected in such market environments and it would be interesting to 
examine empirically whether this is indeed the case. To explore the impact of market 
concentration over the style-herding relationship we first begin by identifying the 
issue theoretically, constructing a framework of arguments originating from the extant 
literature, both analytical and empirical. Moving on to the empirical investigation of 
the issue, we examine it on the premises of the Portuguese capital market
9
 drawing 
upon a unique database provided by the Portuguese Securities Markets Commission 
(CMVM). The database includes month-end portfolio holdings of all Portuguese 
funds investing in Portuguese equities and stretches across the period from July 1996 
to June 2011. We then proceed by employing the approach proposed by Sias (2004) to 
measure herding among fund managers in Portugal. To account for style, we utilize 
six strategies as proxies, namely momentum [Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)], value 
[Lakonishok et al. (1994)], analyst recommendations [Chen and Cheng (2005)], size 
[Banz (1981), volatility [Busse (1999)] and volume [Chen et al. (2001)]. We further 
break up our sample into the pre-EURONEXT and post-EURONEXT access period 
in order to gauge the effect of changes in the regulatory environment over the style-
herding relationship in such a concentrated environment. We believe this chapter to 
contribute significantly to research in behavioral finance as it theoretically presents 
                                                          
9
 Portugal maintains a very small equity market, with about 50-odd stocks listed on its main board and 
a smaller number on its alternative segment. Over the past 20 years the number of stocks listed at 
any point in that market has not managed to exceed 100 by far.  
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and empirically examines the impact of market concentration over the style-herding 
relationship for the first time in the literature. Furthermore, it bears important 
implications for the investment community and, in particular, its institutional 
segment, more so in view of the prolific employment of styles in funds’ investments 
and the fact that many funds are active in emerging markets whose size is often small. 
Finally, this chapter’s findings are bound to be of interest to regulatory authorities and 
policymakers alike, as institutional herding can (due to funds’ dominant position in 
today’s volumes) produce destabilizing outcomes in the market; since style constitutes 
a possible source of herding, assessing the impact of market concentration over the 
style-herding relationship can allow useful insight into the determinants of 
institutional herding in highly concentrated markets.  
Our second empirical chapter deals with the identification of the issue of the impact of 
the introduction of exchange traded funds (ETFs) over noise trading in capital 
markets. ETFs constitute a relatively recent (10-15 years old) innovation in 
international markets and whereas their launch was primarily aimed at rational 
investors aiming at improving their risk management, they do bear several features 
rendering them quite attractive to uninformed investors. We first present a theoretical 
framework on this by introducing a series of arguments in support of ETFs being 
capable of both promoting as well as reducing the intensity of noise trading in the 
market drawing upon a series of analytical and empirical studies from the extant 
literature. We then explore the issue empirically by drawing upon a sample of 
emerging and developed markets’ ETFs and employing the empirical framework 
proposed by Sentana and Wadhwani (1992). The latter assumes the interaction of two 
distinctive investor-types, namely rational speculators who maximize their expected 
utility and feedback traders who invest based on the market’s performance one period 
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back. We run this model for the spot index series of each market before and after the 
introduction-date of the first ETF in each, while we then assume different 
specifications of this model to control for robustness. An advantage of the Sentana 
and Wadhwani (1992) model is that it allows us to further explore the link between 
feedback trading and volatility, thus providing insight into whether noise traders bear 
a destabilizing effect over capital markets. The findings from this chapter are bound to 
yield valuable insight into the implications of the introduction of ETFs over noise 
trading in stock exchanges and will be of particular interest to 
regulators/policymakers as they will inform them of the impact of the introduction of 
ETFs as financial innovations over market dynamics.  
Our final chapter looks into the issue whether institutional investors herd intentionally 
at the industry level. This is something that has not been examined in the literature 
before as the only evidence so far whether institutional investors herd intentionally or 
not has been the study by Holmes et al. (2011); the latter used the interactions of 
institutional herding and several market conditions to address this issue. However, in 
that case the authors examined the intent of fund managers to herd at the overall 
market level, whereas our scope is to examine whether fund managers herd 
intentionally at the industry level. In order to address this issue we use data consisted 
of quarterly portfolio holdings of Spanish mutual funds for the 1995-2008 period. 
What is more, on contrast with Holmes et al. (2011) that used only market conditions, 
we use both market and industry conditions in order to spot whether it is the first or 
the latter that are more reflective of the intent of fund managers to herd. Our results 
can bear important implications both for the investment community (especially those 
engaged in sector investing) and the regulatory authorities (in their effort to try to 
minimize the incentives of fund managers to herd). 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Style investing constitutes a form of characteristic trading through which, investors 
trade on stocks with similar characteristics; as such, these may trade on stocks with 
similar past performance, market capitalization or trading volume. Research has 
identified a relationship between investment styles and herding [Grinblatt et al. 
(1995), Wermers (1999), Sias (2004)], particularly on behalf of institutional investors. 
The intuition behind this is that if investors follow the same investing style, then their 
trades will be correlated, hence this would amplify herding in the market. However, 
the majority of these studies have been carried out in large markets, mostly in the U.S 
and in a lesser extent to some European and Asian markets.  
What has not been addressed before is the effect of market concentration upon the 
relationship between herding and style investing. As high market concentration can 
produce different trading dynamics than those produced in large markets, this could 
have an impact over the relationship between style investing and herding. First of all, 
a highly concentrated market environment allows institutional investors to monitor 
their peers easier; in addition, since in such kind of environments it is more likely that 
fund managers know each other, it will be more difficult for them to deviate from the 
market consensus [Do et al. (2008)]. Secondly, in a highly concentrated market 
environment, it would be more difficult for fund managers to apply investing styles 
since there are less investment options compared to less concentrated markets. These 
two characteristics of highly concentrated markets could bound the significance of 
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style investing on institutional herding and we are going to test this hypothesis under 
the context of a highly concentrated market. More specifically, we are going to 
conduct our research under the premises of the Portuguese mutual fund industry, 
which is characterized by a high level of market concentration. In order to test for the 
relationship between style investing and herding and how this is affected by the level 
of market concentration, we will apply six different style indicators, namely analysts’ 
recommendations, market value (size), momentum, value/growth, volatility and 
volume. Furthermore, we will break our sample period into two sub-periods, pre and 
post Euronext to account for any effects of the merger of the Portuguese Stock 
Exchange into Euronext. In addition, we will further break the post-Euronext period 
into pre and post crisis, trying to gauge the effect the credit crisis that broke out in 
2008 had over our estimations.   
The chapter is arranged as follows: section (3.2) provides the theoretical grounding 
and the findings of the relevant literature about the relationship between herding and 
style investing (3.2.1) and how this relationship is affected by market concentration 
(3.2.2). Section (3.3) describes the applied styles used in our research in order to test 
for the relationship between herding and style investing whereas section (3.4) 
provides a description of the Portuguese market. Section (3.5) describes the data and 
methodology used in this research and section (3.6) presents our empirical findings; in 
particular, section (3.6.1) presents the results for our full sample data, Section (3.6.2) 
presents the results for the pre and post Euronext periods, and section (3.6.3) presents 
the results for the pre and post crisis periods. Section (3.7) discusses the findings of 
our empirical results and finally Section (3.8) concludes. 
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3.2.1 Style investing and herding 
 
Style investing is a term used to describe the strategies investors use in order to 
maximize the returns of their investments; it usually involves the categorization of 
assets according to specific characteristics. There have been documented quite enough 
investment styles; in fact it is often the case that many mutual funds are often 
characterized according to the investment style they employ. As such there can be, for 
example, “growth” as well as “value” funds (whereby the former invest in growth 
stocks
10
 and the latter in value stocks
11) or “small cap” and “large cap” funds 
(contingent upon whether they invest in small or large stocks). Furthermore, an 
investor could choose to follow a passive or an active trading style depending on their 
preference. In addition, momentum or contrarian strategies have also been applied by 
investors to achieve higher returns. Another common style among mutual funds is 
investing in stocks of specific industries; for example, a technology fund would be 
one investing in stocks of the technology industry. Similarly, there can be index-
tracking funds or index-linked ETFs which follow the performance of a specific 
index. Finally, a more recent fashion in investment styles involves investing in stocks 
of companies with certain social or ethical codes of practice; this may entail 
companies that exhibit high social responsibility, are environmentally friendly or 
follow a specific religious code
12
. 
                                                          
10
 Growth stocks, or “glamour stocks”, are the stocks of companies which have a high rate of growth 
in their earnings. [Lakonishok et al. (1994)] 
11
 Value stocks are the stocks of companies which have a relatively low growth rate in their earnings 
and often exhibit low P/E ratios and a high dividend yield among other characteristics [Lakonishok et 
al. (1994)] 
12
 For example, funds that follow the Islamic code do not invest in stocks of the tobacco or brewery 
industries. [Wilson (1997)] 
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However, apart from just being considered an investment strategy, style investing 
bears a behavioral connotation as well. As we mentioned in the previous chapter, 
stock markets have a high level of complexity and investors derive heuristics (rules of 
thumb) in order to make sense out of this complexity. As such, if at the beginning of 
stock markets it was easy for investors to monitor and analyze the fundamentals of the 
companies, the present markets’ complexity with the thousands of assets being traded 
lead to the adoption of investment strategies from investors in order to simplify their 
stock-selection process.  
Style investing is associated with several psychological biases such as the 
representativeness heuristic which states that investors often tend to misjudge 
information about stocks by overweighting more recent news about them. DeBondt 
and Thaler (1985) were the first researchers to identify that a strategy of going long 
on losers and short on winners exhibited significantly high returns and attributed this 
phenomenon to investors’ overreaction to news. The authors suggested that investors’ 
overreaction is caused by the representativeness heuristic. Similarly, Lee (2010) also 
posits that overreaction is caused by representativeness. More specifically, the author 
found that the reaction of growth investors to recent news is higher than that of value 
investors suggesting that the representativeness heuristic is related to style investing. 
Sirri and Tufano (1998) found that over a twenty-year period there were significant 
cash flows in mutual funds with high past performance in the previous periods. So, 
investors, paying too much attention on the recent past performance, flock into these 
mutual funds.  
The limited attention bias is also a relevant factor for style investing; Peng and Xiong 
(2006) suggested that the limited attention bias makes it easier for investors to analyze 
information under a category basis (category learning) rather than examine 
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individually each firm’s characteristics. What is more, the model the authors suggest 
combines limited attention and investors’ overconfidence and provides a better 
explanation of the comovement of returns than other models following the traditional 
paradigm. Limited attention implies that it is almost impossible for people to pay 
equal attention on all possible features of an issue. So, investors are more prone to 
style-invest since this automatically reduces the amount of investment options they 
have; instead of thousands of stocks they now focus on a subset (or subsets) of them 
with specific features. As such, the lesser options they have to choose from, the more 
likely it is for them to converge to some of them; the more the investors focus on the 
same investment style, the more likely it is for them to move similarly on its basis and 
herd. 
Conformity suggests that people feel more comfortable when doing what others do. In 
our case if an investment style has been quite successful in the past and is used by the 
majority of investors, then it is more likely that investors will keep following the same 
style and as such choose stocks according to the characteristics suggested by the 
specific style. Similarly, Conservatism can also have an effect on style investing and 
herding. Investment managers may be reluctant to deviate from the established styles 
that have been proven profitable and used by their peers, thus inducing herding since 
using the same investment styles leads to the trading of the same stocks. 
Apart from the behavioral issues of style investing and herding there are also the 
agency-related issues. More specifically, there can be reputational and professional 
reasons for fund managers to follow some investment styles. More specifically, it can 
be the case that “bad managers” will follow the actions of their successful peers (good 
managers) because of performance assessment reasons; this behavior will inevitably 
lead to the trading of the same stocks. Finally, the adoption of investing styles from 
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professionals makes it easier for investors to assess their performance as it can easily 
be linked to a certain benchmark according to the strategy they follow. In their turn, 
fund managers in order to meet the required rate of return, as this is indicated by the 
benchmark of the style, they will choose stocks which best represent the benchmark 
they have. 
In addition to the former reasoning, style investing can be driven by informational 
reasons as well. It is easier for investors to analyze the information signals that apply 
to the same category of stocks than if those had to be analyzed for each stock 
separately. So, through the classification of stocks into categories investors minimize 
their research cost and thus achieve a more efficient allocation of their funds, both 
cost- and time-wise. Instead of choosing among thousands of assets, investors can 
choose the right style according to their risk and return preferences. 
 
3.2.2 Style investing, herding and market concentration 
 
In the previous section we talked about the relationship between style investing and 
herding. In this section, we will focus on the impact of market concentration on this 
relationship; more specifically we will examine how market concentration affects 
each of the style investing determinants of herding discussed in the previous section. 
As Do et al. (2008) suggested, a concentrated market will differ from a large market 
in terms of transparency levels (information-wise), the amount of traded assets in the 
market and the high level of ownership-concentration by large institutional investors. 
Generally speaking, in the context of a concentrated market we would expect a high 
level of peer monitoring; the latter could increase the possibility of imitation among 
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the investors and thus herding.  However, we have shown that style investing is also 
positively related to herding, in the sense that it can promote herding tendencies 
among investors using similar styles. One thing, though that is not clear cut is the 
relationship between high concentration and style investing. Put it simple, the issue 
here is whether the presence of high concentration affects the ability of style investing 
to generate significant herding.  
We have shown how style investing can give rise to herding through various avenues 
by making explicit reference to behavioral as well as non-behavioral determinants of 
the style-herding relationship. Starting with the representativeness heuristic, market 
concentration can actually affect the style-herding relationship both negatively and 
positively. If we recall from our literature review, this heuristic is associated with the 
sample size neglect, which implies that investors tend to perceive a small sample to be 
equally representative and reliable with a larger sample of the same population. In a 
concentrated market the sample of stocks out of which investors must make their 
decisions is already limited; thus, there exists less complexity in the decision making 
process and less need for investment styles. Consequently, style-investing would be 
expected to be of smaller importance as a determinant of herding in highly 
concentrated environments. On the other hand, Barberis et al. (1998) suggested that 
due to the representativeness heuristic investors often extrapolate from recent and 
limited events to imagine patterns that do not exist and create trends. In the context of 
a highly concentrated market, where low trading volumes are very often the case, the 
amount of volumes, i.e. investors, that are needed to start a trend is significantly 
smaller in relation to that of a large market; as such, trends are easier to kick-start in 
concentrated environments and since certain investment styles are trend-based (e.g. 
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contrarian/momentum trading) it could be the case that market concentration can 
amplify the use of such styles
13
 and the herding emanating from them. 
The limited attention bias is positively related to investment styles since the latter 
narrow the available options of investors and ease the process of decision making. 
However, in a concentrated environment, where the available investment options are 
not so many compared to larger markets, the use of investment styles is of less 
significance as a heuristic because there is already a small amount of stocks to choose 
from, thus reducing the need for category learning (investment styles) since it is easier 
for investors to monitor individual stocks. If so, the importance of style as a 
determinant of herding would be expected to dissipate in such markets. On the other 
hand, investment styles are not applied only for simplifying purposes but for 
maximizing profits as well. When styles are applied in a concentrated market, the 
categorization of stocks will limit the available options of investors even more and as 
mentioned earlier in this chapter the less options investors have the more possible it is 
for them to converge to one of them [Bikhchandani et al. (1992)] and herd
14
. 
Similarly, in the context of a highly concentrated market, conformity can positively 
affect herding through the use of investment styles since in such an environment there 
is a greater sense of belonging to that market as well as more monitoring, so deviant 
actions are easier to detect. As such, professionals following the same investment 
                                                          
13
 DeBondt and Thaler (1985) depicted the representativeness heuristic as the main cause for the 
overreaction of investors to news, thus raising the issue of whether ad hoc developed investment styles 
aimed at profiting from this overreaction, such as contrarian trading, could in fact deliver systematic 
gains 
14
 An example would perhaps help clarify this point. Imagine an investor following a style that involves 
buying the top 10 percent of each month’s winners and selling the bottom 10 percent (the top losers). 
The amount of stocks traded a momentum strategy like that would involve would obviously be 
different between a market with 1,000 stocks and a market with 100 stocks. In the former case (the 
market’s with 1,000 stocks) this would involve trading a couple of hundred stocks each month; in the 
latter case (the market’s with 100 stocks) this would involve trading probably no more than a couple of 
dozen.   
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style feel more comfortable when doing what their peers are doing since a wrong 
investment decision would have a bigger impact on their reputation/assessment than 
that of a successful one when deviating from their peers. So due to the high 
competitiveness of the market investors prefer to play safe and it is more likely for 
them to herd towards their peers’ actions.  
Moving on to the rational determinants of the style-herding relationship, there are 
career-driven reasons that can affect herding through style investing. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, professionals often disregard their clients’ interests and act 
according to their own; as such, since professionals are compared to their peers, it is 
safer for them to act in a similar way with them to avoid the risk of deviating from 
them and making a wrong choice that can affect their performance. In the same way, 
young and inexperienced professionals that follow the same style with their more 
experienced peers will most likely copy the actions of the latter. Since in a 
concentrated market there are relatively few professionals, one can find it easier to 
observe the actions of their peers and follow them. What is more, professionals often 
herd due to reputational reasons. As Scharfstein and Stein (1990) suggested, it is often 
the case that professionals disregard their own private informational set and copy their 
peers’ actions due to reputational reasons; a highly concentrated market could 
strengthen this behavior because firstly the market for professionals is too small and 
these would be more willing to protect their reputation (the smaller the market, the 
easier it is to know the reputation of each) and secondly it will be easier for 
professionals to monitor their peers and herd on their actions.   
Information-wise, the level of informational transparency will differ between 
concentrated and large markets [Do et al. (2008)]. The issue here is twofold. On the 
one hand, information in highly concentrated environments tends to be in the hands of 
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a few large market players, thus implying that price moves are mostly conditioned 
upon these players’ trades. As a result, styles are less applicable in such markets; 
perhaps, those styles aiming at mimicking the behavior of informed players
15
 - thus 
minimizing the importance of style as a determinant of herding. The possibility of 
herding rising due to style in these jurisdictions is when those big players are actually 
the ones practicing style-investing themselves. In this case, style can boost herding 
decisively, since the rest of the investors will resort to it as a means of extracting 
informational payoffs from their informed peers’ trades.  
Apart from the above mentioned reasons, relevant research has documented that 
institutional investors tend to exhibit characteristic trading [Sias (2004)], that is select 
stocks with certain characteristics; however in a small concentrated market where the 
pool of available stocks to choose from is relatively small, the chances of convergence 
among managers who follow the same style is quite high [Do et al. (2008)]. Finally, 
Sias (2004) posited that institutional herding could be due to institutions following 
their own lagged trades of the same assets; Do et al. (2008) suggested that there are 
higher chances of institutions following their own lagged investments in a 
concentrated market than in a larger one. 
Summarizing the given reasoning as described above, we can see that there is a gap in 
the literature on how the environment of a highly concentrated market can impact the 
style-herding relationship. Both the behavioral and non-behavioral determinants of 
this relationship can be either amplified or reduced in a highly concentrated market, 
with concomitant effects over the significance of herding; this is where our research 
intends to contribute to the literature, namely by examining whether style investing is 
capable of generating significant herding in a concentrated market environment.  
                                                          
15
 This is the case, for example, of trade-based manipulation, as described by Allen and Gale (1992) 
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Figure 3.1 – Biases affecting Herding 
 
3.3 Style Indicators 
Over the last decades, the importance of investment styles has been widely recognized 
by institutional investors as a means to diversify their portfolios more efficiently and 
what is more as a tool to evaluate their performance and compare it versus each other. 
Today there are numerous investment styles, applied from investors; in our research 
we will study the best documented ones and those that will better aid us in examining 
the impact of market concentration upon the link of style investing and herding on the 
premises of institutional investors. 
 
3.3.1 Momentum 
Momentum strategies have been widely applied by investors in order to maximize 
their profits. Such kinds of strategies involve buying stocks that performed well in the 
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past and sell stocks that performed poorly; in other words this strategy has to do with 
chasing stock trends and is associated with positive feedback trading. There have been 
many possible explanations given by researchers on the sources of such strategies. 
One of them suggests that investors who have an informational disadvantage 
compared to their peers often use past prices, through technical analysis, in order to 
infer information from them as they believe that past prices contain information about 
companies. Furthermore, stop-loss orders and portfolio insurance may account for the 
fact that investors often sell stocks that underperformed in the past. What is more, 
Conrad and Kaul (1998) suggested that the documented profitability of momentum 
strategies could be explained by the cross-sectional variation in mean returns.  
However, there is the “behavioral” view regarding the underlying causes of 
momentum strategy which draws upon cognitive psychology. More specifically, the 
supporters of the behavioral explanation [De Long et al. (1990a), Barberis et al. 
(1998), Daniel et al. (1998) among others] argue that momentum profitability is 
driven by investors’ under-reaction to news. Among the first researches on 
momentum strategies is that of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993); more specifically, using 
data from 1965 till 1989 for the U.S market, they found significantly higher returns 
for the portfolios comprised of winner stocks in contrast to the ones comprised of 
loser stocks. Grinblatt et al. (1995) found evidence of momentum strategies in the U.S 
market on behalf of institutional investors. The research by Rouwenhorst (1998) 
examined the profitability of momentum strategies in 12 European countries for the 
1980-1995 period; his findings suggest that indeed a portfolio of past winners 
outperformed the one consisted of prior losers and that the returns were higher in 
small firms than in large ones. Forner and Marhuenda (2003) examining the Spanish 
market for the 1963-1997 period found significant positive returns for momentum 
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strategies in a 12-month horizon. Galariotis et al. (2007) examining the U.K. market 
with a sample of 6531 firms for the 1964-2005 period found evidence of momentum 
strategies’ profitability, though these were more prominent in the short-run. 
 
3.3.2 Value vs. Growth 
A common categorization of investment funds is according to the type of stocks they 
invest in, whether the latter are value or growth stocks. By the term “value” we define 
stocks that exhibit low P/E ratios and have high dividend yields [Lakonishok et al. 
(1994)]; in other words these are the stocks that trade below their true value. On the 
other hand, “growth” stocks are those with high P/E ratios and low dividend yields 
and represent companies with high earnings growth rate [Lakonishok et al. (1994)]. 
Since this investment style is based on companies’ fundamentals (earnings, dividends, 
cash flows, book value of company, etc.) it can be considered as a rational style on 
behalf of investors. 
There is overwhelming research suggesting that a strategy investing in value stocks 
surpasses the returns of a strategy investing in growth stocks. Among the first 
researches that documented the relationship of the P/E ratio and the expected returns 
of the firms is that of Basu (1977). More specifically, the author using monthly data 
from over 1400 NYSE firms for the period 1956-1971 examined whether stocks with 
low P/E ratios had significantly higher returns than those with high P/E ratios. After 
constructing portfolios of high and low P/E stocks, his empirical results reported 
significantly higher returns for the low P/E portfolios. Another research for the 
Japanese market by Chan et al. (1991), using the size, book to market ratio (B/M), 
cash flow yield (C/P) and earnings yield (E/P) as the fundamental variables, provided 
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supporting evidence of the profitability of the value strategies. More specifically, 
using monthly data from the Tokyo Stock Exchange from 1971 till 1988, the authors 
concluded that stocks with high ratios of the examined variables had higher returns 
than those with low ones. Now at this point, Fama and French (1992) argued that the 
documented superior performance of value stocks is due to the higher underlying risk 
of these stocks. Lakonishok et al. (1994) suggested that the higher returns achieved by 
value strategies are due to the fact that these are “contrarian” to the strategies of noise 
traders. The latter tend to pay too much attention on recent earnings growth and tend 
to overreact to good or bad news. As a result they tend to overprice the growth 
(“glamour”) stocks and since they overreact to companies that performed poorly in 
the recent past, these companies become underpriced. As such, investors who follow 
value strategies and invest in undervalued companies will eventually achieve higher 
returns than those investing in growth stocks. Using data from 1963 till 1990 from 
NYSE and AMEX, Lakonishok et al. (1994) concluded that indeed value strategies 
outperformed the growth ones; what is more, they argued that value stocks did not 
exhibit any higher fundamental risk than the glamour stocks contrary to the given 
explanation by Fama and French (1992). Supporting evidence to the findings of 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) was provided in the research by Porta et al. (1997). The 
authors using data from NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ for the period 1971-1993 also 
documented that value stocks outperformed glamour stocks. After rejecting the risk-
based explanation for the high performance of value stocks, the authors gave a 
behavioral reasoning for this phenomenon. More specifically, they suggested that 
investors often make errors in their expectations about the future earnings of glamour 
stocks; thus when the earnings are actually announced, value stocks, whose 
expectations were lower, outperform glamour stocks. Several researches have been 
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carried out to support the superiority of value strategies. Chin et al. (2002) examining 
the market of New Zealand for the 1988-1995 period also found that the value 
strategies based on accounting ratios outperformed similar growth strategies. Finally, 
Petkova and Zhang (2005) concluded that time-varying risk is close to explaining the 
premium of value stocks, however it fails to do so and that other driving factors of the 
value premium should be explored such as overreaction mispricing or APT- and 
ICAPM-related risks.   
 
3.3.3 Analysts’ Recommendations 
Although analysts’ recommendations do not formally present themselves as 
candidates for style indicators, there has been an increased interest regarding the link 
between analysts’ recommendations and mutual fund managers and how the former 
affect the decision making process of the latter. Relevant research suggests that 
institutional investors are affected by the recommendations of market analysts [Chen 
and Cheng (2005), Busse et al. (2008)]; what is yet to be examined in depth however, 
is if and to what extend the relationship between analysts’ recommendations and fund 
managers affect institutional herding. The theoretical background of this hypothesis is 
that professionals that have an informational disadvantage relative to their peers will 
often be more prone towards following financial analysts in their attempt to infer 
information from them; this sounds logical, as the majority of investment houses do 
not have in-house analysts as their large counterparts. Nevertheless, even the large 
fund management houses which have their own research departments and analysts 
tend to pay attention to other analysts’ forecasts as well. As Brown et al. (2009) and 
O'Brien and Bhushan (1990) suggest, this is due to the fact that fund managers are 
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obliged to apply the “prudent man rule”, namely act to their clients’ best interest; thus  
paying attention to other analysts’ recommendations, and not only those of their in-
house analysts, is often viewed by fund managers as evidence of good and ethical 
practice. Inevitably, the tendency of fund managers to go in line with the market 
analysts will lead to an increase of herding levels; more specifically, if the majority of 
fund managers in a market is leaning towards analysts’ recommendations then it is 
more likely that they will invest in the same stocks (those suggested or revisited by 
the market analysts). The primary candidate for explaining the tendency of fund 
managers towards following analysts’ recommendations is their career; as 
Kacperczyk and Seru (2007) suggest, there is an inverse relationship between 
managerial skills and responses to public information, i.e. bad managers are 
influenced more from analysts’ recommendations than good managers. 
 
3.3.4. Market Value (“Size”) 
Perhaps the most common investing style that one meets in the market is that of the 
categorization of stocks according to their size. In fact, there is a plethora of mutual 
funds characterized as “Small-cap” or “Large-cap” reflecting their focus on investing 
towards small sized and large sized firms respectively. The importance of firms’ size 
and its impact upon stock prices has been initially brought up by Banz (1981); the 
latter examining the NYSE market, for the 1926-1975 period, found that smaller firms 
tended to exhibit higher returns than those predicted by the CAPM, outperforming the 
larger firms. This phenomenon, widely known as the “size effect” and identified as a 
market anomaly, has been empirically supported by numerous studies in the Finance 
literature [Reinganum (1981), Keim (1983)].  
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These researches were the kick-start for the investment community, both individuals 
and institutional, to use firms’ size as an investing style. Indeed, there has been a vast 
amount of research about size as a style determinant used by mutual funds. Brown 
and Goetzmann (1997) examining the US fund industry for the 1976-1994 period 
found evidence for the adoption of size as an investment style by mutual funds. 
Similarly, Chan et al. (2002) examined U.S funds for the 1976-1997 period and found 
that size was a consistent determinant for style investing on behalf of mutual funds. 
What is more, a factor that drives institutional investors to adopt size as an investment 
style is the regulatory authorities. For example, in certain countries where pension 
fund managers are obliged by regulations to exhibit a certain rate of return, they often 
invest in stocks of a certain size, most likely large ones that are representative of the 
market index, in order not to fall behind the market return [Voronkova and Bohl 
(2005)]. As such, we can see that in contrast to certain styles that decay over time 
(such as investing in mortgage-backed bonds, Barberis and Shleifer (2003)), the use 
of size as a style by investors still continues to persist to a large extent.  
 
3.3.5 Volatility 
Volatility is chosen as a style indicator in our research due to the special relationship 
it has with institutional trading; the latter is typified with a high quality of 
information, something that can be positively or negatively related with volatility, i.e. 
the more informational trading in the market the more volatility prevails since prices 
have to respond in more information [Ross (1989)]. As such, there should be a 
positive relationship between volatility and institutional trading. However, still this 
issue remains controversial, whether informational trading is positively or negatively 
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related to volatility. For example a relevant research by Li and Wang (2010) has 
found that institutional trading in China is negatively related to the volatility of prices. 
Though, apart from institutional trading, there is a vast amount of research verifying 
the relationship between volatility and stock returns. Pindyck (1984) found that there 
is a strong relationship between expected stock returns and market volatility and more 
specifically a negative one. However, another research by Poterba and Summers 
(1986) argues that changes in volatility, due to their short run nature, do not have that 
significant effect on stock price changes. Another research by French et al. (1987) 
also documented a negative relationship between volatility and stock price changes. 
What is more, Campbell and Hentschel (1992) also found a negative relationship 
between expected returns and volatility, though not so important. Finally, Busse 
(1999) showed that fund managers’ trading behavior and compensation is affected by 
market volatility.  
 
3.3.6 Volume 
The trading volume of stocks often plays an important role as to whether the latter 
will be picked by investors or not; the more one stock is traded the more information 
about it is conveyed into the market and the more likely it is for investors to pick it. 
What is more, as Chordia and Swaminathan (2000) suggest, stocks with high volume 
tend to react faster upon the arrival of new information in the market than low volume 
stocks. As such volume seems to be a key determinant of investment styles followed 
by investors.  
Among the first researches about the relationship between stock returns and trading 
volume is that of Crouch (1970);the author examining the NYSE found a positive 
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relationship between trading volume and price changes on both the aggregate market 
level and the individual stock level. Similarly, Epps (1975) also linked trading volume 
with stock returns proclaiming that bull markets are associated with high trading 
volumes and vice versa. What is more, the trading volume is found to be linked with 
another investment style, namely momentum; as Lee and Swaminathan (2000) 
postulate, the profitability of the momentum strategies, as these were exhibited by 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), was higher for high volume stocks. 
Chen et al. (2001), examining nine markets for the 1973-2000 period, found that there 
is a positive relationship between trading volume and stock price changes. 
Additionally, Gervais et al. (2001) examined the existence of the “high volume 
premium” on the premises of the NYSE for the 1963-1996 period; their findings 
reveal a premium in high volume stocks in the short-run, i.e. they exhibit higher 
returns when compared to those of low volume stocks. 
 
3.4 The Portuguese market 
Up until the 1990s, the Portuguese market was very small in terms of volume and 
market capitalization. However, in 1993 the Maastricht treaty, which relaxed the trade 
barriers and capital transfer across the countries that voted for it, allowed Portugal to 
attract significant capital flows from other countries through FDIs and securities’ 
investments. This single fact alone led to an increase of 53.2% in the general index of 
the Portuguese market and a 53.3% increase in terms of market capitalization 
[Balbina and Martins (2002)]. In 1996, there was the initial trade of derivative 
instruments at the Oporto Derivatives Market which allowed investors to trade in 
more complex financial products. What is more, further interest rate cuts and the 
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decrease of the inflation fed up the market with additional capital boosting not only 
the stock market but the economy as a whole (GDP growth, exports, etc.);  at the 
same time, the privatization of an enormous number of public companies took place 
during this period. Additionally, the inclusion of the Portuguese market into the MSCI 
index of developed markets in 1997 attracted additional foreign investors seeking to 
invest in such countries. Last but not least, the announcement that Portugal would be 
among the first EU countries that would enter the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
played an important role to the evolution of the market there. It is worth noting that 
from 1993 since mid 1998 the main index of Portugal rose by approximately 470% 
(Figure.1 shows how the main index evolved throughout the years). 
However, the crises of 1999 (Asian and dot com bubble) did not leave the Portuguese 
market unaffected; to the contrary, there was a sharp decline in the securities’ prices 
which led to an overwhelming delisting of firms from the Portuguese Stock 
Exchange. Another milestone for the Portuguese Stock Exchange was its merger into 
the Euronext platform in 2002. From that point onwards started the slow recovery of 
the stock market which was boosted after 2005 and peaked in 2008 where the debt 
crisis came along. During 2009, there has been a recovery from the lowest point of the 
previous year, however during the last couple of years there has been a high 
turbulence in the market due to the uncertainty as to whether Portugal will be able to 
pay its high debt back. 
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Figure 3.2 - The Evolution of the Portugal Index  
 
Now, regarding the market of mutual funds in Portugal; with the first mutual fund 
being introduced in 1985, the market is characterized by an analogous course with the 
country’s economy. More specifically, the rapid growth and expansion of the mutual 
funds’ market during the 1990s was followed by the sharp fall that took place during 
the end of the 1990s. After the crisis the funds’ market shrunk as many funds were 
either terminated or merged with others. Again the fund market started recovering 
after 2003 and especially from 2005 onwards. As Holmes et al. (2011) suggest the 
mutual funds’ market of Portugal is heavily concentrated. For instance by June 2011 
there were 305 funds managed by 19 investment companies with an asset-pool under 
their management worth of approximately 12.89 billion Euros; out of these 305 funds 
the 10 largest held approximately 32.9% of the market and the 5 largest investment 
companies held over 80% of the market, in terms of market capitalization
16
.      
 
 
                                                          
16
 Source: www.cmvm.pt 
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3.5 Data and Methodology 
Our data comprises of monthly mutual fund holdings for the Portuguese market
17
 
from July 1996 till June 2011. After we limited our data to funds that invest only into 
Portuguese stocks, our sample in its final form consists of 65 mutual funds and 99 
stocks. What our sample consists of, is the code and the name of the fund, its 
description, the code and the name of the assets and the number of stocks each fund 
holds for every month of our sample. 
There have been several models used for testing the herd behavior of investors. 
Among the first ones is that of  Lakonishok et al. (1992) (LSV hereafter). However, 
the LSV measure had some drawbacks. The two most important are the following: 
Firstly, the specific measure takes into account the amount of buyers and sellers of a 
specific stock, but not the amount of stock each party trades. So, in a case where 
buyers and sellers of an asset are similar in absolute numbers but the amount of the 
asset traded by buyers is larger than that of sellers, the LSV measure would not 
indicate any herding even if that existed. Secondly, the LSV measure shows the 
persistence of herding in a stock but it can’t show whether it is the same institutions 
that herd or others. To mitigate these issues, Sias (2004) proposed an approach which 
we employ here and which we shall now describe.  
The first thing to do is calculate the fraction of institutions of each security that are 
buyers for it every month
18. Sias named that ratio the “raw fraction of institutions 
buying” for security k at quarter t: 
 
                                                          
17
 The data was provided by CMVM. 
18
 Sias (2004) used quarterly data due to unavailability of higher frequency data in his case. 
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    k,t   
                         k,t
                         k,t                            k,t 
 
He then assumed this ratio and standardized it as follows: 
      
              ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
          
 
 
Where,       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the cross-sectional average raw fraction of institutions buying in 
quarter t and             is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the raw fraction 
of institutions buying in quarter t. Then in order to identify the existence of herding, 
Sias examined the cross-sectional regression of the standardized fraction of 
institutions buying security k        during the current quarter on the standardized 
fraction of institutions buying security k the previous quarter. 
 
                            (1) 
 
In addition, Sias decomposed the correlation between institutional demand this 
quarter and institutional demand the previous quarter into two components in order to 
identify whether the correlation observed is due to institutional investors following 
“their own trades” or institutional investors following “the trades of others”. So, the 
slope coefficient of the above equation is written as follows:  t      k,t  k,t-1  
      [
 
           k,t) (Raw k,t-1)
]   ∑ [∑
( n,k,t –      ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)  n,k,t-1 –     t-1
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
 k,t k,t-1
 k,t
   ]
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     [
 
           k,t) (Raw k,t-1)
]   ∑ [∑ ∑
( n,k,t –      ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)  m,k,t-1 –     t-1
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ 
 k,t k,t-1
 k,t-1
      
 k,t
   ]
   
    (2) 
 
Where Nk,t is the number of investors trading security k in month t and Dn,k,t is a 
dummy variable equal to one (zero) when trader n is a buyer (seller) of security k in 
month t. Likewise, Nk,t-1 is the number of investors trading security k in month t-1 and 
Dn,k,t-1 is a dummy variable equal to one (zero) when trader n is a buyer (seller) of 
security k in month t-1.  Dm,k,t-1 is a dummy variable that equals one (zero) when 
investor m (m≠n) is a buyer (seller) of security k in month t-1. 
The first term on the right hand side of the above equation is the portion of the 
correlation resulting from investors following their own trades. It will be positive if 
investors tend to follow their trades over adjacent months. Otherwise, if investors’ 
transactions in month t are independent of their own transactions in the previous 
month, the first term will be zero. In case where investors reverse the transactions of 
the last month the term will be negative. 
The second term on the right hand side of the above equation is the portion of the 
correlation resulting from investors following other investors. It will be positive if 
investors tend to follow each other over adjacent months. If investors buy (sell) the 
securities that other investors sell (buy) over the previous month, the term will be 
negative. And in case the transactions of investors are independent of the other 
investors’ transactions, the term will be zero.  
The same procedure will be tested for five different thresholds; stocks traded by one 
fund or more, by two or more and so on up until stocks traded by five funds or more. 
Now, in order to test for the herding-style relationship, namely analysts’ 
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recommendations, momentum, size, value/growth, volatility and volume we will input 
an additional variable in order to control for investment styles. 
                                 (3) 
For example, consensus analysts’ recommendations ranked according to the Thomson 
DataStream classification (1-1.49   “strong buy”; 1.5–2.49   “buy”; 2.5–3.49 = 
“hold”; 3.5–4.49   “underperform”; 4.5–5   “sell”). So, when the coefficient    is 
negative this implies an improvement in the recommendation on behalf of the analysts 
and vice versa. 
Table 3.1 provides the descriptive statistics of our data. As one can see at first glance, 
our sample market is typified by high concentration. More specifically, the total 
number of funds is 65 and the number of traded stocks is 99. Furthermore, the average 
number of traded stocks by more than one fund is 37.8 for the whole period, peaking 
in 1998 to 54.8 and declining to 32.5 at the end of our sample period. Likewise, the 
number of average funds per share for the whole period is 7.7, reaching a peak in 
1999 with a number of 10.4 and falling to 7.5 at the end of our sample period. As 
such, one can infer from the above figures that there is a high level of concentration in 
the market examined which could possibly amplify herding; for example, with almost 
8 active funds for each stock in each month, that means that each fund manager has 
seven other fund managers to monitor. 
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Table 3.1 - Descriptive Statistics 
No. of Stocks 99 
                No. of Funds 65 
                No. of  
Stock-holdings 
positions 129276 
                No. of Stock-months 6767                                 
Average No. 
of active stocks 
per month traded by 
Aug 
1996- 
Jun 
2011 
1996  
(Aug-
Dec) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
2011 
(Jan-
Jun) 
≥1 fund 37,8 49,2 52 54,8 51,8 43,8 35,3 30,7 26,9 28,5 32,4 33,8 32,9 34,8 35,2 34,3 32,5 
≥2 funds 34,3 44,2 47,5 49 47,1 38,3 29,5 25,7 23,1 25,5 29,6 32,4 32,1 33,3 33,2 31,8 30,8 
≥3 funds 31,2 39,6 43,6 44,8 42,2 35,1 26,5 23,5 20,5 22,3 26,3 30,4 29,7 31,2 30,8 29 25,8 
≥4 funds 28,7 34,6 40 41,8 39,1 32,3 24,3 21,7 18,5 20,5 23,7 27,8 26,8 29,8 29,1 26,7 24,7 
≥5 funds 26,4 31,6 37,2 39,6 37,1 30,1 21,3 19,4 15,7 18,2 21,2 25,4 25,4 27,7 26,3 24,5 22 
Average No. 
of active funds 
per stock per month 
Aug 
1996- 
Jun 
2011 
1996 
 (Aug-
Dec) 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
2011 
(Jan-
Jun) 
≥1 fund 7,7 7,7 9,3 10,3 10,4 9,7 7,6 7,0 4,4 8,3 5,9 6,6 7,0 7,3 6,9 7,9 7,5 
≥2 funds 8,2 8,0 9,5 11,0 10,7 10,2 8,6 7,8 5,2 9,1 5,8 7,1 7,2 7,6 7,0 8,0 7,5 
≥3 funds 8,7 8,2 9,7 11,8 12,0 10,4 9,1 9,0 6,2 9,3 6,3 7,0 7,4 7,9 7,6 8,3 8,4 
≥4 funds 8,9 8,9 10,2 12,9 12,0 10,8 9,4 9,1 6,4 9,0 6,6 7,4 7,6 8,0 7,7 8,3 8,6 
≥5 funds 9,2 9,5 11,0 13,4 12,3 10,9 10,5 9,1 6,8 9,2 6,7 7,2 7,5 7,8 7,6 8,6 8,8 
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3.6 Research Hypothesis 
Based on the evidence of the relevant literature discussed previously, we would 
expect that in a concentrated environment, such as that of the Portuguese market, style 
investing will have no, or a minimal, impact on the significance of herding. 
Particularly, the sources that are responsible for herding (both rational and irrational) 
are amplified under the context of a concentrated environment. As such, our 
hypotheses are formalized as following:  
H0: Market concentration does not have an impact over the relationship between 
institutional herding and style investing. 
H1: Market concentration has an impact over the relationship between institutional 
herding and style investing. 
3.7 Empirical Results 
3.7.1 Full Sample 
This section presents the empirical findings of our research. We begin our 
presentation with the results for the whole sample period where table 3.2 shows the 
results from equation 1 and equation 2 with the βt coefficient and its decomposition. 
Particularly, we can see that the βt coefficient is positive and highly statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level with a value of 0.3307. This means that institutional 
demand in a month is highly dependent on the institutional demand of the previous 
month. The partitioning of this coefficient reveals that the month-on-month 
dependence of institutional demand is mostly due to institutions following each other 
(herding). More specifically, the part of the coefficient indicating institutions 
following themselves is 0.1037 (highly significant at the 1 percent level) and the part 
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of the coefficient indicating institutions following each other is 0.2270 (also highly 
significant at the 1 percent level); in other words, herding accounts for 69% of the 
dependence in institutional demand month-on-month.  
The next step of our research is to test whether our results remain robust when we 
take into consideration the most popularly traded stocks. As such, we repeat our tests 
using various sequential thresholds of stocks, namely considering only stocks traded 
by ≥2, ≥3, ≥4 and ≥5 funds. Contrary to the research paper of Sias (2004) which tests 
for stocks traded even by twenty or more funds, we limit out threshold to that of 
stocks traded by five or more funds, as Holmes et al. (2011) did, due to the small size 
of the market examined and the number of funds trading in it. Starting with the first 
threshold, we exclude stocks that are traded by only one fund; in this case we observe 
that all coefficients are positive and highly significant (1 percent level) as well as a 
slight increase of the βt coefficient and its part indicating the presence of herding. 
Particularly, in this threshold, herding accounts for 73% of the month-on-month 
correlation in institutional demand. The next threshold (≥3) includes stocks that are 
traded by 3 or more funds. Again, all coefficients are highly significant (1 percent 
level), though there is a slight decrease on the percentage of the herding component 
which now accounts for 66% of the correlation in institutional demand month-on-
month. Moving on to the next threshold that includes stocks traded by 4 or more 
funds, we report similar results; very highly significant (1 percent level) coefficients 
and a 62% part of βt due to herding. Finally, the last threshold is the one that accounts 
for stocks traded by five or more funds. Here, as in the previous thresholds, all 
coefficients are positive and highly significant (1 percent level); what is more, we 
come across the largest value of the βt coefficient indicating a month-on-month 
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correlation of institutional demand equal to 0.3440, out of which 63% (0.2173) is due 
to herding.     
Continuing with our findings, we will analyze the results from equation (3) which 
relate to the applied investing styles in our study. Since the month-on-month-
correlation of institutional demand is mostly due to herding, as our results have 
indicated, we are going to examine what is the direct impact of various investment 
styles upon the institutional demand month-on-month (and indirectly upon herding 
since the latter largely accounts for it). Firstly, we will examine the effect of analyst 
recommendations upon institutional demand which is outlined in table 3.3. In order, 
to gauge analyst recommendations we use the monthly consensus analysts’ 
recommendations by Thomson DataStream (which uses a 1-5 scale and offers the 
following classifications: 1-1.49   “strong buy”; 1.5–2.49   “buy”; 2.5–3.49 = 
“hold”; 3.5–4.49   “underperform”; 4.5–5   “sell”) for all the stocks held by our 
funds at any point during our sample period. Consensus analysts’ recommendations 
enters the equation (3) in standardized form and a positive value of    implies that 
institutional demand increases (decreases) as consensus analysts’ recommendations 
deteriorate (improve)
19
. Conversely, a negative value of    implies that institutional 
demand increases (decreases) as consensus analysts’ recommendations improve 
(deteriorate). 
As we can see from our results, the correlation coefficient of institutional demand 
month-to-month is once again positive (0.3134) and highly significant at the 1 percent 
significance level. Regarding the analysts’ recommendations coefficient   , this is 
                                                          
19
 As consensus analysts’ recommendations increase in value (i.e. move from 1 to 5), this means that 
the analysts’ outlook on a particular stock worsens. Therefore, a positive value of    would suggest 
that institutional demand increases as consensus analysts’ recommendations increase in value (i.e. as 
analysts’ outlook deteriorates). 
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almost equal to zero, as well as statistically insignificant, indicating that institutional 
demand is not affected by analysts’ recommendations. 
Table 3.2 -Test for herding. 
The table presents the results from equation (1) :                      
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
    Partitioned Slope Coefficient     
Average Coefficient (β)   Funds Following their own trades Funds following others' trades   Average R2  
Stocks traded by ≥1 fund           
0,3307 
 (20,44)***   
0,1037  
(9,76)*** 
0,2270 
 (16,87)***   0,1537 
Stocks traded by ≥2 funds           
0,3396 
 (19,50)***   
0,0907 
 (9,04)*** 
0,2489 
 (16,10)***   0,1631 
Stocks traded by ≥3 funds           
0,3417 
 (20,32)***   
0,1149 
 (8,59)*** 
0,2268 
 (13,10)***   0,1642 
Stocks traded by ≥4 funds           
0,3339 
 (18,70)***   
0,1255 
 (8,74)*** 
0,2085 
 (10,88)***   0,1620 
Stocks traded by ≥5 funds           
0,3440 
 (18,21)***   
0,1267 
 (8,31)*** 
0,2173 
 (10,66)***   0,1810 
 
As previously, we follow the same procedure with the thresholds in order to test 
whether using stocks traded by numbers of funds over and above certain thresholds 
produces different results. The results indicate that in all thresholds examined, the 
coefficient of institutional demand month-to-month is always positive, ranging from 
0.3276 to 0.3188 for the most widely traded stocks, and highly significant at the 1 
percent significance level. The coefficient of analyst recommendations has turned 
negative, implying that institutional demand increases as analyst recommendations 
improve, nevertheless it still appears insignificant at all the thresholds of our sample. 
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Table 3.3 – Analysts’ Recommendations 
 
The table presents the results from equation (3) :                                
where         the variable controlling for the recommendations of analysts. 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates significance 
at the 1% level. 
Average Coefficient (β1)   Analysts' Recommendations Coefficient (β2)   Average R
2  
Stocks traded by ≥1 fund         
0,3134 
 (17,27)***   
0,0011 
 (0,07)   0,1924 
Stocks traded by ≥2 funds         
0,3276 
 (17,90)***   
-0,0078  
(-0,48)   0,2015 
Stocks traded by ≥3 funds         
0,3240 
 (17,91)***   
-0,0142 
 (-0,76)   0,2076 
Stocks traded by ≥4 funds         
0,3120 
 (15,42)***   
-0,0139 
 (-0,68)   0,2173 
Stocks traded by ≥5 funds         
0,3188 
 (14,87)***   
-0,0150 
 (-0,68)   0,2374 
 
The next investing style, that we account for, is market value (size). In order to gauge 
size we use the end-of-month market capitalization values
20
 for all the stocks held by 
our funds at any point during our sample period. These market capitalization values 
enter lagged in the equation (3) in standardized form and a positive (negative) value 
of    implies that institutional demand is a straight (inverse) function of stock size. As 
table 3.4 indicates and in line with the previous findings, the correlation coefficient of 
institutional demands remains positive and highly significant at the 1 percent 
significance level. In contrast with the previously discussed style, all the size 
coefficients are negative and the majority of them are also significant; hence, 
according to our results institutional demand month-to-month is significantly 
negatively related to size. So, starting with the results of our full sample period, there 
                                                          
20
 Source: Thomson DataStream. 
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is a high dependence of institutional demand month-to-month as the βt coefficient 
(0.3452) suggests. The    coefficient indicating the market value of firms is negative 
(-0.1748) and significant at the 5 percent level. The picture is similar in the next two 
thresholds examined, stocks traded by two or more funds and by three or more funds. 
Where we observe a different picture is in the next two thresholds which include the 
most traded stocks. Particularly, whereas the correlation coefficient of institutional 
demand remains positive and highly significant (1 percent level), the coefficient of 
market value becomes less significant and at the final threshold it is insignificant. 
 
Table 3.4 – Market Value 
 
The table presents the results from equation (3) :                                
where         the variable controlling for the market value. 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates significance 
at the 1% level. 
Average Coefficient (β1)   Market Value Coefficient (β2)   Average R
2  
Stocks traded by ≥1 fund         
0,3452 
 (20,39)***   
-0,1748 
 (-2,68)**   0,1857 
Stocks traded by ≥2 funds         
0,3507 
 (20,00)***   
-0,1852 
 (-2,61)**   0,1950 
Stocks traded by ≥3 funds         
0,3498 
 (20,29)***   
-0,2212 
 (-2,68)**   0,2020 
Stocks traded by ≥4 funds         
0,3410 
 (18,56)***   
-0,1759 
 (-1,89)*   0,2096 
Stocks traded by ≥5 funds         
0,3543 
 (18,48)***   
-0,1602 
 (-1,61)   0,2297 
 
We next account for the relationship between momentum trading and institutional 
demand month-on-month. In order to gauge momentum we use the end-of-month 
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closing prices
21
 for all the stocks held by our funds at any point during our sample 
period and calculate their monthly log-differenced returns
22
. These calculated stock 
returns enter lagged in the equation (3) in standardized form and a positive value of 
   implies the presence of momentum trading since institutional demand increases 
(decreases) as stock performance improves (decreases). Conversely, a negative value 
of    implies contrarian trading (the opposite of momentum trading) since in that case 
institutional demand increases (decreases) as stock performance worsens (improves). 
Table 3.5 summarizes our findings which, in the full sample of stocks, indicate once 
more a high correlation of institutional demand over periods (0.3483) and a high level 
of significance at the 1 percent significance level. The “momentum” coefficient 
reflecting the relationship between institutional demand and stock’s monthly returns is 
negative (-0.0210), thus presenting evidence of contrarian strategies on behalf of 
institutional investors in Portugal. However, whereas the βt coefficient is significant 
(1 percent level), the “momentum” coefficient is insignificant. Similar results we get 
from the next threshold examined, i.e. stocks traded by two or more funds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21
 Source: Thomson DataStream. 
22
 The monthly log-differenced return for each stock is given by the difference of the natural logarithms 
of prices at the end of months t and t-1, respectively. 
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Table 3.5 – Momentum 
 
The table presents the results from equation (3) :                                
where         the variable controlling for the past returns. 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates 
significance at the 1% level. 
Average Coefficient (β1)   Momentum Coefficient (β2)   Average R
2  
Stocks traded by ≥1 fund         
0,3483 
 (20,28)***   
-0,0210 
 (-1,37)   0,1968 
Stocks traded by ≥2 funds         
0,3478  
(19,78)***   
-0,0248 
 (-1,54)   0,2026 
Stocks traded by ≥3 funds         
0,3460 
 (19,79)***   
-0,0366  
(-2,14)**   0,2030 
Stocks traded by ≥4 funds         
0,3341 
 (18,18)***   
-0,0443 
 (-2,55)**   0,2090 
Stocks traded by ≥5 funds         
0,3492 
 (17,65)***   
-0,0364 
 (-2,11)**   0,2278 
 
The picture changes when accounting for the next three thresholds of the most traded 
stocks. More specifically, whereas the correlation coefficient of the institutional 
demand month-to-month remains positive, ranging from 0.3460 to 0.3492 in the last 
threshold, and highly significant at the 1 percent significance level, the    coefficient 
remains negative (-0.0443) indicating a relationship between contrarian strategies and 
institutional demand month-to-month, though in these thresholds the coefficient is 
significant at the 5 percent significance level contrary to the first two thresholds.  
The next style that is being examined is that of value/growth strategies (Table 3.6). 
The proxy that we choose to use in our research is the P/E ratio where value strategies 
usually pick stocks with low P/E and growth strategies pick stocks with higher P/E 
ratios. Particularly, in order to proxy for value/growth trading we use the end-of-
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month price-earnings (P/E) values
23
 for all the stocks held by our funds at any point 
during our sample period. The calculated month-end price-earnings values enter 
lagged in the equation (3) in standardized form and a positive (negative) value of    
implies that institutional demand is a straight (inverse) function of P/E
24
. Our findings 
do not provide any evidence of a relationship between these strategies and the 
institutional demand month-to-month since the    coefficient of the P/E ratio is 
insignificant at all thresholds of our sample. More specifically, the correlation 
coefficient of institutional demand month-to-month is positive, ranging from 0.3479 
to 0.3409 in the last threshold, and highly significant at the 1 percent significance 
level.   
Table 3.6 – Value Strategies 
 
 
The table presents the results from equation (3) :                                
where         the variable controlling for the P/E ratio. 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and 
***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Average Coefficient (β1)   P/E Coefficient (β2)   Average R
2  
Stocks traded by ≥1 fund         
0,3479 
 (20,18)***   
-0,0001 
 (0,00)   0,2018 
Stocks traded by ≥2 funds         
0,3524 
 (19,88)***   
-0,0068 
 (-0,33)   0,2077 
Stocks traded by ≥3 funds         
0,3487  
(19,18)***   
-0,0064  
(-0,26)   0,2168 
Stocks traded by ≥4 funds         
0,3328 
 (16,90)***   
0,0067 
 (0,28)   0,2191 
Stocks traded by ≥5 funds         
0,3409 
 (16,29)***   
0,0175 
 (0,73)   0,2342 
                                                          
23
 Source: Thomson DataStream. 
24
 A positive value of    indicates that funds increase (decrease) their demand as the stocks’ P/E 
increases (decreases); in other words, funds in that case prefer “expensive” (high P/E) stocks, on 
average. A negative value of    indicates that funds increase (decrease) their demand as the stocks’ P/E 
decreases (increases); in other words, funds in that case prefer “cheap” (low P/E) stocks, on average. 
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Regarding the coefficient of the P/E ratio, this appears negative at the first three 
thresholds and switches to positive in the last two with the most widely traded stocks; 
in all cases however, as mentioned before, the coefficient of the style indicator is 
insignificant. 
The next examined style is that of volatility (Table 3.7). In order to proxy for 
volatility we use the approach by Schwert (1989) which calculates volatility as the 
monthly standard deviation of daily log-differenced returns for each of the stocks held 
by our funds at any point during our sample period. This volatility measure’s values 
enter lagged in the equation (3) in standardized form and a positive (negative) value 
of    implies that institutional demand is a straight (inverse) function of volatility
25
. 
Yet again, the βt coefficient of intertemporal institutional demand month-on-month is 
positive (ranging from 0.3323 to 0.3502) and highly significant at the 1 percent 
significance level at all the thresholds examined. The    coefficient of volatility in its 
turn is positive, except in the threshold including stocks traded by two or more funds, 
and statistically insignificant at all the thresholds examined. As such, our results do 
not indicate any relationship between volatility and institutional demand month-to-
month. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 A positive value of    indicates that funds increase (decrease) their demand as the stocks’ volatility 
increases (decreases); in other words, funds in that case prefer riskier stocks, on average. A negative 
value of    indicates that funds increase (decrease) their demand as the stocks’ volatility decreases 
(increases); in other words, funds in that case prefer less risky stocks, on average. 
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Table 3.7 - Volatility 
 
The table presents the results from equation (3) :                                
where         the variable controlling for the volatility. 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates 
significance at the 1% level. 
Average Coefficient (β1)   Volatility Coefficient (β2)   Average R
2  
Stocks traded by ≥1 fund         
0,3470 
 (19,98)***   
0,0057  
(0,26)   0,1935 
Stocks traded by ≥2 funds         
0,3426  
(20,06)***   
-0,0017 
 (0,08)   0,1983 
Stocks traded by ≥3 funds         
0,3502 
 (21,36)***   
0,0019 
 (0,08)   0,2013 
Stocks traded by ≥4 funds         
0,3323 
 (18,05)***   
0,0367 
 (1,44)   0,2102 
Stocks traded by ≥5 funds         
0,3490 
 (17,90)***   
0,0316  
(1,12)   0,2322 
 
The last style that we examine is that of volume, presented in table 3.8. In order to 
proxy for volume we use the monthly volume (calculated by aggregating all daily 
volume observations
26
 within a month) for each of the stocks held by our funds at any 
point during our sample period. These calculated monthly volume values enter lagged 
in the equation (3) in standardized form
27
 and a positive (negative) value of    implies 
that institutional demand is a straight (inverse) function of volume. As our results 
indicate, the βt coefficient of inter-temporal dependence of institutional trades is 
positive (ranging from 0.3374 to 0.3581) and highly significant at the 1 percent 
significance level, whereas the    coefficient appears negative at all the thresholds 
                                                          
26
 Source: Thomson DataStream. 
27
 Standardized monthly volume values are calculated here by replacing Raw∆k,t with the monthly 
volume values in equation (2). 
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examined. Particularly, the latter is significant at the 5 percent significance level at the 
first two thresholds (stocks traded by one or more funds and stocks traded by two or 
more funds) and appears to gradually lose its significance till the last thresholds 
(stocks traded by five or more funds) where it appears to be insignificant. As such, 
our results suggest a negative relationship between institutional demand month-to-
month and the volume of traded stocks. 
 
Table 3.8 – Volume 
 
The table presents the results from equation (3) :                                
where         the variable controlling for the volume. 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates 
significance at the 1% level. 
Average Coefficient (β1)   Volume Coefficient (β2)   Average R
2  
Stocks traded by ≥1 fund         
0,3374 
 (19,50)***   
-0,0222 
 (-2,30)**   0,1913 
Stocks traded by ≥2 funds         
0,3492  
(19,18)***   
-0,0200 
 (-1,99)**   0,2026 
Stocks traded by ≥3 funds         
0,3533 
 (19,99)***   
-0,0185 
 (-1,80)*   0,2093 
Stocks traded by ≥4 funds         
0,3430 
 (17,95)***   
-0,0181 
 (-1,71)*   0,2176 
Stocks traded by ≥5 funds         
0,3581 
 (17,90)***   
-0,0118 
 (-1,15)   0,2342 
 
So far, our results indicate a highly significant (1 percent level) institutional demand 
over the months; what is more, this institutional demand appears to be due to funds 
following the trades of other funds and it is robust when accounting for a number of 
investing styles. Consistent to our hypothesis, there is limited evidence of style 
investing in such a concentrated environment as half of the style-indicators employed 
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in this study (analysts’ recommendations, price-earnings, and volatility) appear 
insignificant. However, in the Portuguese fund industry, there is evidence of 
contrarian trading as well as a preference towards trading on stocks of small 
capitalization and lower volume stocks. 
 
3.7.2 Pre and Post Euronext 
Another test of robustness that we are going to apply is to break the sample into two 
periods, pre-Euronext and post-Euronext. In September 2002, the Portuguese Stock 
Exchange was merged into Euronext and it will be interesting to see whether this had 
any effect on both institutional demand month-on-month and the examined 
investment styles. So, our first sub sample covers the period July 1996 till August 
2002 and the second one covers the period September 2002 till June 2011. 
Starting our analysis with the full sample results, there are some interesting findings 
revealed in table 3.9. Starting with the βt coefficient of the inter-temporal dependence 
of institutional demand month-on-month, we see that it is still significant pre and post 
Euronext at the 1 percent significance level. However, the value of the βt coefficient 
was lower before Euronext (0.2806) than in the post-Euronext period (0.3647); as the 
t-test of the relative change between these two periods indicates, this increase was 
significant (at the 5 percent level).  
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Table 3.9 – Herding pre and post Euronext 
 
The table presents the results from equation (1) :                      
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
    
Partitioned Slope Coefficient 
    Average Coefficient (β)     Funds Following their own trades     Funds following others' trades     Average R
2
  
Pre-Euronext Post-Euronext t test   Pre-Euronext Post-Euronext t test   Pre-Euronext Post-Euronext t test   Pre-Euronext Post Euronext 
Stocks traded by ≥1 fund 
0,2806  
(12,98)*** 
0,3647 
 (16,33)*** (-2,71)**   
0,0694 
 (5,74)*** 
0,1269 
 (8,20)*** (-2,93)**   
0,2112 
 (10,41)*** 
0,2378 
 (13,27)*** (-0,98)   0,1089 0,1842 
Stocks traded by ≥2 funds 
0,3129  
(13,61)*** 
0,3588 
 (14,68)*** (-1,33)   
0,0541 
 (5,47)*** 
0,1156 
 (7,77)*** (-3,42)***   
0,2588 
 (10,75)*** 
0,2422 
 (11,97)*** (-0,53)   0,1293 0,1861 
Stocks traded by ≥3 funds 
0,3072  
(13,65)*** 
0,3652 
 (15,50)*** (-1,78)*   
0,0731 
 (4,66)*** 
0,1433 
 (7,41)*** (-2,82)**   
0,2341 
 (8,31)*** 
0,2219 
 (10,09)*** (-0,34)   0,1282 0,1886 
Stocks traded by ≥4 funds 
0,3231  
(14,19)*** 
0,3413 
 (13,25)*** (-0,53)   
0,0813 
 (4,99)*** 
0,1555 
 (7,41)*** (-2,79)**   
0,2418 
 (8,49)*** 
0,1858 
 (7,26)*** (1,46)   0,1290 0,1844 
Stocks traded by ≥5 funds 
0,3382  
(12,79)*** 
0,3480 
 (13,26)*** (-0,26)   
0,0788 
 (4,44)*** 
0,1592 
 (7,21)*** (-2,84)**   
0,2593 
 (8,11)*** 
0,1888 
 (7,20)*** (1,71)*   0,1545 0,199 
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Likewise, there was a significant increase (5 percent level) in the first component of 
the βt coefficient, indicating funds following their own trades; as such in the period 
before Euronext the coefficient had a value of 0.0694 and increased to 0.1269, both 
values being significant at the 1 percent level. Contrary to the previous coefficients, 
the herding coefficient did increase but the relative change over these two periods was 
insignificant as the t-statistic suggests. So, before Euronext the herding component 
had a value of 0.2112 and after Euronext increased to 0.2378, both values being 
significant at the 1 percent level. What is more, the herding component accounted for 
75% of the institutional demand month-on-month before Euronext and fell to 65% in 
the period following the merger into Euronext. 
As previously, we will use some thresholds to test whether our findings remain robust 
when accounting for more widely traded stocks. The first threshold is that of stocks 
traded by two or more funds. At first glance we can see that the βt coefficient and its 
two components are all positive and highly significant at the 1 percent level. The βt 
coefficient appears increased in the second period, from 0.3129 to 0.3588, though this 
change is not significant. What is significant (at the 1 percent level) is the change of 
the first component which increased from 0.0541 in the first period to 0.1156 in the 
second one. The second component of the βt coefficient, measuring herding, appears 
to be slightly decreased in the second period after Euronext from 0.2588 to 0.2422; 
however this change is not significant. Overall, the percentage of herding on the 
dependence of institutional demand month-on-month fell from 83% to 68%. 
The next threshold examined is that of stocks traded by three or more funds. 
Accordingly, the coefficient of temporal dependence of institutional demand and its 
two components are significant at the 1 percent significance level. What is more, there 
is a significant increase (10 percent level) on the βt coefficient from 0.3072 to 0.3652 
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over the two periods and a significant increase (5 percent level) of the first component 
from 0.0731 to 0.1433 over the two periods. In contrast, there is a decrease, though 
not significant, of the herding component from 0.2341 to 0.2219 over the two periods. 
As such the percentage of herding over the institutional demand month-on-month fell 
from 76% in the first period to 61% in the second one. Moving forward to the next 
threshold, that of stocks traded by four or more funds, we document a similar picture; 
with the βt coefficient and its two components being significant (1 percent level) the 
former one increases over the two sub-periods, though not significantly, from 0.3231 
to 0.3413 and so does its first component from 0.0813 to 0.1555, though this change 
is significant at the 5 percent significance level. As in previous cases, the herding 
component decreases from 0.2418 to 0.1858, though not significantly, and its 
percentage over the total institutional demand month-on-month correlation falls from 
75% to 54%. 
In the last threshold, with stocks trade by five or more funds, yet once more the βt 
coefficient and its two components are significant (1 percent level) at both periods. 
The βt coefficient and its first component have increased, the first one insignificantly 
so and the second one significantly at the 5 percent level, whereas there is a 
significant decrease (10 percent level) on the herding component from 0.2593 to 
0.1888 over the two periods. Finally, the contribution of herding on month-on-month 
institutional demand correlation fell from 77% to 54% from the first period of our 
sample to the second one. 
What is next is to analyze the findings regarding our applied investing styles and their 
relationship with institutional demand. Table 3.10 shows the results regarding analyst 
recommendations. Starting with the sample of all stocks, we can see that the 
correlation coefficient of institutional demand month-to-month is positive and highly 
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significant at the 1 percent significance level. Furthermore, we document an 
insignificant increase from 0.2870 in the first period to 0.3314 in the second period. 
Regarding, the analysts’ recommendations coefficient, this is positive (0.0043) in the 
pre-Euronext period and negative (-0.0010) in the post Euronext period, though 
insignificant in both cases and without any significant change over these two periods. 
The next threshold includes stocks traded by two or more funds. As we can see, the 
case is the same for the βt coefficient, i.e. it is positive and highly significant (1 
percent level). Particularly, there is an insignificant increase in the βt coefficient (from 
0.3211 to 0.3321), whereas the coefficient of analysts’ recommendations is negative 
in both pre and post Euronext periods, (-0.0046) and (-0.0099) respectively, contrary 
to the previous threshold where it was positive in the first period, and this increase is 
insignificant. In the third threshold, i.e. stocks traded by three or more funds, we 
document that the βt coefficient is positive and highly significant (1 percent level), 
increasing from 0.3146 to 0.3303. Furthermore, once again the coefficient of analyst 
recommendations remains negative at both periods (-0.0183 and -0.0115 respectively) 
and its relative increase over the two periods is insignificant as well. 
Things begin to change from the next threshold onwards. More specifically, in the 
threshold that includes stocks traded by four or more funds, the βt coefficient appears 
for the first time to decrease over the two periods (from 0.3328 to 0.2978), though not 
significantly. As regards the coefficient of the analysts’ recommendations this 
remains insignificant over the two periods, however there is a switch of its sign from 
negative in the first period to positive in the second one, (-0.0428) and (0.0057) 
respectively. 
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Table  3.10 – Analysts’ recommendations pre and post Euronext 
 
The table presents the results from equation (3) :                                
where         the variable controlling for the analysts’ recommendations. 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Average Coefficient (β)     
Analysts' recommendations Coefficient 
(β2)     Average R
2  
Pre-Euronext Post-Euronext t test   Pre-Euronext Post-Euronext t test   Pre-Euronext Post Euronext 
Stocks traded by ≥1 fund 
0,2870  
(12,00)*** 
0,3314 
 (12,88)*** (-1,26)   
0,0043 
 (0,20) 
-0,0010 
 (-0,05) (0,18)   0,1504 0,2210 
Stocks traded by ≥2 funds 
0,3211 
 (13,57)*** 
0,3321 
 (12,64)*** (-0,31)   
-0,0046 
 (-0,21) 
-0,0099  
(-0,44) (0,17)   0,1644 0,2267 
Stocks traded by ≥3 funds 
0,3146 
 (13,31)*** 
0,3303 
 (12,77)*** (1,97)***   
-0,0183  
(-0,69) 
-0,0115 
 (-0,44) (-0,18)   0,1697 0,2333 
Stocks traded by ≥4 funds 
0,3328  
(13,96)*** 
0,2978  
(9,96)*** (0,92)   
-0,0428  
(-1,53) 
0,0057 
 (0,20) (-1,21)   0,1796 0,2429 
Stocks traded by ≥5 funds 
0,3467 
 (12,34)*** 
0,2998  
(9,83)*** (1,13)   
-0,0479 
 (-1,70)* 
0,0073 
 (0,23) (-1,30)   0,2018 0,2615 
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Lastly, when accounting for stocks traded by five or more funds, we see yet again that 
the correlation coefficient of institutional demand month-to-month is still positive and 
significant (1 percent level) and more specifically that it is insignificantly decreasing 
over the two periods (from 0.3328 to 0.2978). There is also another change in this 
threshold compared to the previous ones and this has to do with the coefficient of 
analysts’ recommendations which appears to be statistically significant (10 percent 
level) in the pre-Euronext period. Again, the sign of the coefficient appears increasing 
over the two periods from (-0.0479) to (0.0073). 
The next style that we are going to examine is that of market value. Again, as table 
3.11 indicates, the βt coefficient is positive and highly significant (1 percent level) at 
both periods, pre and post Euronext; what is more, we document a significant (5 
percent level) increase on the βt coefficient (from 0.2872 to 0.3846). Regarding the 
coefficient of market value, this appears negative on both periods, however it is only 
significant (1 percent level) at the post Euronext period and its decrease over these 
two periods is also statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The next threshold, 
i.e. stocks traded by two or more funds, reveals similar results. Particularly, the βt 
coefficient (significant at the 1 percent level) has statistically (10 percent level) 
increased over the two periods (from 0.3160 to 0.3742). Again, the market value 
coefficient appears negative on both periods (-0.0277 and -0.2921 respectively), 
though significant (1 percent level) at the post Euronext period with its relative 
decrease over the two periods being statistically significant (10 percent level). A 
similar picture is witnessed on the threshold examining stocks traded by three or more 
funds. More specifically, the βt coefficient which is significant (1 percent level) at 
both periods appears to significantly (5 percent level) increase over the two periods 
from (0.3086 to 0.3778). 
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Table 3.11 – Market Value 
 
The table presents the results from equation (3) :                                
where         the variable controlling for the market value. 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Average Coefficient (β)     Market Value Coefficient (β2)     Average R
2  
Pre-Euronext Post-Euronext t test   Pre-Euronext Post-Euronext t test   Pre-Euronext Post Euronext 
Stocks traded by ≥1 fund 
0,2872 
 (11,99)*** 
0,3846  
(17,02)*** (-2,96)**   
-0,0105  
(-0,12) 
-0,2864 
 (-3,14)*** (2,20)**   0,1369 0,2189 
Stocks traded by ≥2 funds 
0,3160  
(13,26)*** 
0,3742 
 (15,32)*** (-1,71)*   
-0,0277 
 (-0,29) 
-0,2921 
 (-2,94)*** (1,92)*   0,1561 0,2213 
Stocks traded by ≥3 funds 
0,3086 
 (13,18)*** 
0,3778 
 (15,80)*** (-2,07)**   
-0,0292 
 (-0,29) 
-0,3516 
 (-2,95)*** (2,07)**   0,1562 0,2332 
Stocks traded by ≥4 funds 
0,3208 
 (13,63)*** 
0,3546  
(13,44)*** (-0,96)   
-0,0079 
 (-0,07) 
-0,2901 
 (-2,17)** (1,58)   0,1663 0,2391 
Stocks traded by ≥5 funds 
0,3414 
 (12,64)*** 
0,3631 
 (13,69)*** (-0,57)   
0,0274 
 (0,20) 
-0,2877 
 (-2,07)** (1,62)   0,1954 0,2529 
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Moreover, the coefficient of market value is again highly significant (1 percent level) 
on the second sub-period and its decrease from (-0.0292) to (-0.3516) over these two 
periods is also significant (5 percent level). 
When looking into stocks traded by four or more funds, we again observe that the 
correlation coefficient of institutional demands month-to-month is positive and highly 
significant (1 percent level) and that there is an insignificant increase. Yet again the 
coefficients of market value appear significant only at the post Euronext era, though 
this time they are significant at the 5 percent significance level instead of the 1 
percent level in the previous thresholds. What is more, their decrease over the two 
periods is not statistically significant, differentiating from the previous thresholds. 
The next style that we are going to analyze is momentum, i.e. whether trading 
strategies affect institutional demand over periods. As table 3.12 indicates, the 
correlation coefficient of institutional demand is positive and highly significant (1 
percent level) at both periods in all the thresholds examined. Furthermore, we can see 
that it appears to increase over the two periods, with this relative increase being 
significant (5 percent level) only at the thresholds of the full sample stocks and those 
traded by three or more funds. The momentum coefficient in its turn is insignificant in 
the pre Euronext periods, whereas in the post Euronext periods it appears negative and 
significant at all thresholds except the last one, i.e. stocks traded by five or more 
funds. 
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Table 3.12 – Momentum 
 
The table presents the results from equation (3) :                                
where         the variable controlling for the past returns. 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Average Coefficient (β)     Momentum Coefficient (β2)     Average R
2  
Pre-Euronext Post-Euronext t test   Pre-Euronext Post-Euronext t test   Pre-Euronext Post Euronext 
Stocks traded by ≥1 fund 
0,2925 
 (12,08)*** 
0,3862 
 (16,75)*** (-2,80)**   
0,0129 
 (0,63) 
-0,0440 
 (-2,06)** (1,92)*   0,1403 0,2352 
Stocks traded by ≥2 funds 
0,3160 
 (13,01)*** 
0,3695 
 (15,16)*** (-1,55)   
-0,0016 
 (-0,07) 
-0,0406 
 (-1,83)* (1,23)   0,1588 0,2323 
Stocks traded by ≥3 funds 
0,3051 
 (12,41)*** 
0,3737 
 (15,66)*** (-2,00)**   
-0,0204 
 (-0,79) 
-0,0476 
 (-2,09)** (0,79)   0,1629 0,2303 
Stocks traded by ≥4 funds 
0,3192 
 (13,16)*** 
0,3441 
 (13,16)*** (-0,70)   
-0,0317 
 (-1,16) 
-0,0529 
 (-2,34)** (0,60)   0,1756 0,2317 
Stocks traded by ≥5 funds 
0,3326 
 (11,54)*** 
0,3605 
 (13,40)*** (-0,71)   
-0,0426 
 (-1,54) 
-0,0322 
 (-1,46) (-0,29)   0,2009 0,2461 
124 
 
The next style examined is that of value/growth strategies (table 3.13). Once more, the 
coefficient of institutional demand month-to-month is positive and highly significant 
(1 percent level) at both periods in all the thresholds examined; what is more, there is 
a significant increase on the βt coefficient (1 percent level) in all thresholds as well. 
Regarding the coefficient of the P/E ratio, which is used as a proxy for the 
value/growth strategy, this appears insignificant both in the pre and post Euronext 
period. In a few words, we can say that there are mixed results regarding the use of 
value/growth strategies as these are reflected through our P/E proxy. More 
specifically, in some cases the sign of the coefficient is positive and in others 
negative. If we concentrate on the majority of the cases we could say that there are 
indications of value strategies; however since in all cases the coefficients were 
insignificant we can say that there is no impact of these strategies upon the 
institutional demand month-to-month in both the pre and post Euronext periods.  
The next indicator examined is that of volatility (Table 3.14). Again here, the 
coefficient βt remains positive and highly significant at both pre and post Euronext 
periods with the relative increase being significant (5 percent level) only in the first 
and third thresholds examined. The volatility coefficient in its turn appears positive 
and insignificant in the pre Euronext period, with the exception of the second and 
third thresholds where it appears significant at the 5 percent and 10 percent 
significance levels respectively. 
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Table 3.13 – Value/Growth strategies 
 
The table presents the results from equation (3) :                                
where         the variable controlling for the P/E ratio. 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Average Coefficient (β)     P/E Coefficient (β2)     Average R
2  
Pre-Euronext Post-Euronext t test   Pre-Euronext Post-Euronext t test   Pre-Euronext Post Euronext 
Stocks traded by ≥1 fund 
0,2758  
(11,82)*** 
0,3969 
 (17,17)*** (-3,69)***   
0,0208 
 (0,87) 
-0,0142 
 (-0,55) (0,99)   0,1424 0,2422 
Stocks traded by ≥2 funds 
0,2872 
 (12,18)*** 
0,3966  
(16,36)*** (-3,24)**   
-0,0076 
 (-0,25) 
-0,0063  
(-0,22) (-0,03)   0,1594 0,2405 
Stocks traded by ≥3 funds 
0,2763 
 (11,75)*** 
0,3979 
 (15,92)*** (-3,54)***   
-0,0118 
 (-0,34) 
-0,0028 
 (-0,08) (-0,18)   0,1669 0,2507 
Stocks traded by ≥4 funds 
0,2854 
 (11,51)*** 
0,3650 
 (12,98)*** (-2,12)**   
0,068 
 (0,18) 
0,0066 
 (0,21) (0,00)   0,1745 0,2494 
Stocks traded by ≥5 funds 
0,2927 
 (10,11)*** 
0,3737 
 (12,97)*** (-1,98)**   
0,0361 
 (1,01) 
0,0049 
 (0,15) (0,65)   0,1984 0,2586 
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In the post Euronext period, the volatility coefficient appears insignificant at all 
thresholds; furthermore, it is negative in the first three thresholds examined whereas 
in the last two thresholds of the most traded stocks it appears positive. The only cases 
where there is a significance decrease (5 percent level) of the coefficient is on the 
second and the third threshold. Overall, we could say that there is weak evidence of a 
negative relationship between volatility and month-on-month institutional demand 
and this is present only in two thresholds, namely in those with stocks traded by two 
or more funds and those traded by three or more funds, hence in less widely traded 
stocks. 
The final style that is examined is that accounting for the trading volume (table 3.15). 
Once more, the βt coefficient remains positive and significant (1 percent level) in both 
sub-periods at all the thresholds examined. As our results indicate, there is a 
significant (5 percent level) increase in the βt coefficient in the first and the third 
threshold whereas in the other cases the relative change between the two sub-periods 
is insignificant. The volume coefficient is positive and insignificant in the first sub-
period at all the thresholds examined whereas in the post Euronext period shifts to 
negative and significant at the 1 percent significance level in the first three thresholds 
and at the 5 percent significance level in the last two thresholds. Moreover, its relative 
change over the two periods is also significant (5 percent level) at all thresholds.  
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Table 3.14 – Volatility 
 
The table presents the results from equation (3) :                                
where         the variable controlling for the volatility. 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
          Average Coefficient (β) 
  
Volatility Coefficient (β2) 
  
Average R2  
Pre-Euronext Post-Euronext t test   Pre-Euronext Post-Euronext t test   Pre-Euronext Post Euronext 
Stocks traded by ≥1 fund 
0,2962 
 (12,22)*** 
0,3742 
 (16,21)*** (-2,33)**   
0,0320 
 (1,12) 
-0,024 
 (-0,87) (1,41)   0,1583 0,2175 
Stocks traded by ≥2 funds 
0,3216 
 (14,35)*** 
0,3642  
(14,68)*** (-1,28)   
0,0608 
 (2,19)** 
-0,0318 
 (-1,05) (2,26)**   0,1463 0,2214 
Stocks traded by ≥3 funds 
0,3040 
 (13,56)*** 
0,3816 
 (16,94)*** (-2,44)**   
0,0586 
(1,76)* 
-0,0366 
 (-1,22) (2,12)**   0,1668 0,2248 
Stocks traded by ≥4 funds 
0,3141 
 (13,85)*** 
0,3446  
(12,85)*** (-0,87)   
0,0329 
 (0,94) 
0,0393 
 (1,10) (-0,13)   0,1719 0,2361 
Stocks traded by ≥5 funds 
0,3362 
 (12,90)*** 
0,3577 
 (12,96)*** (-0,57)   
0,0157 
 (0,40) 
0,0424 
 (1,08) (-0,48)   0,2003 0,2539 
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Table 3.15 – Volume 
 
The table presents the results from equation (3) :                                
where         the variable controlling for the volume. 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Average Coefficient (β)     Volume Coefficient (β2)     Average R
2  
Pre-Euronext Post-Euronext t test   Pre-Euronext Post-Euronext t test   Pre-Euronext Post Euronext 
Stocks traded by ≥1 fund 
0,2903 
 (12,29)*** 
0,3693 
 (15,51)*** (-2,36)**   
0,0106  
(0,84) 
-0,0444 
 (-3,31)*** (3,00)**   0,1409 0,2255 
Stocks traded by ≥2 funds 
0,3183 
 (13,39)*** 
0,3701 
 (14,32)*** (-1,48)   
0,0138 
 (1,13) 
-0,0429 
 (-2,99)*** (3,01)**   0,1564 0,2340 
Stocks traded by ≥3 funds 
0,3113 
 (13,01)*** 
0,3818 
 (15,56)*** (-2,06)**   
0,0128 
 (1,04) 
-0,0397 
 (-2,69)*** (2,73)**   0,1581 0,2441 
Stocks traded by ≥4 funds 
0,3241 
 (13,81)*** 
0,3558 
 (12,77)*** (-0,87)   
0,0114 
 (0,89) 
-0,0381 
 (-2,50)** (2,49)**   0,1634 0,2543 
Stocks traded by ≥5 funds 
0,3430 
 (12,86)*** 
0,3684 
 (12,99)*** (-0,65)   
0,0149 
 (1,24) 
-0,0300  
(-1,99)** (2,33)**   0,1855 0,2674 
  
129 
 
What can one infer upon the results from tables 3.10-3.15, is that the styles that 
appear significant in the full period sample draw their significance in the post-
Euronext period; in addition, in the post-Euronext period, there is a decrease in the 
“funds following the trades of others” and an increase in the part “funds following 
their own trades”. A possible explanation of this phenomenon could be that the 
induction of the Portuguese stock market into the Euronext improved the transparency 
and the quality of the information in the market. As such, fund managers had fewer 
incentives to herd on their peers and started to apply their own investing strategies. 
The latter view, is strengthened though the fact that the style-indicators are significant 
in the post-Euronext period, as tables 3.10-3.15 indicate. However, the post-Euronext 
period includes the current financial crisis, the effect of which we are going to 
examine in the next section. 
3.7.3 Pre and Post Crisis 
In order to identify any possible effects of the financial crisis into our results we will 
break our second sub-period (post-Euronext) into two sub-samples, namely pre and 
post crisis. The crisis began in the U.S market due to the real estate bubble and the 
sub-prime mortgages. Later on, the crisis spread to the European markets as many of 
the European banks were exposed on such kind of investments, often referred to as 
toxic bonds; there have been several cases where private banks were bail out from the 
governments in order not to declare bankruptcy. What is more, the debt crisis 
outbreak in a numerous European countries, such as Ireland, Greece and Portugal 
which is still undergo when this thesis is written. As such, we will try to gauge 
whether the results that came up on the post Euronext period are robust or were 
subject to other factors and more specifically whether the crisis outbreak in 2008 
affected the behavior of institutional investors in terms of herding (through month-to-
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month institutional demand) and the impact of style investing on it. Accordingly, the 
first period will be from 1/9/2002 till 31/12/2007 and the second sub-period will be 
from 1/1/2008 till 31/6/2011. 
As we can see from table 3.16, the βt coefficient and both its components are positive 
and highly significant at the 1 percent significance level for both the pre and post 
crisis periods. Particularly, the βt coefficient appears insignificantly decreasing from 
0.3672 to 0.3609, whereas its first component, i.e. institutions following themselves, 
increases from 0.1221 to 0.1343, though the relative change over the two periods is 
insignificant. Regarding the herding component, this appears insignificantly 
decreasing from 0.2451 to 0.2265 and its overall percentage over the βt coefficient 
decreases from 67% to 63% over the two periods.   
What is next is to examine whether there are differences in the results when we 
account for more widely traded stocks. As such, in the threshold with stocks traded by 
two or more funds we again observe that the correlation coefficient and its two 
components are positive and highly significant at the 1 percent significance level at 
both periods. Starting with the βt coefficient we can see that there is a small increase 
from 0.3569 to 0.3590 in the second period, though this relative increase is 
insignificant. Once more, the first component increases over the two sub-periods, 
namely from 0.1015 to 0.1370, though again this change is insignificant. Lastly, the 
herding component appears to decrease over the two periods from 0.2554 to 0.2220 
and its contribution over the month-to-month institutional demand falls from 72% to 
62%. 
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Table 3.16 – Herding pre and post Crisis 
 
The table presents the results from equation (1) :                      
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
    
Partitioned Slope Coefficient 
    Average Coefficient (β)     Funds Following their own trades     Funds following others' trades     Average R2  
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis t test   Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis t test   Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis t test   Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
Stocks traded by ≥1 fund 
0,3672 
 (12,01)*** 
0,3609 
 (11,21)*** (1,98)   
0,1221 
 (8,28)*** 
0,1343 
 (4,17)*** (2,00)   
0,2451 
 (9,72)*** 
0,2265 
 (9,42)*** (1,98)   0,1900 0,1753 
Stocks traded by ≥2 funds 
0,3569  
(10,35)*** 
0,359 
 (10,62)*** (1,98)   
0,1015 
 (7,46)*** 
0,137  
(4,32)*** (2,00)   
0,2554 
 (9,15)*** 
0,2220  
(7,82)*** (1,98)   0,1946 0,1732 
Stocks traded by ≥3 funds 
0,3629 
 (10,90)*** 
0,3685 
 (11,70)*** (1,98)   
0,126 
 (6,95)*** 
0,1695 
 (4,21)*** (2,00)   
0,2369 
 (7,70)*** 
0,1990 
 (6,68)*** (1,98)   0,1973 0,1754 
Stocks traded by ≥4 funds 
0,3415 
 (9,80)*** 
0,341 
 (8,98)*** (1,99)   
0,1315 
 (6,30)*** 
0,1919 
 (4,56)*** (2,00)   
0,2100 
 (5,95)*** 
0,1490 
 (4,20)*** (1,98)   0,1936 0,1703 
Stocks traded by ≥5 funds 
0,3531 
 (9,98)*** 
0,3401  
(8,73)*** (1,99)   
0,1409 
 (6,26)*** 
0,1870 
 (4,25)*** (2,00)   
0,2122 
 (5,77)*** 
0,1531 
 (4,36)*** (1,98)   0,2107 0,1811 
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The next threshold examines stocks that are traded by three funds or more; again our 
results indicate that the coefficient of institutional demand month-to-month and its 
two components are positive and high significant at the 1 percent significance level at 
the periods pre and post crisis. The βt coefficient appears to insignificantly increase 
from 0.3629 to 0.3685 over the two periods, as its first component does; the latter 
increases (insignificantly) from 0.1260 to 0.1695 over the two periods. The herding 
component appears decreasing once more, though insignificantly, from 0.2369 to 
0.1990 over the two periods; accordingly its contribution over the institutional 
demand month-to-month decreases from 65% to 54% over the two periods. 
Moving on to the next threshold that includes stocks traded by four or more funds we 
document that the βt coefficient and both its components are positive and highly 
significant at the 1 percent significance level at both periods. The first one 
insignificantly decreases from 0.3415 to 0.3410 in the second sub period whereas its 
first component increases, though insignificantly, from 0.1315 to 0.1919. The herding 
component appears to insignificantly decreasing from 0.2100 to 0.1490 and its 
percentage over the βt coefficient falls from 61% to 44%. 
The results from our final threshold, i.e. stocks traded by five or more funds, are 
similar to the previous thresholds’. Particularly, the βt coefficient and both its 
components are positive and highly significant (1 percent level) at the pre and post 
crisis periods. More specifically, the βt coefficient insignificantly decreases from 
0.3531 to 0.3401 over the two periods whereas its first component increases 
(insignificantly) from 0.1409 to 0.1870. The herding component appears decreasing 
(insignificantly) over the two periods from 0.2122 to 0.1531 with its percentage over 
the correlation coefficient of institutional demand month-to-month falling from 60% 
to 45%. 
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The next step in our analysis is to examine the impact of the crisis on both the 
correlation of month-on-month institutional demand and investment styles. Starting 
with the analysts’ recommendations (table 3.17) we observe that the correlation 
coefficient of institutional demand month-to-month is positive and significant at the 1 
percent significance level at both periods, pre and post crisis, in all the thresholds 
examined; particularly, the correlation coefficient of institutional demand month-to-
month decreases over the two periods insignificantly in the first three thresholds and 
significantly so at the 10 percent and 5 percent significance levels in the last two 
thresholds respectively. Regarding the coefficient of analysts’ recommendations, this 
appears insignificant in the pre crisis period at all the thresholds examined. In the post 
crisis period, the coefficient of analysts’ recommendations in insignificant in all the 
thresholds but the last two ones with the most widely traded stocks of our sample 
where it is significant (10 percent level) and positive; in addition the relative change 
over the two periods in these last thresholds is also significant at the 5 percent 
significance level.  
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Table 3.17 – Analysts’ recommendations 
 
The table presents the results from equation (3) :                                
where         the variable controlling for the analysts’ recommendations. 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Average Coefficient (β)     Analysts' recommendations Coefficient (β2)     Average R
2  
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis t test   Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis t test   Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
Stocks traded by ≥1 fund 
0,3376 
 (9,42)*** 
0,3218 
 (9,04)*** (1,98)   
0,0100 
 (0,34) 
-0,0178 
 (-0,62) (1,98)   0,2396 0,1925 
Stocks traded by ≥2 funds 
0,3546  
(10,05)*** 
0,2978  
(7,68)*** (1,99)   
-0,0139 
 (-0,44) 
-0,0039 
 (-0,13) (1,98)   0,2552 0,1831 
Stocks traded by ≥3 funds 
0,3616 
 (10,66)*** 
0,2827 
 (7,21)*** (1,99)   
-0,0304 
 (-0,82) 
0,0175 
 (0,54) (1,98)   0,2669 0,1820 
Stocks traded by ≥4 funds 
0,3400 
 (9,01)*** 
0,2335 
 (4,89)*** (1,99)*   
-0,0301 
 (-0,72) 
0,0602 
 (1,81)* (1,98)**   0,2780 0,1893 
Stocks traded by ≥5 funds 
0,3523 
 (9,40)*** 
0,2198 
 (4,43)*** (1,99)**   
-0,0411  
(-0,93) 
0,081 
 (1,95)* (1,98)**   0,2997 0,2033 
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Table 3.18 – Market Value 
 
The table presents the results from equation (3) :                                
where         the variable controlling for the market value. 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Average Coefficient (β)     Market Value Coefficient (β2)     Average R
2  
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis t test   Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis t test   Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
Stocks traded by ≥1 fund 
0,3870 
 (12,25)*** 
0,3810 
 (12,26)*** (1,98)   
-0,3776  
(-3,11)*** 
-0,1475 
 (-1,08) (1,99)   0,2284 0,2043 
Stocks traded by ≥2 funds 
0,3793 
 (11,14)*** 
0,3664 
 (10,86)*** (1,98)   
-0,3928 
 (-2,88)*** 
-0,1386  
(-1,00) (1,98)   0,2363 0,1985 
Stocks traded by ≥3 funds 
0,3757 
 (11,18)*** 
0,3809 
 (11,77)*** (1,98)   
-0,3822 
 (-2,38)** 
-0,3051 
 (-1,72)* (1,99)   0,2426 0,2189 
Stocks traded by ≥4 funds 
0,3527 
 (9,76)*** 
0,3577  
(9,41)*** (1,98)   
-0,3513  
(-1,87)* 
-0,1968 
 (-1,10) (1,98)   0,2515 0,2203 
Stocks traded by ≥5 funds 
0,3667 
 (10,29)*** 
0,3577  
(9,02)*** (1,99)   
-0,3558  
(-1,83)* 
-0,1838 
 (-0,97) (1,98)   0,2679 0,2302 
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The next style that we are going to examine is market value. As table 3.18 indicates, 
the correlation coefficient of month-to-month institutional demand is positive and 
highly significant at the 1 percent significance level in pre and post crisis, at all the 
thresholds examined. Regarding the coefficient of market value this appears negative 
in the pre crisis period at all the thresholds examined but its significance appears to 
weaken over the thresholds; as such in the first two thresholds it is significant at the 1 
percent significance level, in the third threshold its significance lowers into the 5 
percent significance level whereas in the last two thresholds falls to the 10 percent 
significance level. In the post crisis period, the coefficient of market value still 
appears negative at all the thresholds examined, though it is insignificant with the 
only exception being the third threshold where it is significant at the 10 percent 
significance level. 
Then next style indicator examined is that of momentum whose results are exhibited 
in table 3.19. As we can see, the correlation coefficient of institutional demand 
month-on-month is positive and highly significant at the 1 percent significance level 
at both periods in all the thresholds of our sample; furthermore, it appears decreasing 
over the two sub-periods, though not significantly. Regarding the momentum 
coefficient this appears negative at both periods in all the thresholds examined. Most 
importantly, it appears significant at the 5 percent significance level in the last three 
thresholds of our sample. 
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Table 3.19 - Momentum 
 
The table presents the results from equation (3) :                                
where         the variable controlling for the past returns. 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Average Coefficient (β)     Momentum Coefficient (β2)     Average R
2  
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis t test   Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis t test   Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
Stocks traded by ≥1 fund 
0,3993 
 (12,33)*** 
0,3663 
 (11,78)*** (1,98)   
-0,0567 
 (-1,77)* 
-0,0247 
 (-1,07) (1,98)   0,2536 0,2072 
Stocks traded by ≥2 funds 
0,3834 
 (11,15)*** 
0,3482 
 (10,74)*** (1,98)   
-0,0434 
 (-1,28) 
-0,0365 
 (-1,60) (1,98)   0,2531 0,2007 
Stocks traded by ≥3 funds 
0,3832  
(11,33)*** 
0,3594 
 (11,40*** (1,98)   
-0,0457 
 (-1,29) 
-0,0504 
 (-2,43)** (1,98)   0,2447 0,2083 
Stocks traded by ≥4 funds 
0,3523 
 (9,83)*** 
0,3318 
 (8,85)*** (1,98)   
-0,0423  
(-1,29) 
-0,0690  
(-2,46)** (1,98)   0,2424 0,2154 
Stocks traded by ≥5 funds 
0,3763 
 (10,37)*** 
0,3363 
 (8,49)*** (1,99)   
-0,0081 
(-0,25) 
-0,0690 
 (-2,54)** (1,98)   0,2592 0,2261 
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Table 3.20 – Value/Growth strategies 
 
The table presents the results from equation (3) :                                
where         the variable controlling for the P/E ratio. 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Average Coefficient (β)     P/E Coefficient (β2)     Average R
2  
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis t test   Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis t test   Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
Stocks traded by ≥1 fund 
0,3987 
 (12,44)*** 
0,3941 
 (12,16)*** (1,98)   
0,0069 
 (0,19) 
-0,0464 
 (-1,33) (1,98)   0,2523 0,2268 
Stocks traded by ≥2 funds 
0,3995  
(12,08)*** 
0,3922 
 (11,14)*** (1,98)   
0,0125  
(0,31) 
-0,0350  
(-0,95) (1,98)   0,2546 0,2191 
Stocks traded by ≥3 funds 
0,4008 
 (11,69)*** 
0,3936 
 (10,99)*** (1,98)   
-0,0100 
 (-0,20) 
0,0081 
 (0,20) (1,98)   0,2679 0,2246 
Stocks traded by ≥4 funds 
0,3710 
 (9,74)*** 
0,3557  
(8,61)*** (1,99)   
0,0025 
 (0,05) 
0,0129 
 (0,34) (1,98)   0,2687 0,2198 
Stocks traded by ≥5 funds 
0,3870 
 (10,27)*** 
0,3533 
 (7,86)*** (1,99)   
-0,0105 
 (-0,22) 
0,0284 
 (0,71) (1,98)   0,2774 0,2299 
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Table 3.21 – Volatility 
 
The table presents the results from equation (3) :                                
where         the variable controlling for the volatility. 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Average Coefficient (β)     Volatility Coefficient (β2)     Average R
2  
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis t test   Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis t test   Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
Stocks traded by ≥1 fund 
0,3732 
 (11,50)*** 
0,3756 
 (12,00)*** (1,98)   
-0,0308 
 (-0,89) 
-0,0149 
 (-0,31) (1,99)   0,2233 0,2086 
Stocks traded by ≥2 funds 
0,3706 
 (10,95)*** 
0,3545  
(9,86)*** (1,98)   
-0,0649 
 (-1,79)* 
0,0187 
 (0,36) (1,99)   0,2308 0,2071 
Stocks traded by ≥3 funds 
0,3855 
 (12,30)*** 
0,3756 
 (12,00)*** (1,98)   
-0,0508 
 (-1,32) 
-0,0149  
(-0,31) (1,99)   0,2354 0,2086 
Stocks traded by ≥4 funds 
0,3405  
(9,45)*** 
0,3508 
 (8,76)*** (1,99)   
0,0227 
 (0,50) 
0,0647 
 (1,09) (1,99)   0,2451 0,2225 
Stocks traded by ≥5 funds 
0,3602 
 (10,00)*** 
0,3540 
 (8,15)*** (1,99)   
0,0117 
 (0,23) 
0,0891 
 (1,43) (1,99)   0,2702 0,2291 
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The next style indicator analyzed is that of the P/E ratio which is used as a proxy for 
value/growth investment styles; table 20 exhibits the results of our research. As we 
can see the correlation coefficient of institutional demands month-to-month is positive 
and highly significant at the 1 percent significance level in both periods examined, at 
all the thresholds of our sample. In addition, this coefficient appears to decrease over 
the two periods, though insignificantly. Regarding the P/E coefficient, this appears 
insignificant at both periods, pre and post crisis, at all the thresholds examined. 
The next investment style that we are taking into consideration is volatility (table 
3.21). As our results indicate, the correlation coefficient is positive and significant at 
the 1 percent significance level at both periods and throughout the thresholds 
examined. Regarding the volatility coefficient is insignificant in both periods in all 
thresholds examined, except in that with stocks traded by two or more funds.  
The final style indicator examined in our research is that of volume. As table 3.22 
indicates, the coefficient of institutional demand month-to-month is positive and 
highly significant (1 percent level) at both periods, at all the examined thresholds. As 
regards the volume coefficient, this appears negative in the pre crisis period at all the 
thresholds examined and significant at the 1 percent level except for the last threshold 
where it is significant at the 5 percent significance level. In the post crisis period, the 
volume coefficient is insignificant at all the thresholds and in the vast majority of the 
cases it is positive (except for the third threshold). Moreover the relative change over 
the two periods is significant at the 5 percent significance level except for the last 
threshold where it is significant at the 10 percent significance level. 
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Table 3.22 - Volume 
 
The table presents the results from equation (3) :                                
where         the variable controlling for the volume. 
*indicates significance at the 10% level, **indicates significance at the 5% level and ***indicates significance at the 1% level. 
Average Coefficient (β)     Volume Coefficient (β2)     Average R
2  
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis t test   Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis t test   Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis 
Stocks traded by ≥1 fund 
0,3611 
 (10,79)*** 
0,3819 
 (11,87)*** (1,98)   
-0,0748 
 (-4,14)*** 
0,0019 
 (0,11) (1,98)**   0,2432 0,1985 
Stocks traded by ≥2 funds 
0,3706 
 (10,33)*** 
0,3695 
 (10,23)*** (1,98)   
-0,0719  
(-3,64)*** 
0,0013 
 (0,07) (1,98)**   0,2588 0,1961 
Stocks traded by ≥3 funds 
0,3743 
 (10,95)*** 
0,3931 
 (11,59)*** (1,98)   
-0,0635 
 (-3,14)*** 
-0,0033 
 (-0,17) (1,98)**   0,2680 0,2077 
Stocks traded by ≥4 funds 
0,3467 
 (9,20)*** 
0,3697 
 (9,01)*** (1,99)   
-0,0631 
 (-3,03)*** 
0,0000 
 (0,00) (1,98)**   0,2785 0,2175 
Stocks traded by ≥5 funds 
0,3657 
 (9,64)*** 
0,3725 
 (8,73)*** (1,99)   
-0,0528 
 (-2,60)** 
0,0048 
 (0,23) (1,98)*   0,2943 0,2263 
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The results from tables 3.17-3.22 show that the style-indicators found insignificant in the 
previous tests (analysts’ recommendations, value/growth and volatility), remain 
insignificant when we account for the financial crisis; the only exception is that of 
analysts’ recommendations which appears significant (10 percent level) for the stocks 
most widely traded. The other three style-indicators were indeed affected by the financial 
crisis. More specifically, the size and the volume, which were found significant in the 
post-Euronext period, appear to be significant in the pre- but insignificant in the post-
crisis period. Inversely, the contrarian trading seems to be a product of the crisis, as it 
appears insignificant in the pre-crisis period but turns to be significant in the post-crisis 
period.   
3.8 Discussion 
 
Table 3.23 - Significance of Herding and Investment Styles 
  Sample Period 
 
Full 
Period 
Pre-
Euronext 
Post-
Euronext 
Pre-
Crisis 
Post-
Crisis 
HERDING √ √ √ √ √ 
INVESTMENT STYLE           
Analyst's Recommendations - - - - √ 
Size √ - √ √ - 
Momentum √ - √ - √ 
Value/Growth - - - - - 
Volatility - - - - - 
Volume √ - √ √ - 
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In this section we will discuss our empirical results and their contribution to the research 
upon institutional investors’ herd behavior in the context of a concentrated market. One 
of the most important findings of our research is that the inter-temporal dependence of 
institutional demand month-to-month in the Portuguese market is very high and 
significant. The latter, after applying the Sias (2004) methodology and decomposing it 
into funds following their own trades and funds following others, has been found that to a 
large extend is due to herding. What is more, our results remain robust even when we test 
for various thresholds of funds; more specifically, the accountability of herding for the 
inter-temporal institutional demand month-to-month varies from 62% to 73% into the 
different thresholds we used, which is a quite high percentage. These results confirm 
previous arguments by Do et al. (2008) that herding is more likely to occur in a 
concentrated environment. As discussed in the theoretical part of this research, this can 
be due to several reasons. First of all, since the concentrated environment allows 
investors to monitor each other and it is easier to follow the actions of their peers, in 
contrast with a larger market where investors are many more in absolute numbers and it 
can be more difficult to observe the actions of other investors. Furthermore, since the 
stocks traded in a concentrated market are relatively few compared to a large market, it is 
more likely that investors will trade roughly in the same stocks. Finally, due to the fact 
that institutional investors are relatively few in a concentrated market and they know each 
other, it is more likely that they will herd on others’ action for career/reputational 
reasons.  
Our findings are in line with previous research regarding institutional investors’ herd 
behavior in the Portuguese market. More specifically, Holmes et al. (2011) using the 
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same methodology with ours found evidence of herding on behalf of institutional 
investors; however our results indicate a stronger evidence of herding since our levels of 
herding are far  higher and more significant that those found in the previous mentioned 
research. Since the methodology applied is the same in both researches, the differences in 
the findings can be attributed to two different approaches. Firstly, in order to measure the 
position of institutions holding a security each month we used each stock’s volume (the 
number of shares each fund owns for every month) instead of the stock’s market value 
(the value of stocks each funds has every month). We believe that this measure is more 
accurate than the one used in the research by Holmes et al. (2011), since the number of 
shares one fund has might be the same over the months, however through the difference 
in the price of the stock, this would appear that a mutual fund has increased or decreased 
its position in the stock, whereas it might have not. Secondly, the difference in our results 
could be due to the larger database we used; particularly, our sample examined is double 
the size of the one used in the other research (fifteen years instead of seven years). 
Nevertheless, our findings do not contradict with those found in the research of Holmes 
et al. (2011),  on the contrary they provide supporting evidence to their findings. 
Another important finding of our research is that the inter-temporal dependence of 
institutional demand month-to-month, which indirectly is a proxy for herding, is weakly 
related to style investing. Particularly, having tested for six different investment styles in 
our research, we have found that when the latter are input in our model the lagged 
coefficient of institutional demand month-to-month remains highly significant at the 1 
percent significance level, hence implying that investment styles have no impact at 
herding in a concentrated market. Nevertheless, we have found some evidence of a weak 
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relationship between institutional demand and some investing styles, namely size, volume 
and contrarian strategies. 
In the first two cases, our findings are in line with previous researches arguing that 
herding is more pronounced in small stocks; this phenomenon can be attributed to 
informational reasons. Particularly, since there is less information in such kinds of stocks, 
investors could infer information from the actions of others (investigative herding). 
Likewise, low volume stocks are candidates for herding since in order for investors to 
trade on them, they have to trade when others do (create volume); thus this is the point 
when interactive observation among investors take place and it is more likely for them to 
follow the trades of the others. In the case of trading strategies, several studies have 
found evidence for their relationship with herding; however the majority of them 
associated herding with momentum trading whereas in our research there was evidence of 
contrarian strategies associated to herding. Nevertheless, as our results indicate, the effect 
of these styles on the coefficient of institutional demand month-to-month is very small. 
Since all our data is standardized, the coefficients of the lagged institutional demand 
month-to-month and those of the styles can be directly compared. As such, after we input 
the variables for style, there was a minor change on the correlation coefficient of 
institutional demand month-to-month, thus implying that styles do not affect the level of 
herding. For example, in the case of size, when we input a (standardized) lag of the size 
variable, the correlation coefficient of the institutional demand month-to-month increased 
from 0.3307 to 0.3452, which is not an important difference. What is more, the lagged 
institutional demand is 50% greater than the lagged size variable (in the full sample of 
stocks); hence, since our variables are standardized as we already discussed, one standard 
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deviation change in the correlation coefficient of institutional demand of the previous 
month predicts 50% greater change in the following month’s institutional demand than a 
one standard deviation change of the lagged size variable. The case is the same with the 
other two styles found significant. 
In order to further examine the herd behavior of institutional investors in our market we 
break the sample into two periods, pre and post Euronext. Our results indicate that the 
correlation coefficient of institutional demand month-on-month increased over the two 
periods, and so did the coefficient indicating institutions following their own trades. On 
the contrary, the component of herding has decreased, especially in the most widely 
traded stocks of our sample where the level of herding fell from 77% to 54%, though it 
remained significantly high. The only exception where the herding component has 
increased was in the sample of stocks that included stocks traded by one institutional 
investor. The fact that the coefficient showing institutions following their own trades 
significantly increased over the two periods and at the same time the one indicating the 
level of herding decreased could be an indication of the effect of the improvements in the 
regulatory framework of Portugal. More specifically, it could be the case that the merger 
of the Portuguese Stock exchange into Euronext improved the quality of the first one in 
terms of transparency, trading costs and liquidity [Malkamäki (1999), Pagano (1989)]. 
The latter imply that institutional investors in Portugal could take advantage of these 
improvements, hence feel more confident on their own informational sets (since the 
market will be more transparent and more information will be widely available) and as 
such they might have less need herding on their peers’ actions.  
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What is striking is the almost absolute absence of any significance of investing styles on 
behalf of the institutional investors in the pre Euronext period; both the size effect 
(market value and volume) and the contrarian strategy found in our full sample is only 
evident and significant in the post Euronext period. This could indicate that as one 
concentrated market develops and its regulatory framework improves, its investors 
become more sophisticated. Put it differently, styles are often applied to alleviate 
complexity, so the entry of the Portuguese Stock Exchange into the Euronext brought 
forth new realities in the investment business that pushed the local funds towards style 
investing.  
What is more, it could be the case that after the merger with the Euronext, the Portuguese 
institutional investors started engaging in style investing due to professional reasons. 
More specifically, it could be the case that after the merger with Euronext, Portuguese 
funds are most probably assessed versus their peers from Euronext. As such, since an 
investment style can be a benchmark, Portuguese funds may have resorted style as a 
means of comparability to their peers from Euronext.   The only style indicator that had 
some presence in the pre Euronext period is that of volatility, with the latter being present 
in the less widely traded stocks (only in one threshold was it highly significant) and 
disappearing in the post Euronext period. 
Going further deep into institutional investors’ herd behavior, we once more partitioned 
the second sub-sample (post Euronext) into two more sub-samples, before the global 
credit crisis, taken place in 2008, and after the crisis; in this way we tried to capture any 
effect the crisis had over herding. The results indicate that the institutional demand 
month-to-month remained more or less at the same levels at both periods. What has 
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changed, especially in the most widely traded stocks, is that the level of institutions 
following their own trades has increased, whereas the level of herding has decreased, 
particularly in the most widely traded stocks where the level of herding fell from 60% to 
45%; still however, as the numbers indicate the presence of herding is more than evident 
in the market even during the crisis. This finding is in line with the findings of previous 
research that herding is less evident during extreme market conditions, i.e. crises. This is 
because during crises, the market is so unstable that there is no certain direction which 
investors can herd towards. Moreover, our findings are in line with the previous research 
of Choe et al. (1999) who found, on the premises of the emerging market of Korea, that 
institutional investors herded less during the Asian crisis. 
Equally interesting findings we get to see regarding the use of style investing on behalf of 
institutional investors, when we analyze the pre and post crisis periods. Particularly, we 
can see that analysts’ recommendations enter the picture by turning to positive and 
significant (though not highly significant) in the post crisis period. The intuition behind 
these results is that institutional investors’ behavior is affected by the selling 
recommendations of the analysts
28
 during a crisis. More specifically, during a crisis and 
as a fund manager wants to be safe, in terms of career and reputation, he may decide on 
following the market consensus and thus be in line with the suggestions of the analysts. 
This could be a reasoning why in the most widely traded stocks of our sample, analysts’ 
recommendation become significant. Regarding the size effect found earlier, this 
becomes insignificant in the post crisis period, as both the market value indicator and the 
                                                          
28
 Consensus analysts’ recommendations ranked according to the Thomson DataStream 
classification (1-1.49   “strong buy”; 1.5–2.49   “buy”; 2.5–3.49   “hold”; 3.5–4.49 = 
“underperform”; 4.5–5   “sell”). So, when the coefficient    is negative this implies an 
improvement in the recommendation on behalf of the analysts and vice versa. 
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volume indicator suggest. This could be due to the fact that during a crisis, investors 
avoid to invest on small and risky stocks, which are also characterized by less 
informational transparency, and prefer investing in safer stocks, these usually being the 
larger ones. Finally, as regards the contrarian strategy found earlier, the case here appears 
the other way around; more specifically, in the pre crisis period there is no sufficient 
evidence for the use of contrarian strategies on behalf of institutional investors, however 
this appears present in the post crisis period and for the more widely traded stocks (stocks 
traded by three or more funds). A possible explanation of this phenomenon could be that 
during crises, where stock prices often overreact to bad information, there will be 
mispricing in the market with the prices of stocks often trading below their fundamental 
values. If this is the case, then institutional investors who are better informed than the 
individual investors will step in the market and take advantage of this mispricing, 
building positions on stocks whose prices trade lower than their fundamentals imply, in 
order to achieve profit for them when the prices recover to their fair values. As such, as 
our results indicate that institutional investors engage in contrarian strategies, investing in 
stocks which performed poorly in the past months.   
Summarizing our findings, we come up with some interesting and useful conclusions. 
First of all, we can see that in a concentrated environment herding is dominating the 
market; in all samples and thresholds examined the levels of herding were very high. 
Secondly, in a concentrated market with a low quality regulatory framework and a lack of 
information transparency there is no evidence of the use of investing styles on behalf of 
institutional investors. As such, there is no case that investment styles can promote 
herding in such countries. Furthermore, the improvement of the regulatory framework 
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and the development of a concentrated market seem to alter the sophistication of its 
institutional investors since after the merger into the Euronext, they appeared to engage in 
the use of investment styles. Thus, as the market develops, herding decreases (as our 
results indicated) and investors are more confident about their own information. 
However, it is the development of the market that causes herding to decrease and not the 
use of investing styles, as the latter had little impact upon the institutional demand 
month-to-month according to our results. So, even in the case of market development, 
investing styles are not found to promote herding; this finding is in line with similar 
researches in large countries which found that institutional herding was not due to the use 
of various styles, such as momentum trading [Sias (2004)]. What is more, even during 
crises where some investing styles make their appearance and others disappear, there is 
no supporting evidence that the use of investing styles can be held responsible for the 
herd behavior of institutional investors. 
Finally, we would say that our research sheds light on the relationship between style 
investing and institutional herding on the premises of a concentrated market. Our findings 
provide clear evidence that the impact of style investing upon herding is negligible and 
that the latter dominates the market in all states of it. Our findings bear important 
implications for the professional fund managers as well as their clients and they are 
applicable to concentrated markets, especially to the emerging ones. A useful thought for 
further research would be to test for the profitability of the investing styles found in this 
research and whether these are useful for institutional investors when they invest in 
concentrated markets, though this is not the scope of this thesis; what we wanted and 
managed to show is that style investing does not affect herding in concentrated markets. 
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Furthermore, since when we wrote this chapter, the debt crisis was still going, it would be 
interesting to re-examine the relationship between style investing and institutional 
herding after the end of the crisis (when this happens) in order to examine whether there 
should be any significant difference on the findings of our research.        
 
3.9 Conclusion 
Institutional herding has been found to be promoted by style investing in quite a few 
studies. However, the majority of the research has been undertaken in very large markets 
such as the U.S. The gap that we identified in the relevant literature and examined in this 
chapter was the impact of market concentration over the relationship between 
institutional herding and style investing; an issue that has not been explored before. In 
order to do so, we used data from the Portuguese mutual fund industry, which is typified 
by a high level of market concentration. More specifically, we used monthly portfolio 
holdings for a period of fifteen years, namely from 1996 till 2010.  
Our results indicate that institutional demand over time appears highly significant in the 
Portuguese fund industry and it is due to funds following the trades of other funds 
(herding). In addition, our results indicate that in the context of a concentrated market, 
style investing has no significant impact upon the persistence of institutional demand 
which remains significant throughout all tests carried out. Particularly, we found that 
herding levels in a concentrated market are quite high and that these remain robust when 
we account for various investment styles (consensus analysts’ recommendations, 
momentum, size, value/growth, volatility, and volume). More specifically, we found that 
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some (consensus analysts’ recommendations, value/growth, and volatility) of them 
exhibit no significance at all, whereas others (momentum, size, and volume) exhibit 
evidence of trading patterns on behalf of the Portuguese mutual funds. The latter appear 
to be contrarian traders and exhibiting greater persistence in their demand when trading 
on stocks of smaller size and lower volume. 
When we accounted for the entrance of the Portuguese market into the Euronext, we saw 
that the styles which were significant in the full sample period (momentum, size, and 
volume) appear significant only in the post-Euronext period. A possible explanation 
could be that as the market develops, information quality and transparency in the market 
is enhanced; hence, fund managers have fewer incentives to herd on their peers’ actions. 
Furthermore, after the breaking up of our sample into pre and post crisis periods, the 
results indicate a decrease in herding and the disappearing of investing styles, with the 
exception of contrarian strategies. However, when we split the post-Euronext period into 
pre-and post-crisis, the results do not appear robust. More specifically, the style-
indicators of size and volume, previously found significant in the post-Euronext period, 
now appear significant only in the pre-crisis period indicating that crisis did have an 
impact upon these styles. Inversely, the contrarian trading found for the Portuguese 
mutual funds in the post-Euronext period, appears significant only in the post-crisis 
period indicating that this investing style is a product of the crisis itself. Again, it is worth 
noting that the institutional demand over time remains significant in all tests carried out. 
Concluding, what one can infer from our findings is that the institutional demand over 
time in the Portuguese market is mostly due to funds following the trades of others (i.e. 
herding) and its significance is not amended when accounted for a series of investing 
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styles. What is more, the significance of the Portuguese funds’ style investing is sensitive 
to the period tested for. Finally, our results indicate that style investing is not a common 
practice in highly concentrated markets and that it does not bear any effect upon the 
significance of herding among fund managers in such kind of markets.  
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Chapter 4 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs hereafter) constitute a relatively new financial innovation 
despite their 20-year presence in the financial markets. ETFs are a combination of open-
end and close-end funds combining the advantages of both types of funds into one 
product. More specifically, an ETF is a fund, investing in a basket of stocks, whose aim is 
to replicate a benchmark index; nevertheless it can be traded as a stock itself intra-daily. 
The key features of the ETFs that made them so popular are their “creation and 
redemption process”, tax effectiveness, low management fees, risk diversification and 
liquidity, which shall be discussed in detail later in this chapter. As Deville (2008) 
suggests, the characteristics of the ETFs make them particularly attractable to the rational 
investors (e.g. use as a hedging tool); however, Curcio et al. (2004) suggest that ETFs 
can be attractable to retail investors as well. Given that the retail investors are the prime 
candidates for noise trading [ Barber et al. (2009)], the issue arising is what is the impact 
of the ETFs’ introduction over market dynamics, in other words does the introduction of 
the ETFs promote market efficiency and depress noise trading?  
This issue has not been addressed before in the literature and we will try to shed light on 
this by applying the established methodology of Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) which 
allows to test for a span of market dynamics, such as noise trading, return autocorrelation 
and volatility, by assuming two types of traders (rational and feedback). In order to do 
this, we use a sample of eight European countries and we also account for the current 
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financial crisis. In addition, we test for the noise traders’ migration hypothesis, i.e. 
whether noise traders migrate from the spot market to the ETF segment. Our research 
will be of particular interest for market regulators and policy makers as it will provide 
evidence whether ETFs could enhance the efficiency of the markets and contribute 
towards to their completeness. In addition, as our study is carried out under the premises 
of developed countries, our findings could have a beneficial impact for the emerging 
markets and markets in their infancy level as well. As far as it concerns the investment 
community, our findings could provide evidence whether the use of ETFs as an 
investment option could be beneficial for them as well. 
The chapter is arranged as follows: section (4.2) provides the theoretical grounding and 
the findings of the relevant literature about noise trading, its causes and primary 
candidates for it. Section (4.3) provides an in depth description of the ETFs and its 
characteristics. Section (4.4) examines the relationship between ETFs and rational 
investors and whether the first ones are more appealing to the second ones, whereas 
section (4.5) examines the relationship between the ETFs and individual investors. 
Section (4.6) describes the data and methodology used in this research and section (4.7) 
presents our empirical findings. An additional discussion of the later is provided in 
section (4.8) whereas section (4.9) concludes. 
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4.2 Noise Trading 
According to the Efficient Market Hypothesis of Fama (1970), investors are considered 
to be rational; the relative homogeneity of investors, in terms of rationality, is a 
prerequisite for the markets to be efficient. If irrational traders make their presence felt, 
rational arbitrageurs will enter the market and take advantage of the mispricing, driving 
prices back to their fundamental values. However, in the mid 1980s, a new term was 
introduced to describe those investors not strictly adhering to the rational paradigm, that 
of the noise trader (Kyle (1985); Black (1986). The term “noise” refers to the signals 
arriving in the market, which may not be real information, such as rumors, but are still 
treated by investors as if they were real information. Having said that, according to Black 
(1986), the presence of “noise” traders is essential in order for the markets to have 
substantial liquidity. Noise traders trade on non-fundamental information; however, noise 
trading can also be based upon fundamentals if the latter’s processing is undertaken in a 
non-rational fashion. For example, Barberis et al. (1998) presented a model of investor 
sentiment illustrating how investors can form their beliefs about fundamentals in an 
irrational way. More specifically, the authors found that prices under-react to positive 
earnings announcements and overreact upon the arrival of good or bad earnings’ news. 
What is more, Brav and Heaton (2002) suggested that investors can react irrationally 
either because they do not possess all the relevant information (rational structured 
uncertainty) or because, even if they do possess the right information, they cannot decide 
rationally due to the impact of biases and heuristics in their investing decisions 
(investors’ irrationality).   
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Noise trading has been mainly associated with individual (retail) investors who may not 
have the quality of information large institutional investors or insiders may have. Barber 
et al. (2009) conclude that individual investors’ trades may have an impact on stock 
prices as the authors suggest that their “noise” is systematic. Particularly, the authors 
suggest that the trades of individual investors are correlated and that these are mostly 
driven by various psychological biases such as the representativeness heuristic, limited 
attention, the disposition effect as well as common shifts in risk aversion. In support of 
the previously mentioned argument, there is a plethora of relative research regarding the 
trading of individual investors and how these make their investing decisions. 
Odean (1998) studying ten thousand accounts of individual investors in the U.S found 
that the latter have the tendency to hold on to losing stocks and selling the winning ones 
(the disposition effect). The author suggests that whether the effect of this behavior upon 
stock prices is large or not, depends upon the actions of the more informed market 
participants, such as institutional investors. Kumar and Lee (2006) also analyzing the 
trades of individual investors over the period 1991-1996 in the U.S market found that 
these trades are correlated among each other and argued that investors’ sentiment could 
possibly be an explanation for it. What is more, Dorn et al. (2008) examining the German 
individual investors for the 1998-2000 period found that the trades of the individual 
investors are correlated and that these correlated trades predict future returns. Finally, 
Barber and Odean (2008) showed that individual investors exhibit an attention grabbing 
behavior when trading on stocks, especially on the buy side. This is due to the fact that 
buy-decisions entail more difficulty than sell-ones in terms of stock-selection. When an 
investor has to decide upon buying a stock, his possible options have to be drawn out of a 
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universe of hundreds or thousands of stocks. Conversely, when deciding which stock to 
sell, he only has to look at the stocks already in his portfolio. 
All the above researches provide evidence in support of the view that individual investors 
are more prone to noise trading than institutional investors. 
Having identified the prime candidates for noise trading, the question that arises at this 
point is how to measure noise trading. The latter can take place through various 
techniques, such as technical analysis, momentum trading or put it simply by using past 
returns. A proxy for modeling noise trading is feedback trading, a strategy based on past 
stock prices. Feedback trading can be positive or negative; in the first case investors 
buy/sell when prices rise/drop and in the second investors buy/sell when prices drop/rise. 
Feedback trading can be motivated by technical analysis, i.e. the use of historical past 
prices, where investors, who have an informational disadvantage relative to their peers, 
believe that past stock prices contain information about the companies. There have been 
several studies regarding technical analysis and its profitability, most notably those by 
Brock et al. (1992), Antoniou et al. (1997) and Wong et al. (2003), which confirmed the 
profitability of technical analysis internationally. 
In addition to technical analysis, other trading strategies such as momentum and 
contrarian trading have been associated with feedback trading. Particularly, momentum 
strategies (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) are linked to positive feedback trading and 
suggest that it can be profitable for investors to buy past winners and sell past losers. On 
the other hand, contrarian strategies (Galariotis et al. (2007) are linked with negative 
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feedback trading and suggest that investors could make profit by buying previous losers 
and sell past winners. 
Apart from the technical analysis and the trading strategies, the sources of feedback 
trading can be traced through several biases and heuristics. More specifically, Barberis et 
al. (1998) associated the representativeness heuristic [Kahneman and Tversky (1973)] 
and the conservatism bias [Edwards (1968)] with feedback trading. In the first case, 
investors perceive price patterns as trends and ride on them whereas in the second one, 
investors are reluctant of updating their beliefs upon the arrival of new information in the 
market and this leads to the under-reaction of prices. What is more, negative feedback 
trading has been associated with the disposition effect [Shefrin and Statman (1985)], 
namely the tendency of investors to hold on to losing stocks and sell the winning ones. 
Overconfidence [Odean (1998)], a bias that causes investors to overvalue their own 
knowledge and skills is also associated to positive feedback trading. This is because the 
overvaluation of their own skills leads them to overreact to their own signals and this 
overreaction will persist the longer prices move in (“confirm”) the direction of their own 
trades (i.e. confirm to them that their signals are correct), as this helps boost their 
overconfidence [Daniel et al. (2002)].  
Furthermore, feedback trading could also take place due to informational reasons. More 
specifically, investors could engage in feedback trading strategies due to an informational 
disadvantage relative to their peers. Typical examples of the informational inferiority of 
some investors are the case of domestic vs. foreign investors as well as the case of 
investors investing in small firms. In the first case, foreign investors have an 
informational disadvantage compared to their domestic counterparts; as such it is possible 
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that they might try to infer information about the stocks using their past prices. However, 
the problem of informational asymmetry between domestic and foreign investors has 
decayed throughout the years due to the technological advances that allow foreign 
investors to have access to similar information with their domestic counterparts. Today, it 
can only be the case for very small markets (emerging ones) that there is such a high 
informational asymmetry between foreign and domestic investors. Similarly, in the case 
of investors investing in small firms, since there is less information available on such 
kind of firms, investors will use past prices in order to gain information regarding these 
firms. However, the problem with this approach here is that small stocks tend to be 
subject to thin trading, so it is doubtful whether their prices (which exhibit frequent 
pockets of trading inactivity) can constitute a reliable tool to that end.  
There has also been a quite large amount of empirical findings regarding feedback 
trading. One of the most important papers regarding feedback trading is considered to be 
that of Sentana and Wadhwani (1992), which examined the U.S and the U.K markets and 
found significant evidence in favor of positive feedback trading there. Additional 
research by Koutmos (1997) which examined the presence of feedback trading strategies 
in six developed countries found significant evidence of positive feedback trading. 
Conversely, Aguirre and Saidi (1999) examined the presence of feedback trading 
strategies in a span of developed and emerging markets, yet did not find significant 
evidence of feedback trading strategies; in case where feedback trading was found, it was 
negative feedback trading that was prevailing in the market rather than positive. Another 
research by Koutmos and Saidi (2001), examining feedback trading on the premises of 
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emerging markets, found evidence of positive feedback trading during declining markets, 
whereas feedback trading was very weak during upward markets. 
In addition to the above researches that examined feedback trading at the aggregate level, 
there has also been a vast amount of research examining the behavior of institutional 
investors. Lakonishok et al. (1992) examining a sample of U.S pension funds for the 
1985-1989 period found little evidence of feedback trading, the latter being more evident 
in small sized firms. Another research by Wermers (1999) for the U.S. mutual fund 
industry revealed evidence of positive feedback trading in the case of growth funds, the 
latter typically investing in small capitalization stocks.  
Choe et al. (1999) found evidence of positive feedback trading on behalf of foreign 
investors for the Korean market before the Asian crisis in 1997, whereas after the crisis 
positive feedback trading appeared to have weakened. Furthermore, Walter and Weber 
(2006) examining 60 mutual funds of the German market for the 1997-2002 period found 
the fund managers exhibited positive feedback trading behavior in the short run. Finally, 
Do et al. (2008) examining the Finish market for the 1995-2004 period found that foreign 
investors in Finland positive feedback trade more than their domestic counterparts. 
4.3 Exchange Traded Funds 
An Exchange Traded Fund (ETF hereafter) is a relatively new financial innovation that 
tracks a benchmark index, like an index fund. ETFs share several features in common 
with both the open-end funds (mutual funds) as well as the closed-end funds, as we shall 
later discuss. At the beginning, ETFs were financial instruments replicating equity 
indices; however, over the years we have born witness to the voluminous evolution of 
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ETFs tracking a variety of benchmarks including commodities, sectors, international 
markets, or even investing styles. The great acceptance of ETFs from investors outlines 
the gap they came and filled in with respect to the existing financial products. It is the 
special characteristics of the exchange traded funds and their ease of trade that made 
them so appealing to investors.  
ETFs were introduced in Canada in the early 1990s; these were known as TIPs (Toronto 
Index Participation units) and they were tracing the Toronto 35 Index, with their main 
feature being their relatively low management fees. However, ETFs became widely 
known through the SPDRs (Standard & Poor’s 500 Depositary Receipts, often referred as 
“spiders”) which were introduced in the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) in 1993. A 
milestone in ETF history is considered the introduction of the Nasdaq-100 Index tracking 
Stock in 1999, an ETF later known as Cubes which became very popular after its launch. 
Since in the late 1990s the technology sector was at its peak and the NASDAQ 
accommodated the tech related stocks, this also played an important role in the 
development and spread of the particular ETF. Likewise, in Europe the first ETFs 
appeared in the U.K, German and Swedish markets in 2000, followed by those in the 
Euronext and the Swiss Stock Exchange in 2001. In 2002, ETFs were introduced in the 
stock markets of Finland and Italy, which were later followed by those in Iceland (2004), 
Norway (2005), Ireland (2005), Austria (2005) and Greece (2008). What is more, ETFs 
have been quite popular in emerging countries as well. To mention a few, the first ETF 
was introduced in South Africa in 2000, in Taiwan in 2003 whereas in Turkey it was no 
later than in 2005.   
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In simple words, an ETF is fund investing in a basket of stocks aiming at replicating a 
benchmark index; nevertheless it can be traded as a stock itself intra-daily. Some of the 
key features of the ETFs that made them so popular are their “creation and redemption 
process”, tax effectiveness, low management fees, risk diversification and liquidity. First 
of all, unlike other mutual funds ETFs are traded in the stock exchange as any ordinary 
stock and can also be traded as ordinary stocks, which means they can be margin or even 
short traded. This characteristic makes ETFs attractive to a very large span of investors, 
be they institutional or smaller individual investors. Having said that, it is much easier for 
investors to invest in an ETF that invests in a basket of stocks than to monitor and invest 
in a number of stocks individually. As such, ETFs are considered a very important tool of 
portfolio diversification as well as a better hedging tool than futures since they have a 
lower cost than them and even smaller investors can use them to hedge their relatively 
small portfolios. 
What is more, ETF shares (creation units) can be created or redeemed anytime by 
investors; the latter can be the authorized participants or market makers.  Particularly 
these authorized traders can create ETF shares (creation units), often in batches of 50000 
shares, by depositing the corresponding stocks of the basket and an additional amount of 
cash, whereas in the case of redeeming ETF shares, investors give their ETF units and 
receive the basket of stocks and an amount of cash. The cash amount in both cases 
represents the difference between the Net Asset Value and the value of the basket of 
stocks.  
Since ETFs exchange their units with stocks and vice versa, in contrast with the common 
mutual funds, they do not have to keep a part of their assets in cash in order to cover any 
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redemptions that may occur; as such, the full amount of money is always invested. 
Furthermore, in the case of the ETFs, any dividends acquired from the invested stocks are 
credited to their investors’ account as opposed to the common mutual funds that reinvest 
the dividends automatically. Another feature of the ETFs is their low management fees. 
Since their basket of stocks tracks an index, there is no need for active management on 
behalf of their managers. As such, the cost of running an ETF is substantially lower 
compared to a closed end fund which requires a more active trading strategy. 
Furthermore, ETFs are also known for the tax effectiveness. Particularly, ETFs do not 
distribute large realized capital gains since they do not have to sell stocks in order to 
redeem their shares; this is done through their creation and redemption process. 
Additionally, ETFs are more transparent than conventional funds. The latter usually 
disclose their holdings quarterly whereas ETFs publish their stock baskets daily. As such, 
it is easier for investors to monitor their investments and there is greater transparency. 
Finally, ETFs are found to be more price efficient than closed-end funds. This is due to 
the fact that ETFs are easier to trade and more frequently traded than the other funds and 
arbitrageurs can take advantage of any difference between the NAV and the ETF price. 
However, the latter statement is a bit controversial, since there have been quite enough 
researches claiming the opposite. More specifically, numerous researchers have found 
that there are significant tracking errors in the ETFs; the tracking error is the difference 
between the performance of the ETF and its benchmark index [Shin and Soydemir 
(2010)]. One of the reasons for this phenomenon could be the previously mentioned 
passive management of the ETFs; the latter do not need a very active management on 
behalf of their managers as it is the case for the common mutual funds. As Gastineau 
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(2004) posits, a more aggressive management policy, such as this one followed by mutual 
fund managers, could lead ETF managers to (at least, a large extent) minimize the 
problem of tracking errors.   
Evidence in support of the ETFs’ pricing efficiency is provided by Lin et al. (2006) for 
the Taiwanese market. Particularly, the authors examined the only ETF in Taiwan, 
namely the Taiwan Top 50 Tracker fund (TTT), and found that it exhibited almost the 
same returns with the tracked Taiwan 50 Index. As such, according to their results, the 
specific ETF was a successful index-tracking tool. Further evidence in support of the 
ETFs’ pricing efficiency is provide by the study of Kayali (2007) who examining the 
DJIST (Turkish ETF) found that it is price efficient and that any discounts or premia 
were disappearing in the second day of their occurrence. 
On the other hand, the research by Ackert and Tian (2008) suggests that there are 
significant premia of the ETF prices relative to their Net Asset Values, especially in 
country funds
29
, and attribute this mispricing to the limits of arbitrage. What is more, the 
authors suggest that the liquidity of the markets could be a possible explanation for this 
phenomenon, since they found that high liquidity in the U.S market was linked with 
lower premia, whereas in the case of emerging markets the low liquidity in the ETFs and 
their underlying spot markets was associated with higher premia. The authors suggest 
that this inverse effect of liquidity over the mispricing of the ETFs could be due to 
taxation and trading differences between the developed and emerging markets.  
 
                                                          
29
 The country ETFs were: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K, Brazil, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Mexico, South Africa, South 
Korea and Taiwan.  
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4.4 Exchange Traded Funds as Promoters of Rational Trading 
Given the sophistication of rational investors we would expect that an advanced and 
innovative financial product such as the ETFs would attract more informed investors in 
the market and subsequently depress the effect of noise traders. Since ETFs provide a 
better diversification and hedging tool relative to other existing financial products, 
arbitrageurs would be very keen on using them. In fact, certain researches have showed 
that after the introduction of ETFs, the markets where these were introduced became 
more efficient and the mispricing less frequent. This phenomenon is attributed to the fact 
that the introduction of ETFs lowered arbitrage costs, as such more arbitrageurs came to 
the market and subsequently less arbitrage opportunities (less mispricing) became 
available. For example, Park and Switzer (1995) examined whether the introduction of 
the Toronto Index Participation Units (TIPS), the first ETF, had an impact on the Toronto 
35 Index futures market, in terms of pricing efficiency. In order to test for this, the 
authors examined the trading volume and mispricing of the index futures pre and post the 
introduction of the TIPS. In the first case, that of trading volume, their results indicated 
that there was an increase in the demand for index futures and they attributed this 
phenomenon to the increased use of hedging and arbitrage. In the second case, that of 
mispricing, there was a significant decrease in the level of mispricing between the actual 
prices of index futures and their theoretical values. Similarly, another research by Switzer 
et al. (2000) examined the effect of the Standard and Poor’s Depository Receipts 
(SPDRs) introduction on the S&P’s future market, in terms of pricing efficiency. In line 
with the previous research mentioned, the authors found that the introduction of the 
SPDRs had a positive impact on the pricing efficiency of the underlying futures’ market 
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since the mispricing on these financial products had a significant, even though small, 
decrease after the introduction of the specific ETF. What is more, Kurov and Lasser 
(2002) also provided supporting evidence to the previous mentioned researches. 
Particularly, by examining the pricing efficiency of the NASDAQ-100 futures and the 
underlying index upon the introduction of the NASDAQ-100 Index Tracking Stock 
(Qubes), they found that indeed the pricing relationship between the futures market and 
the underlying spot index significantly improved after the introduction of the specific 
ETF. In addition, any mispricing in these markets was corrected faster after the 
introduction of the ETF, hence implying more effective hedging on behalf of the 
investors. 
Another characteristic of ETFs that makes them attractive to rational investors is their 
capacity to simplify the stock selection process. More specifically, given the fact that a 
stock market is comprised by thousands of stocks or even a single index by some dozens 
or hundreds of them, investors by investing in an exchange traded fund have the 
opportunity to effectively diversify their portfolio without having to invest additional 
time and money by trading on multiple stocks; the latter, besides the invaluable time 
needed for the stock selection process also requires higher trading costs. This specific 
advantage of ETFs becomes more evident in the case of investing in foreign stock 
markets. Given the purported informational asymmetry between domestic and foreign 
investors, the introduction of ETFs provides foreign investors with a tool that allows 
them to hold a portfolio of stocks with relatively low trading costs and greater flexibility. 
For example, an investor investing in a foreign country not only faces an informational 
disadvantage but can also meet certain limitations and frictions, such as taxes, capital 
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flow limitations and exchange rate risk. These, in conjunction with uncertainty, make the 
stock selection process for foreign investors more challenging; a solution to that could be 
the use of ETFs. The latter could minimize the research and monitoring cost, simplifying 
the stock selection process and additionally they could minimize the trading costs since it 
would much more cost effective to trade in a basket security rather than in a number of 
individual stocks.  
Particularly, the trading from arbitrageurs would reduce any mispricing in the underlying 
spot markets; hence improve the pricing efficiency of the latter. Miffre (2007) examined 
16 country-specific ETFs
30
 and outlined the benefits of investing in such ETFs due to 
their special features. More specifically, the author emphasized on the ETFs’ feature of 
short selling, tax advantage and low trading costs; these features provide superior 
portfolio diversification, in an international context, and have comparative advantages in 
relation to other index securities such as closed-end funds and index futures. Harper et al. 
(2006) also provide supporting evidence to the previous mentioned research. Particularly, 
the authors compared 29 closed-end funds of 14 countries and the underlying iShares 
ETFs for these countries; their results outlined two major advantages of the ETFs 
compared to the closed-end funds. First, ETFs exhibited higher mean returns than the 
closed-end funds of these countries and secondly that a less active investment strategy 
using ETFs was more profitable than a more active one using closed-end funds.  
Rational investors are characterized by their ability to effectively hedge their portfolios; 
put it simple, they are involved in the use of various risk management techniques. The 
                                                          
30
 The authors examined 16 iShares ETFs from Barclays Global Investors. The examined markets were: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Mexico, Singapore, the 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the U.K. 
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options these investors have in order to effectively manage the risk of their portfolios 
span across a series of financial instruments such as options, swaps and futures. Having 
said that, another characteristic of ETFs that is of great importance for arbitrageurs is 
their hedging effectiveness. Highly related to the previous characteristic of the simplified 
selection process, ETFs constitute a relative cheap and easy-to-use hedging tool when 
compared to options and other similar products. For example, in the case of an investor 
who holds a portfolio of stocks of the S&P 500 index, it would be too costly for him to 
hedge a number of stocks in his portfolio. However, he could hedge his portfolio of 
stocks by using an ETF of the underlying index, without having to bear high trading costs 
or capital requirement as in the case of index futures where there is a certain margin 
requirement. What is more, in recent years, another type of ETFs has been introduced, 
namely the inverse ETF; the latter is specifically designed to provide an inverse multiple 
of the return (daily) of the underlying index; these can be -1x (-1 times the daily return),-
2x (-2 times the daily return) or -3x (-3 times the daily return). Hill and Teller (2010) 
provide hedging examples using inverse ETFs and outline the advantages of the latter in 
terms of liquidity and monitoring. Nevertheless, according to the authors, the use of such 
financial instruments demands high managerial and monitoring skills. The latter can only 
be possessed by high-calibre investors with adequate skills and not by the individual 
investors. As such, compared to the existing hedging tools, ETFs enhanced investors’ 
choices for hedging their portfolios by provide them lower trading and holding costs, 
more liquidity, tax efficiency and greater transparency.   
The above mentioned characteristics of exchange traded funds make them quite 
appealing to rational investors. As such, in the case that ETFs succeed in attracting more 
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rational investors into the markets they have been introduced, this should depress noise 
trading in these particular markets. Summarizing, the introduction of ETFs can increase 
the significance of rational investors in market trading due to three distinctive aspects of 
ETFs. First of all, it is their pricing efficiency; ETFs have been found to exhibit a low 
tracking error (that is the difference of the ETF price and the NAV). What is more, the 
introduction of the ETFs seems to have improved the pricing efficiency of the underlying 
spot markets in quite a few researches, as discussed above. Secondly, the ETFs can 
substantially simplify the stock selection process of investors and this is more evident in 
foreign country investments where investors have to surpass various frictions and 
restrictions. Thirdly, ETFs provide rational investors an additional tool for managing the 
risk of their portfolios more effectively and less costly. Despite the presence of these 
features, the introduction of ETFs may produce the opposite results, namely boost the 
significance of noise investors; this possibility is explored in the section below.  
4.5 Exchange Traded Funds as Promoters of Noise Trading  
Moving on to the case of noise traders, an ETF or a basket-security generally appears 
more attractive to them since they can achieve better diversification of their portfolio in a 
much cheaper and easier way than if they had to invest separately in the underlying assets 
of the basket-security. Gorton and Pennacchi (1993) in their theoretical model showed 
that the introduction of basket-securities, in a market without full disclosure of available 
information, has a positive impact on the expected utility of liquidity traders, providing a 
lower variance portfolio and less informational asymmetry. If this is the case and ETFs 
attract noise traders, due to their simplicity, we should expect that there should be 
substantial tracking errors and generally no improvement on pricing efficiency in the 
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underlying markets. Before the introduction of the ETFs, individual investors could 
invest in open-ended and closed-ended funds; these two provided investors with a tool to 
diversify their investments, relatively easy and at a low cost. Mutual funds, by pooling 
funds from a span of different sources could offer their clients not only an additional 
diversification tool but access to markets that these investors would otherwise be less 
able to invest in. The introduction of the ETFs surpassed some obstacles/drawbacks of 
the mutual funds (by providing trading flexibility and tax efficiency) that made them 
even more attractive to the individual investors; in simple words, an ETF combines the 
characteristics of an open-ended fund with those of a closed-ended fund. Also, the key 
feature of an ETF is that it can be traded as a simple stock during the whole day by the 
investors. So, if the ETFs attract more noise traders, this would have a negative impact 
upon the pricing efficiency of the underlying spot markets; there are quite a few 
researches outlining the inefficiency of the ETF markets and the mispricing between 
them and the prices of the underlying markets. 
Jares and Lavin (2004) examined the behavior of the Japan and Hong Kong iShares from 
1996 till 2001. Their findings revealed significant premia and discounts between the 
NAV and the ETF returns. What is more, the authors suggested that these premia and 
discounts were predictable and could be exploited through various trading rules; for 
example, buy foreign ETF shares when the market price is smaller than the NAV, and 
sell the foreign ETF shares short when the market price is larger than the NAV. By 
applying these trading techniques, the authors came up with a return of 542.25% for the 
Japanese market and 12.119% for the Hong Kong market. As such, according to their 
study, the market of ETFs is not efficient in itself, at least in the case of foreign markets 
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where the trading of ETFs does not occur simultaneously with the underlying market. 
Madura and Richie (2004) examined the overreaction hypothesis on a number of various 
U.S ETFs, including country and sector ETFs, for the period 1998-2002. Indeed, the 
authors found evidence of significant reversals on the ETF prices; the latter was more 
evident in country ETFs and in those that had extreme movements in their stock prices. 
Though, reversals on the ETF prices are weaker during after hours. The authors, conclude 
that arbitrageurs correct the mispricing caused by noise investors’ overreaction. 
Furthermore, Shin and Soydemir (2010) examined 26 ETFs (out of them 20 were country 
ETFs and 6 were for the U.S market); their results indicated negative and significant 
tracking errors which to a great extent were ascribed to the exchange rate deviations. 
What is more, the ETFs of the Asian markets were found to exhibit momentum 
characteristics as their premia and discounts were related to past performance and their 
tracking errors were more persistent; something that was not the case for the U.S ETFs 
whose market appeared informational more efficient. As such, it appears that Asian 
markets are noisier than the U.S market and that trading techniques such as momentum 
trading, and the higher liquidity risk in these markets can induce mispricing and drive 
away prices from their fundamental values. So, the issue arising here is that if the market 
of ETFs is not price-efficient in itself, then we would expect that the introduction of these 
financial instruments would have a negative impact on the underlying markets, in terms 
of pricing efficiency. 
An additional characteristic of the ETFs that makes them attractive to individual investors 
is the simplicity they offer. If ETFs can simplify the stock selection process for rational 
investors, this is amplified in the case of individual investors who do not have the skills 
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or the means of their more sophisticated counterparts. Particularly, individual investors 
with their limited resources may face difficulties during the selection process of their 
investments. Having said that, the introduction of the ETFs has allowed investors to hold 
the whole index of a market in one go instead of searching the best stocks to invest in. 
The feature of the ETFs that allows investors to trade on them as if these were simple 
stocks gives them greater flexibility and familiarity. The latter was used by Huberman 
(2001) to demonstrate that investors were more prone to invest in companies 
geographically closed to them or domestic companies (which were more familiar to 
them) than in foreign ones. According to the author, companies that investors are more 
familiar with tend to be favored against those which are not that familiar; this familiarity 
could lead investors to be more confident on these stocks and give them the illusion that 
have better information or more control on them. In the case of ETFs, familiarity could 
be better explained from the following example. It is the case that the average investor 
cannot be familiar with all the constituent stocks of an index (i.e. S&P 500); some 
companies will have greater daily media coverage than others and usually even the 
investors knows all the constituent companies by name, it is hardly the case that he will 
have equal information for all of them. As such, by investing in an ETF, the investor 
would have the opportunity to invest in the specific basket of the index he is interested in. 
The last statement about familiarity could be a possible source of over-optimism [Montier 
(2003)] and the illusion of control bias [Montier (2003)] on behalf of the noise traders. 
Particularly, the simplicity of the ETFs and its similar characteristics with those of a 
simple stock could make investors overestimate their capabilities and underestimate the 
underlying risk of the ETFs. As such, without the ETFs, it would be difficult for investors 
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to invest in so many stocks in order to achieve an efficient replication of the underlying 
index. However, the simplicity of an ETF may give investors the illusion that they can 
have greater control of the underlying index than they really have; this in turn could make 
investors over-optimistic and overconfident about their skills. Now, given the fact that 
overconfident investors tend to trade more, the issue arising is that due to the ease with 
which investors can trade a single index through an ETF (this can be done through a 
single transaction), it can be that short term trading spirits proliferate among noise 
investors and the ETF market can become something of a speculative venue with knock 
on effects over the underlying basket’s stocks at the spot segment. What is more, with the 
markets becoming more and more complex, investors are looking for tools to make their 
life easier, just as with the case of the heuristics’ adoption. In fact, the limited attention 
bias may apply in the case of the ETFs (and the other basket securities as well) since by 
trading on a single ETF, investors do not have to monitor a large number of stocks with 
all the costs involved in both financial and time terms. It may be easy for investors to 
reach to a decision on which of their holding stocks they will sell, however choosing 
which stocks to buy among thousands of options is more difficult for them. As such, 
ETFs make the stock-selection process much faster and easier. And as in the case of 
rational investors discussed previously, this becomes more immense in the case of 
investing into foreign markets, where the trading costs are higher and monitoring the 
underlying stocks is too difficult for small individual investors.  
Another heuristic, similar to the familiarity bias discussed previously, is the recognition 
heuristic [Boyd (2001)]. According to it, an investor when confronted with two available 
investment options, he will be in favor of the one that he recognizes the most. To make 
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things clearer, let us elaborate on an example. Supposing that an investor wants to invest 
on the stock of S&P 500, it is hardly the case that he will know all the 500 constituent 
stocks of the index (especially the ones in the bottom of the list) and what is more the 
name of the companies would not be as highly recognizable as the S&P 500 Index itself. 
As such, an ETF linked to the S&P 500 Index would be more appealing to the investor 
since as it is more recognizable to him. 
What is more, another bias that seems relevant to the attraction of retail investors by the 
ETFs is the ambiguity aversion. Retail investors often lack the necessary skills, 
experience and available sources of information and capital that their rational 
counterparts have. As such, building a portfolio to track the performance of a specific 
index could be difficult for a retail investor; hence he could be quite ambiguous about his 
investment choices. An ETF can be a useful tool for the inexperienced investor to follow 
the performance of a specific index removing any ambiguity from him, since he would 
not have to construct its own portfolio, rather he could choose the appropriate ETF. 
So, the above mentioned characteristics make ETFs appealing to noise traders; hence if 
more noise traders trade in the market due to the introduction of the ETFs, this would 
have a negative impact on the pricing efficiency of the underlying markets. Certain 
researches, as discussed above, found significant tracking errors between the ETF prices 
and the NAV, thus implying that the markets of the ETFs are not always efficient and this 
can be due to certain behavioral biases such as overreaction. Additionally, the 
simplification of the stock selection process is more intense in the case of the individual 
investors rather than of the rational investors, given the lack of expertise and resources 
the former have. Additionally, certain psychological biases could boost the activity of 
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noise traders on the ETF markets; over-optimism, illusion of control, overconfidence and 
the limited attention bias could be some of them. More specifically, the simplicity ETFs 
offer to investors could lead to the overestimation of their own skill and control they may 
think they have over the underlying index, hence this could eventually lead to the use of 
the ETFs as a tool, used for short term speculation; in this case, this could have a 
destabilizing effect on both the ETF and the underlying spot markets with noise trading 
driving away prices from their fundamental values. As such, it could be the case that the 
introduction of ETFs attracts more noise traders than rational investors.  
4.6 Data and Methodology 
Our sample is obtained from Bloomberg and Datastream and includes data of spot daily 
index prices for the period 2/1/1990 till 12/12/2011 from eight European countries 
(indices in the brackets), namely Belgium (BEL 20), Finland (OMXH25), France (CAC 
40), Germany (DAX30), Netherlands (AEX), Sweden (OMXS30), Switzerland (SMI) 
and the U.K. (FTSE100). We used 2/1/1990 as our starting point as the availability of 
data from the Belgium market starts at this point of time. In addition, our sample includes 
the spot ETF daily prices and their starting dates varying according to each market’s 
launch date of the ETFs; the ETFs selected for our study are the first ETFs introduced in 
each market, allowing us for a larger sample of observations. More specifically, the ETFs 
examined are LYXOR ETF BEL 20 (Belgium), SLG OMXH25 (Finland), LYXOR ETF 
CAC 40 (France), DAXEX (Germany), AEXT STREETTRACKS (Netherlands), XACT 
OMXS 30 (Sweden), XMTCH ON SMI (Switzerland) and iSHARES FTSE 100 (U.K.). 
Our sample is divided into two sub-periods for each market, namely the one pre the 
introduction of the ETFs, starting for all markets on 2/1/1990, and the other post the 
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introduction of the ETFs, ending for all markets on 12/12/2011. So, according to the 
introduction of ETFs in each market the sub-periods are formed as following: Belgium 
(2/1/1990-1/10/2002; 2/10/2002-12/12/2011), Finland (2/1/1990-10/2/2002; 11/2/2002-
12/12/2011), France (2/1/1990-21/1/2001; 22/1/2001-12/12/2011), Germany (2/1/1990-
2/1/2001; 3/1/20011-12/12/2001), Netherlands (2/1/1990-29/5/2001; 30/5/2001-
12/12/2011), Sweden (2/1/1990-29/10/2000; 30/10/2000-12/12/2011), Switzerland 
(2/1/1990-14/3/2001; 15/3/2001-12/12/2011), U.K. (2/1/1990-27/4/2000; 28/4/2000-
12/12/2011).   
The methodology we are going to apply in our research is that of Sentana and Wadhwani 
(1992) which has been applied in numerous researches testing for feedback trading 
[Koutmos and Saidi (2001), Antoniou et al. (2005)]. The model assumes two types of 
traders, namely rational ones and noise traders or “feedback traders”.  
Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) calculated the demand for stocks of both rational and 
feedback traders.  
The demand function of rational investors is the following: 
    (1) 
Where: tQ  
, is the fraction of shares outstanding hold by rational traders,  tt rE 1  is the 
expected return on period t, based on the information at the previous period, is risk-
free rate,   is the measure of risk aversion and 2
t  is the coefficient of conditional 
variance at period t. 
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The demand for feedback traders is calculated by the following formula: 
  (2) 
Where:    is the demand of feedback traders,      is the returns of the previous period 
and   distinguishes between positive feedback traders (     and negative feedback 
traders (    . 
In case of equilibrium in the market, this is expressed by 
tQ + tY  = 1 (3) 
If we substitute (1) and (2) into equation (3) we get: 
 tt rE 1   =  - 1tr 
2
t + 
2
t   (4) 
Then if we set tr   =  tt rE 1   + t , t  being a stochastic error term, and substitute into the 
above equation we get the following: 
tr    =  – 1tr 
2
t  + 
2
t + t   (5) 
Where: tr  is the return at period t and t  is the error term. Now, in order to allow for 
autocorrelation, we apply the following specification as proposed by Sentana and 
Wadhwani (1992): 
  ttttt rr    21210   (6) 
Where: 
0
  captures any non-synchronous trading effects, 
1
 = -  indicates the 
presence of positive feedback trading when negative and the presence of negative 
1 tt rY 


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feedback trading when positive. Moreover, the term 1tr 
2
t , suggests that if positive 
feedback traders prevail in the market the autocorrelation will be negative, whereas if 
negative feedback traders prevail, then the autocorrelation will be positive. Now, in order 
to account for any asymmetries on feedback trading subject to market direction equation 
(6) can be modified as follows: 
 
tttttt
rrr  
 12
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                                                         (7) 
Where: If 
2
  is positive then positive feedback trading grows more after market declines 
than market upturns and the coefficient on 1tr becomes: 
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Now, in order to identify any significant difference in feedback trading over the two 
periods, pre and post the introduction of the ETFs, we apply the following specification 
proposed by Antoniou et al. (2005): 
ttttttttt RDDRDDR    1
2
2,11,112,01,0
2 )]1([)]1([                           (8) 
2
11
2
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2
112,01,0
2 )1(   ttttttt SDD                                                           (9) 
Where: tD  is the dummy variable that takes the value of one in the pre-ETF period and 
the value of zero in the post-ETF period. 
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What is more, since there is an ongoing credit crisis in the post-ETF period, we re-
calculate the equations (8) and (9) for the post-ETF period, by setting tD  equal to one in 
the pre-crisis period and equal to zero in the post-crisis period. 
To identify whether feedback traders have a longer memory in their demand than just one 
period, we introduce a second lag in equation (2) which takes the following form: 
rrY ttt 2211                                                                                                    (10) 
Accordingly, equation (6) will become: 
    ttttttt rrr    222431210                                                   (11) 
Where: 1 = - 1 and 4 = - 2 ; when 1  and 4  are positive this would suggest the 
presence of negative feedback, whereas if these coefficients are negative this would suggest the 
presence of positive feedback trading. Similarly, if 0  is positive this would imply the 
presence of inefficiencies through a significant first order autocorrelation and if 3  is 
positive this would suggest the presence of market inefficiencies through a significant 
second order autocorrelation. 
Finally,  the conditional variance ( 2
t ) is specified as an Asymmetric GARCH process 
Glosten et al. (1993) to examine whether there is a link between the established volatility 
asymmetries and the feedback trading asymmetries calculated via equation (7): 
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  ttttt S       (12) 
Where: δ measures the asymmetric responses of volatility on positive versus negative 
shocks,  St-1 is a variable that equals to one if the shock at period t-1 is negative and 
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equals to zero if the shock at period t-1 is positive. If δ is positive and statistically 
significant this suggests that negative shocks increase volatility more that positive shocks 
do.  
Table 4.1 provides the descriptive statistics for our data, namely the mean, standard 
deviation, skewness, kurtosis, the normality test (Jarque-Bera) and the Ljung-Box 
statistics for 10 lags. As one can infer from the table, the return-series appear to depart 
from normality as the skewness and kurtosis measures indicate and confirmed by the 
Jarque-Bera test. More specifically, the spot indices of Finland, Germany, Netherlands, 
Switzerland and the U.K appear to be significantly (1% level) negatively skewed, those 
of the Swedish market appear significantly (1% level) positively skewed, whereas those 
of Belgium and Paris are insignificantly skewed, positively and negatively respectively. 
Moreover, all eight series appear highly leptokurtic, whereas the significant (1% level) 
Jarque-Bera test-statistics confirm these departures from normality for all the spot indices 
examined. These departures from normality are also documented in the ETF series. 
Furthermore, the LB statistic is significant (5% level) in the all of the series but that of 
Finnish ETF series indicating that there are temporal dependencies in the first moments 
of the return series; market inefficiencies could be the reason for this phenomenon.
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Table 4.1 - Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Spot Market Returns 
  
BEL 20 
(2/1/1990-
12/12/2011) 
OMXH25 
(2/1/2990-
12/12/2011) 
CAC 40 
(2/1/1990-
12/12/2011) 
DAX 30 
(2/1/1990-
12/12/2011) 
AEX 
(2/1/1990-12/12/2011) 
OMXS 30 
(2/1/1990-
12/12/2011) 
SMI 
(2/1/1990-
12/12/2011) 
FTSE 100 
(2/1/1990-
12/12/2011) 
μ 0.0069 0.0237 0.0080 0.0211 0.0140 0.0267 0.0206 0.0144 
  1.17 1.54 1.41 1.46 1.37 1.51 1.19 1.14 
S  0.0322 -0.1399** -0.0209 -0.134777** -0.149673** 0.157458** -0.153008** -0.1182** 
E(K) 7.19452** 3428.451** 4.81715** 5.017958** 6.660763** 3.954705** 6.2505** 6.3200** 
Jarque-Bera 12,346.012368** 2,823.066956** 5,536.728327** 6,024.840403** 10,606.3108** 3,755.030105** 9,343.5617** 9,543.1603** 
LB(10) 76.663** 29.46* 49.374** 21.752* 71.265** 25.856* 63.736** 87.3580** 
LB
2 
(10) 3,620.314** 1,405.300** 2,600.058** 2,544.918** 4,615.734** 1,663.497** 3,419.23** 3,932.7120** 
Panel B: ETF Returns 
  
LYXOR ETF  
BEL 20 
(2/10/2002-
12/12/2011) 
SLG OMXH25 
(11/2/2002-
12/12/2011) 
LYXOR ETF  
CAC 40 
(22/1/2001-
12/12/2011) 
 
DAX
EX
 
(3/1/2001-
12/12/2011) 
AEXT  
STREETTRACKS 
(30/5/2001-12/12/2011) 
XACT 
 OMXS30 
(30/10/2000-
12/12/2011) 
XMTCH 
 ON SMI 
(15/3/2001-
12/12/2011) 
iSHARES  
FTSE 100 
(28/4/2000-
12/12/2011) 
μ 0.0158 0.0073 -0.0218 -0.0053 -0.0252 -0.0075 -0.0079 -0.0032 
  1.22 1.61 1.57 1.60 1.63 1.67 1.31 1.36 
S  -0.0123 2.5761** 0.0663 0.0317 -0.2178** 0.0476 -0.1428* -0.6752** 
E(K) 7.1359** 50.3621** 4.7329** 4.9762** 6.6765** 3.1183** 5.5128** 14.0484** 
Jarque-Bera 5,070.9611** 26,8996.585** 2,652.8994** 2,944.1616** 5,023.1261** 1,176.1084** 3,557.7241** 25,030.7644** 
LB(10) 22.033* 12.7170 52.835** 21.929* 53.57** 31.198** 44.224** 72.012** 
LB
2
 (10) 734.959** 5.1060 1,388.581** 1,262.31** 1,990.169** 762.728** 2,090.305** 1,326.713** 
** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, * denotes significance at the 5 percent level; μ   mean,     standard deviation, S   skewness, E(K) = excess kurtosis, LB(10), LB2 (10) = the 
Ljung- Box  test-statistics for returns and squared returns for 10 lags. Dates in brackets refer to the sample window for each series. All spot indices bear 2/1/1990 as their start-date; ETF-series 
bear different start dates contingent upon the launch-date of each.  
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Nevertheless, this statistic cannot detect any sign reversals in autocorrelations caused by 
feedback trading, since it only documents dependencies in the first moments. As such, 
when we apply the LB statistic in the squared returns series, we get to see that there are 
higher moment dependencies, since the LB test in this case is also significant (1% level) 
in all cases but the Finnish ETF series and higher than the simple LB test on both the 
returns and ETF series. 
 
4.7 Research Hypothesis 
The relevant literature so far has presented evidence that the introduction of specific 
financial products (e.g. index futures, etc.) depressed the level of noise trading and had a 
beneficial impact over the efficiency of the markets these have been introduced to. ETFs 
have certain characteristics that make them attractive to both institutional investors 
(informed traders) and retail investors (these being the prime candidates for noise 
trading). However, given the fact that the introduction of similar products improved the 
efficiency of the markets these have been introduced to and the fact that the segment of 
the ETFs is dominated by institutional investors, we would expect that the introduction of 
the ETFs would depress the level of noise trading and improve the efficiency of the 
markets these are introduced to. As such, our hypotheses are formalized as following:  
H0: The introduction of the ETFs does not depress the level of noise trading. 
H1: The introduction of the ETFs depresses the level of noise trading. 
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4.8 Empirical Results 
We begin our analysis with the findings of the equations (6) and (12) on spot indexes’ 
prices during the pre and post ETF introduction; table 4.2 and table 4.3 present our 
findings. Starting with the coefficient φ0, this indicates the presence of significant first 
order autocorrelation in the majority of the markets examined prior the introduction of 
the ETFs, as it is significant (5% level) in most of the cases, except those of the 
Netherlands and the U.K. However, in the sample period after the introduction of the 
ETFs, there is no evidence of first order autocorrelation as the coefficient φ0 is 
insignificant in all markets. Hence, one can infer from this outcome that these six markets 
of our sample became more efficient after the introduction of the ETFs. 
Furthermore, as we can see from the table which shows the pre ETF introduction period, 
the coefficient φ1 indicating the presence of feedback trading is negative in most of the 
cases but the U.K. market. A negative and significant φ1 coefficient implies the presence 
of positive feedback trading whereas a positive and significant coefficient implies 
negative feedback trading. As such in our case there is significant positive feedback 
trading in the markets of Belgium (5%level) and Finland (1% level). However, after the 
introduction of the ETFs in these two markets, there is no evidence of significant 
feedback trading as table 3.3 indicates. Regarding the conditional variance process as 
exhibited in eq.12, the coefficient γ is highly significant (1% level) in both pre and post 
ETF periods suggesting that volatility is persistent over the two periods. Further evidence 
to the above provides the measurement of the volatility’s half life, calculated as HL= 
ln(0.5)/ln(β+γ+δ/2) [Harris and Pisedtasalasai (2006)]. The results from this test indicate 
that the effect of a volatility shock on the market lasts for a significant number of trading 
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days
31
; what is more, the half life numbers are higher for the post ETF period (except in 
the U.K. market), indicating an increase on the volatility’s persistence. 
Regarding the β coefficient, this appears significantly (5% level) positive in all markets in 
the pre ETF periods, suggesting that volatility has increased due to the news arriving in 
the market over that period. Now, in the post ETF period, the β coefficient is insignificant 
in half of the markets, whereas in the other half is significantly (5% level) negative. 
Moving on to the coefficient δ, this is remains positive and highly significant (5% level) 
in all markets examined at periods, pre and post the introduction of the ETFs. This 
suggests that negative news have a greater impact upon market volatility rather than 
positive news. Supporting evidence to the previous finding provides the asymmetric ratio 
(β+δ/δ) which indicates that during the post ETF introduction period the asymmetric 
volatility is more pronounced (the higher the asymmetric ratio and the δ coefficient, the 
higher the asymmetric volatility).   
Now, in order to control for possible asymmetries in feedback trading we will use the 
extension of the previous model used, as this was implemented by Sentana and 
Wadhwani (1992) and is expressed in equation (7). Tables 4.4 and 4.5 indicate the results 
pre and post the ETF introduction respectively. Again, in the pre-ETF period the φ0 
coefficient appears to be significant in five markets (Belgium, Finland, France, Sweden 
and Switzerland). However, in the post-ETF period these coefficients become 
insignificant. As previously, this signals an improvement in terms of market efficiency in 
these markets. Furthermore, the coefficient    is significant and negative in the markets 
                                                          
31
 Ranging from 7 trading days (Switzerland) to 92 (U.K.) in the pre ETF period and 40 trading days 
(Switzerland) to 75 trading days (Netherlands) in the post ETF period. 
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of Belgium and Finland, indicating the presence of negative feedback trading; though 
once again, these coefficients turn insignificant in the post ETF period. In addition, as the 
coefficient    is insignificant for all the markets examined at both sub-periods, we can 
say that there is no evidence of relationship between market direction and the feedback 
traders’ behavior. 
What is next is to examine the significance of the difference in feedback trading between 
the two periods, pre and post the introduction of the ETFs. In order to do this, we follow 
the specification of Antoniou et al. (2005) as indicated above in equations (8) and (9). 
The results are shown in table 4.5 and as we can see the coefficients    and    reveal 
similar outcomes to the previous models applied. More specifically, there is an 
improvement in terms of market efficiency for five markets of our sample as    is 
significant in the pre-ETF period and turns to insignificant in the post ETF period. 
Similarly, for the markets of Belgium and Finland, the coefficient  , being significant 
and positive in the pre-ETF period, becomes insignificant in the post-ETF period. In 
addition, in all markets except that of Belgium, the volatility’s level is smaller in the post-
ETF period (β0,1 > β0,2) and as our Wald-tests show, there is significant difference (5% 
level) in this coefficient’s values between the pre and post ETF periods; the only 
exception here is the markets of Belgium and the Netherlands.  
Our next step is to examine the robustness of our results by recalculating our model using 
different windows around the introduction of the ETFs; in our case we will use 2-year, 3-
year and 4-year windows (that is 2 years before and 2 years after the introduction of the 
ETFs and so on). The results of this test are indicated in table 4.7. As we can see from the 
tables, the coefficient    appears to be significant for some markets. More specifically, in 
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the pre-ETF period, the coefficient is significant for Belgium in all three time windows 
(2-3-4 years). Similarly, the coefficient for France is also significant for the 2- and 4-year 
window and the one for U.K market (3- and 4- year window). Nevertheless, the 
coefficient for these markets turns insignificant in the post ETF periods with this 
difference being significant (5% level). 
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Table 4. 2 - Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Sentana and Wadwhani (1992) Model: Pre-ETF Spot Market Indices Daily Returns 
Conditional Mean Equation:  
ttttt
rr  

2
1
2
10
   
Conditional Variance Specification:
2
11
2
1
2
1
2
  ttttt S   
Parameters 
BEL 20 
(2/1/1990 - 
1/10/2002) 
OMXH25 
(2/1/1990 - 
10/2/2002) 
CAC 40 
(2/1/1990 - 
21/1/2001) 
DAX 30 
(2/1/1990 - 
2/1/2001) 
AEX 
(2/1/1990 -
29/5/2001) 
OMXS30 
(2/1/1990 - 
29/10/2000) 
SWISSMI 
(2/1/1990 - 
14/3/2001) 
FTSE 100 
(2/1/1990 - 
27/4/2000)  
α 
-0.0043  
(0.0197)      
0.0498 
 (0.0427)       
-0.1085 
  (0.0493)*      
-0.0038 
  (0.0380)      
0.0153 
  (0.0262)       
0.0625 
  (0.0355)       
0.0008 
  (0.0328)       
0.0035 
 (0.0293)       
θ 
0.0171 
  (0.0245)       
-0.00750 
 (0.0205)      
0.0996 
  (0.0361)       
0.0356 
  (0.0275)       
0.0347 
  (0.0277)       
-0.0020 
  (0.0221)      
0.0462 
  (0.0341)       
0.0401 
 (0.0397)      
φ0 
0.1812 
 (0.0239)**     
0.2105 
 (0.0314)**       
0.0782 
  (0.0384)*       
0.0672 
  (0.0339)*     
0.0331 
  (0.0288)       
0.1242 
  (0.0303)**       
0.1040 
  (0.0286)**       
0.0581 
 (0.0369)       
φ1 
-0.0268 
  (0.0121)*      
-0.0291   
(0.0084)**      
-0.0158 
  (0.0186)      
-0.0170 
  (0.0132)      
-0.0050 
  (0.0146)      
-0.0168 
  (0.0096)      
-0.0209 
  (0.0137)   
0.0016 
 (0.0324)      
ω 
0.0347 
 (0.0028)**     
0.0877 
(0.0093)**       
0.0649 
  (0.0088)**       
0.0458 
  (0.0057)**       
0.0197 
  (0.0025)**       
0.0473 
  (0.0080)**       
0.0994 
 (0.0090)**      
0.0062 
 (0.0016)**       
γ  
0.8442   
(0.0111)**    
0.8658 
(0.0090)** 
0.9018 
  (0.0114)**      
0.8951 
  (0.0103)**      
0.9082 
  (0.0084)**    
0.8732 
  (0.0109)**      
0.7832 
  (0.0191)**  
0.9559 
 (0.0050)**     
β 
0.0573  
 (0.0099)**   
0.0800 
(0.0074)**      
0.0145 
  (0.0086)**       
0.0437 
  (0.0093)**    
0.0474 
  (0.0078)**       
0.0484 
  (0.0071)**       
0.0322 
  (0.0115)**     
0.0129 
 (0.0057)*     
δ 
0.1209  
 (0.0141)**       
0.0387  
 (0.0118)*       
0.0737 
  (0.0119)**       
0.0586 
  (0.0112)**       
0.0493 
  (0.0085)**       
0.1117 
  (0.0139)**       
0.1729 
  (0.0157)**      
0.0474 
 (0.0082)**      
(β  δ)/ β 3.1099 1.4838 6.0828 2.3410 2.0401 3.3079 6.3696 4.6744 
Half Life 17.9 19.5 14.4 21.4 34.7 30.4 6.7 92.1 
** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, * denotes significance at the 5 percent level. Parentheses include the standard errors of the estimates. 
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Table 4.3 - Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) Model: Post-ETF Spot Market Indices Daily Returns 
Conditional Mean Equation:  
ttttt
rr  

2
1
2
10
   
Conditional Variance Specification:
2
11
2
1
2
1
2
  ttttt S   
Parameters 
BEL 20 
(2/10/2002-
12/12/2011) 
OMXH25 
(11/2/2002-
12/12/2011) 
CAC 40 
(22/1/2001-
12/12/2011) 
DAX 30 
(3/1/2001-
12/12/2011) 
AEX 
(30/5/2001-
12/12/2011) 
OMXS30 
(30/10/2000-
12/12/2011) 
SWISSMI 
(15/3/2001-
12/12/2011) 
FTSE 100 
(28/4/2000-
12/12/2011) 
α 
0.0496 
 (0.0224)* 
0.0329 
 (0.0286)       
-0.0138 
  (0.0240)      
0.0091 
  (0.0249)       
0.0031 
  (0.0217)       
0.0043 
  (0.0288) 
0.0007 
  (0.0211)       
-0.0042 
  (0.0198)      
θ 
(-0.0130) 
(0.0175)      
-0.0023 
  (0.0176)      
0.0058 
  (0.0135)       
0.0039 
  (0.0130)       
-0.0054 
  (0.0126)      
0.0036 
  (0.0145)       
0.0017 
  (0.0176)       
0.0036 
  (0.0167)       
φ0 
0.0079   
(0.0262)       
0.0506 
(0.0305)       
-0.0383 
  (0.0261)      
-0.0108 
  (0.0270)      
0.0183 
  (0.0259)       
0.0043 
  (0.0288)       
-0.0037 
  (0.0231)      
-0.0408 
  (0.0241)     
φ1 
0.0004   
(0.0071)    
-0.0057 
 (0.0088)      
0.0002 
  (0.0062)       
-0.0016 
  (0.0059)      
-0.0050 
  (0.0051)      
-0.0038 
  (0.0070)      
0.0027 
  (0.0064)       
-0.0022 
  (0.0074)      
ω 
0.0197 
 (0.0029)**       
0.0190 
(0.0032)**      
0.0238   
(0.0036)**       
0.0265 
  (0.0037)**       
0.0163 
  (0.0027)**       
0.0224 
  (0.0037)**      
0.0209 
  (0.0032)**      
0.0161 
(0.0024)**      
γ  
0.8901 
  (0.0076)**    
0.9239 
(0.0080)**    
0.9180 
  (0.0076)**     
0.9180 
  (0.0087)**     
0.9265 
  (0.0070)**     
0.9325 
  (0.0069)**     
0.9017 
  (0.0084)**     
0.9156 
(0.0080)**    
β 
0.0092   
(0.0083)     
0.0143 
  (0.0086)       
-0.0229 
  (0.0067)**      
-0.0198 
  (0.0085)**      
-0.0171 
  (0.0078)*     
-0.0099 
  (0.0066)      
-0.0142 
  (0.0071)*      
-0.0097 
  (0.0081)     
δ 
0.1740 
(0.0158)**      
0.1008 
(0.0125)**       
0.1850   
(0.0140)**      
0.1747 
  (0.0135)**      
0.1628 
  (0.0123)**      
0.1340 
 (0.0118)**      
0.1905 
  (0.0143)**     
0.1590 
(0.0120)** 
(β  δ)/ β 19.9130 8.0490 -8.3434 -7.8232 -8.5205 -12.5354 -12.4155 -15.3918 
Half Life 50.2 60.5 55.6 47.6 75.0 66.3 39.8 47.1 
** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, * denotes significance at the 5 percent level. Parentheses include the standard errors of the estimates. 
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Table 4.4 - Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) Model: Pre-ETF Spot Market Indices Daily Returns 
Conditional Mean Equation:
 
 
tttttt
rrr  
 12
2
1
2
10
   
Conditional Variance Specification:
2
11
2
1
2
1
2
  ttttt S   
Parameters 
BEL 20 
(2/1/1990 - 
1/10/2002) 
OMXH25 
(2/1/1990 - 
10/2/2002) 
CAC 40 
(2/1/1990 - 
21/1/2001) 
DAX 30 
(2/1/1990 - 
2/1/2001) 
AEX 
(2/1/1990 -
29/5/2001) 
OMXS30 
(2/1/1990 - 
29/10/2000) 
SWISSMI 
(2/1/1990 - 
14/3/2001) 
FTSE 100 
(2/1/1990 - 
27/4/2000)  
α 
0.0024 
(0.0205)       
0.0486 
  (0.0431)       
-0.1026 
  (0.0491)*      
-0.0067 
  (0.0394)      
0.0014 
  (0.0275)       
0.0617 
  (0.0364)       
0.0047 
  (0.0332)       
0.0074 
  (0.0304)       
θ 
0.0322 
 (0.0284)       
-0.0094   
(0.0239)      
0.1112 
  (0.0396)*      
0.0306 
  (0.0303)       
0.0091 
  (0.0313)       
-0.0030 
  (0.0254)      
0.0539 
  (0.0376)       
0.0483 
  (0.0427)       
φ0 
0.1870  
(0.0242)**       
0.2095 
(0.0320)**       
0.0837 
  (0.0392)*       
0.0655 
  (0.0341)      
0.0273 
  (0.0290)       
0.1236 
  (0.0308)**       
0.1079 
  (0.0293)**       
0.0606 
  (0.0373)       
φ1 
-0.0277   
(0.0120)*      
-0.0289  
(0.0085)**     
-0.0176 
  (0.0189)      
-0.0165 
  (0.0133)      
-0.0030 
  (0.0147)      
-0.0167 
  (0.0096)      
-0.0214 
  (0.0136)     
0.0003 
  (0.0325)       
φ2 
-0.0334  
(0.0291)     
0.0053 
(0.0314)       
-0.0259 
  (0.0328)      
0.0124 
  (0.0358)       
0.0583 
  (0.0323)      
0.0028 
  (0.0327)       
-0.0176 
  (0.0352)     
-0.0159 
  (0.0332)      
ω 
0.0352 
(0.0029)**      
0.0877  
(0.0095)**      
0.0668 
  (0.0090)**       
0.0453 
  (0.0056)**      
0.0192 
  (0.0025)**     
0.0472 
  (0.0081)**      
0.1005 
  (0.0091)**      
0.0063 
  (0.0016)** 
γ  
0.8422 
(0.0112)**      
0.8658   
(0.0092)**      
0.8994 
  (0.0116)**     
0.8960 
  (0.0102)**      
0.9096 
  (0.0084)**     
0.8733 
  (0.0109)**      
0.7810 
  (0.0193)**    
0.9554 
  (0.0051)**  
β 
0.0572 
(0.0099)**      
0.0802 
(0.0076)**      
0.0152 
  (0.0088)       
0.0434 
  (0.0093)**       
0.0466 
  (0.0078)**       
0.0484 
  (0.0072)**       
0.0323 
  (0.0117)**    
0.0132 
  (0.0058)*    
δ 
0.1243 
(0.0143)**      
0.0383 
(0.0118)*       
0.0745 
  (0.0121)**       
0.0581 
  (0.0112)**       
0.0487 
  (0.0083)**       
0.1116 
  (0.0139)**       
0.1749 
  (0.0162)**    
0.0477 
  (0.0083)**     
(β  δ)/ β 3.1731 1.4776 5.9013 2.3387 2.0451 3.3058 6.4149 4.6136 
Half Life 17.7 19.5 14.0 21.6 35.3 30.5 6.6 91.5 
** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, * denotes significance at the 5 percent level. Parentheses include the standard errors of the estimates. 
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Table 4.5 - Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) Model: Post -ETF Spot Market Indices Daily Returns 
Conditional Mean Equation:
 
 
tttttt
rrr  
 12
2
1
2
10
   
Conditional Variance Specification:
2
11
2
1
2
1
2
  ttttt S   
Parameters 
BEL 20 
(2/10/2002-
12/12/2011) 
OMXH25 
(11/2/2002-
12/12/2011) 
CAC 40 
(22/1/2001-
12/12/2011) 
DAX 30 
(3/1/2001-
12/12/2011) 
AEX 
(30/5/2001-
12/12/2011) 
OMXS30 
(30/10/2000-
12/12/2011) 
SWISSMI 
(15/3/2001-
12/12/2011) 
FTSE 100 
(28/4/2000-
12/12/2011) 
α 
0.0482 
(0.0248)      
0.0477 
(0.0318)       
-0.0177  
 (0.0281)      
0.0164 
  (0.0289)       
0.0006 
  (0.0262)       
0.0119 
  (0.0320)       
-0.0015 
  (0.0244)     
-0.0062 
  (0.0233)      
θ 
-0.0142 
 (0.0210)      
0.0087 
(0.0191)       
0.0043 
  (0.0148)       
0.0073 
  (0.0143)       
-0.0065 
  (0.0139)      
0.0079 
  (0.0159)       
0.0000 
  (0.0196)       
0.0022 
  (0.0182)       
φ0 
0.0074 
 (0.0266)       
0.0537 
(0.0304)       
-0.0391 
  (0.0262)      
-0.0089 
  (0.0270)      
0.0179 
  (0.0260)       
0.0064 
  (0.0287)       
-0.0044 
  (0.0235)      
-0.0411 
  (0.0241)     
φ1 
0.0004 
 (0.0071)       
-0.0059 
(0.0088)      
0.0002 
  (0.0062)       
-0.0017 
  (0.0059)     
-0.0050 
  (0.0052)      
-0.0040 
  (0.0069)      
0.0028 
 (0.0064)       
-0.0022 
  (0.0075)      
φ2 
0.0041   
(0.0355)       
-0.0385 
 (0.0353)      
0.0077 
  (0.0332)       
-0.0155 
  (0.0334)      
0.0055 
  (0.0332)       
-0.0171 
  (0.0317)      
0.0060 
  (0.0333)      
0.0050 
  (0.0321)       
ω 
0.0197  
(0.0029)**       
0.0194 
(0.0033)**       
0.0238 
  (0.0036)**       
0.0264 
  (0.0037)**       
0.0163 
  (0.0027)**       
0.0225 
  (0.0037)**      
0.0209 
  (0.0032)**      
0.0161 
  (0.0024)**     
γ  
0.8903   
(0.0079)**     
0.9225 
 (0.0082)**     
0.9182 
  (0.0077)**     
0.9177 
  (0.0087)**     
0.9266 
  (0.0071)**     
0.9320 
  (0.0069)**     
0.9019 
  (0.0084)** 
0.9158 
  (0.0081)** 
β 
0.0091  
 (0.0084)      
0.0145 
(0.0086)       
-0.0232 
  (0.0067)**      
-0.0194 
  (0.0085)**      
-0.0173 
  (0.0079)**     
-0.0097 
  (0.0066)     
-0.0143 
  (0.0071)*      
-0.0098 
  (0.0081)      
δ 
0.1739   
(0.0160)      
0.1026 
 (0.0128)**       
0.1849 
  (0.0141)**      
0.1746 
  (0.0135)**      
0.1627 
  (0.0124)**      
0.1345 
  (0.0119)**      
0.1903 
  (0.0144)**      
0.1588 
  (0.0121)**   
(β  δ)/ β 20.1099 8.0759 -6.9698 -8.0000 -8.4046 -12.8660 -12.3077 -15.2041 
Half Life 50.4 58.9 54.9 47.8 73.8 66.0 39.8 47.1 
** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, * denotes significance at the 5 percent level. Parentheses include the standard errors of the estimates.
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The only exception here is the Swedish market whose coefficient is significant in the 
post-ETF market, though its difference over the two periods is insignificant. Regarding 
the    coefficient, this appears insignificant in all markets and time windows with the 
only exception of the Swedish market where the coefficient is significant in the post ETF 
period, though its difference over the two periods is insignificant. As such, we can draw 
from the above results that feedback trading does not constitute an element of market 
dynamics in our sample countries.  
Another test of robustness we apply is to split the post ETF period into pre and post crisis 
to gauge any effect of the ongoing credit crisis. As such, for any given series of our 
sample, we split the period from the ETF launch date till 31/8/2007 and from 1/9/2007 till 
12/12/2011 and we rerun equations (8) and (9); the results are presented in table 4.8. 
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Table 4.6 - Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) Model: Test for parameter changes in the Spot Market Indexes Daily Returns 
   
Conditional Mean Equation:
              
ttttttttt rDDrDDr    1
2
2,11,112,01,0
2 )]1([)]1([                              
   
Conditional Variance Specification:
  
2
11
2
1
2
12,01,0
2 )1(   ttttttt SDD                                          
Parameters BEL 20 OMXH25 CAC 40 DAX 30 AEX OMXS30 SWISSMI FTSE 100 
α 
0.0139   
(0.0140)       
0.0531 
(0.0241)*       
-0.0246 
  (0.0211)      
0.0140 
  (0.0207)       
0.0199 
  (0.0159)       
0.0379 
  (0.0223)       
0.0048 
  (0.0175)      
0.0067 
  (0.0152)       
θ 
0.0055 
(0.0138) 
-0.0123 
  (0.0132)      
0.0224 
  (0.0132)       
0.0112 
  (0.0124)       
0.0031 
  (0.0120)       
-0.0004 
  (0.0124)      
0.0195 
  (0.0160)     
0.0107 
  (0.0158)      
φ0,1 
0.1750   
(0.0229)** 
0.2075 
(0.0294)**   
0.0837 
  (0.0350)*       
0.0656 
  (0.0324)*       
0.0486 
  (0.0280)      
0.1282 
  (0.0288)**       
0.0968 
  (0.0271)**       
0.0591 
  (0.0359)      
φ0,2 
0.0056   
(0.0266)       
0.0537 
(0.0307)       
-0.0397 
  (0.0263)     
-0.0147 
  (0.0277)      
0.0158 
  (0.0263)      
-0.0001 
  (0.0297)      
-0.0094 
  (0.0236)      
-0.0469 
  (0.0241)      
φ1,1 
-0.0234 
(0.0118)**      
-0.0275 
(0.0079)**      
-0.0146   
(0.0161)      
-0.0135 
  (0.0122)      
-0.0083 
  (0.0138)      
0.0183 
  (0.0100)      
-0.0164 
  (0.0122)      
0.0080 
  (0.0306)      
φ1,2 
0.0006 
(0.0068)       
-0.0090 
(0.0086)     
-0.0012 
  (0.0064)      
-0.0032 
  (0.0061)      
-0.0060 
  (0.0052)      
-0.0051 
  (0.0069)      
0.0016 
  (0.0065)       
-0.0023 
  (0.0076)  
β0,1 
0.0271 
(0.0016)**      
0.0500   
(0.0053)**       
0.0442 
  (0.0040)**      
0.0400 
 (0.0035)**      
0.0200 
  (0.0018)**    
0.0347 
  (0.0040)**       
0.0464 
  (0.0031)**      
0.0151 
 (0.0019)**     
β 0.2 
0.0278 
(0.0027)**     
0.0240   
(0.0031)**       
0.0267 
  (0.0032)**       
0.0293 
  (0.0034)**       
0.0172 
  (0.0024)**       
0.0279 
  (0.0037)**      
0.0305 
  (0.0032)**      
0.0116 
 (0.0017)**      
γ 
0.8690   
(0.0066)**     
0.9047  
(0.0053)**     
0.9174 
  (0.0054)**     
0.9052 
  (0.0057)**     
0.9103 
  (0.0052)**    
0.9049 
 (0.0059)**     
0.8776 
  (0.0072)**     
0.9240 
  (0.0053)**    
β 
0.0333   
(0.0060)**      
0.0492   
(0.0047)**      
-0.0013 
  (0.0046)      
0.0150 
  (0.0047)**       
0.0246 
  (0.0042)**       
0.0225 
  (0.0046)**       
0.0059 
 (0.0054)       
0.0101 
  (0.0055)       
δ 
0.1448 
(0.0102)**      
0.0593   
(0.0077)**       
0.1226 
  (0.0084)**      
0.1164 
  (0.0081)**      
0.1007 
  (0.0067)**      
0.1169 
  (0.0083)**      
0.1625 
  (0.0091)**     
0.1044 
  (0.0078)**     
(β δ)/β 5.3483 2.2053 -93.3077 8.7600 5.0935 6.1956 28.5424 11.3366 
Half Life 27.0 41.8 30.3 31.7 46.6 48.6 19.3 50.2 
Wald 
tests 
statistics 
H0: φ0,1  φ0,2 23.3092** 13.2654** 7.9303* 3.5511 0.7217 9.6152  8.8097* 6.0001* 
H0: φ1,1  φ1,2 3.2053 2.656312 0.6088 0.5725 0.0248 1.1810  1.8034 0.1089 
H0: β0,1 = β0,2 0.1214 46.2358 ** 44.5183**  17.873635**  2.2880 5.035845*  52.0386**  6.4387*  
** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, * denotes significance at the 5 percent level. Parentheses include the standard errors of the estimates. 
Wald-test statistics are represented here through their chi-square values. 
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Table 4.7: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Extended Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) Model: Tests for parameters changes using 2-/3-/4-year windows 
Conditional Mean Equation:  
ttttttttt rDDrDDr    1
2
2,11,112,01,0
2 )]1([)]1([  Conditional Variance Specification:  
2
11
2
1
2
12,01,0
2 )1(   ttttttt SDD   
 
Parameters BEL 20 OMXH25 CAC 40 DAX 30 AEX OMXS30 SWISSMI FTSE 100 
2
-y
ea
r 
w
in
d
o
w
s φ0,1 
0.1326 
(0.0592)*       
0.1767 
(0.1319)       
0.3320 
  (0.1293)*       
0.1908 
  (0.1485)       
-0.0369 
  (0.1183)     
0.0841 
  (0.1060)       
-0.0434 
  (0.1218)      
0.1224 
  (0.0842)       
φ0,2 
-0.0739 
(0.0639)      
0.0969 
  (0.1047)       
-0.0081 
  (0.0759)     
-0.0098 
  (0.0798)      
-0.0027 
  (0.0760)      
0.2543 
  (0.1080)*      
-0.0201 
  (0.0649)      
-0.0288 
  (0.0665)      
φ1,1 
-0.0005 
(0.0205)      
-0.0262   
(0.0267)      
-0.1254 
  (0.0667)      
-0.0602 
  (0.0618)      
0.0210 
  (0.0611)       
-0.0363 
  (0.0328)      
0.0434 
  (0.1022)       
-0.0109 
  (0.0460)      
φ1,2 
0.0108   
(0.0150)       
-0.0124 
 (0.0503)      
-0.0018 
  (0.0165)      
-0.0040 
  (0.0129)      
-0.0019 
  (0.0102)      
-0.0413 
  (0.0202)*     
0.0142 
  (0.0148)       
0.0154 
  (0.0358)      
Wald tests 
statistics 
H0: φ0,1  φ0,2 5.6306* 0.2229 4.9150*  1.4142 0.0587 1.2687 0.0277 2.1432 
H0: φ1,1  φ1,2 0.2064 0.0576 3.2370 0.7943 0.1378 0.0180 0.0792 0.2426 
3
-y
ea
r 
w
in
d
o
w
s 
φ0,1 
0.1591 
(0.0513)*       
-0.0110 
 (0.0933)      
0.1073 
  (0.0707)       
0.0419 
  (0.0742)       
-0.0053 
  (0.0596)      
0.0714 
  (0.0623)       
0.0170 
  (0.0518)       
0.1828 
  (0.0727)*      
φ0,2 
-0.0181  
 (0.0490)      
0.0949 
  (0.0730)       
-0.0283 
  (0.0652)      
-0.0516 
  (0.0693)      
-0.0110 
  (0.0604)      
0.1793 
  (0.0755)*       
-0.0645 
  (0.0542)      
-0.0541 
  (0.0533)      
φ1,1 
-0.0067   
(0.0180)      
0.0076 
(0.0188)       
-0.0091 
  (0.0262)      
0.0046 
  (0.0231)       
0.0193 
  (0.0190)       
-0.0158 
  (0.0164)      
0.0113 
  (0.0183)       
-0.0311 
  (0.0408)      
φ1,2 
0.0016 
 (0.0130)       
-0.0202 
(0.0429)      
-0.0012 
  (0.0147)      
-0.0011 
  (0.0116)      
-0.0036 
  (0.0091)      
-0.0309 
  (0.0161)     
0.0167 
  (0.0142)      
0.0028 
  (0.0191)       
Wald tests 
statistics 
H0: φ0,1  φ0,2 6.1760* 0.808546 1.9647 0.8542 0.0044 1.1750 1.1769 6.9180*  
H0: φ1,1  φ1,2 0.1478 0.3589 0.0691 0.0507 1.2029 0.4110 0.0562 0.5883 
4
-y
ea
r 
w
in
d
o
w
s 
φ0,1 
0.1697 
(0.0461)**      
0.0122 
(0.0687)       
0.1319 
  (0.0608)*       
0.0806 
  (0.0549)       
0.0430 
  (0.0539)       
0.0540 
  (0.0516)       
0.0635 
  (0.0480)       
0.1508 
  (0.0590)*      
φ0,2 
-0.0019 
(0.0415)      
0.0766 
(0.0601)       
-0.0647 
  (0.0508)      
-0.0415 
  (0.0540)     
0.0208 
  (0.0457)       
0.0724 
  (0.0567)       
-0.0454 
  (0.0444)      
-0.0924 
 (0.0493)      
φ1,1 
-0.0082  
(0.0177)      
0.0020   
(0.0137)       
-0.0211 
  (0.0217)      
-0.0093 
  (0.0150)      
0.0025 
  (0.0171)       
-0.0121 
  (0.0145)      
-0.0003 
  (0.0170)      
-0.0300 
  (0.0386)      
φ1,2 
0.0065   
(0.0120)      
-0.0125 
  (0.0398)      
0.0034 
  (0.0132)       
-0.0029 
  (0.0103)      
-0.0078 
  (0.0079)      
-0.0163 
  (0.0137)      
0.0098 
  (0.0131)       
0.0056 
  (0.0183)       
Wald tests 
statistics 
H0: φ0,1  φ0,2 7.5660**  0.502729 6.1347* 2.5235 0.0981 0.0566 2.7858 10.0273**  
H0: φ1,1  φ1,2 0.0060 0.1220 0.9555 0.1245 0.3037 0.0439 0.2377 0.7069 
** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, * denotes significance at the 5 percent level. Parentheses include the standard errors of the estimates. 
Wald-test statistics are represented here through their chi-square values. 
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As the results indicate the coefficients    and    are insignificant in both the pre and 
post ETF periods, suggesting that the current credit crisis did not have any impact on the 
insignificance of feedback trading and first order autocorrelation found previously in our 
tests for the post-ETF period. What is more, our results indicate that the level of volatility 
on average has increased due to the crisis for all the markets (β0,2 > β0,1); more 
specifically, the rise of the volatility is significant (5% level) in the markets of Belgium, 
Finland, France, the Netherlands and the U.K, whereas in the other markets of our sample 
is insignificant. Finally, the persistence and asymmetries of the volatility found 
previously is maintained. 
Now, in order to examine whether investors exhibit longer memory we re-calculate 
equations (9) and (12) by introducing a second lag in the demand function of feedback 
traders; Results for the pre and post-ETF periods are reported in tables 4.9 and 4.10. 
Particularly, in the markets of France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, the first 
order coefficients (
0
  and 1 ) and the second order coefficients ( 3 and 4 ) are found to 
be insignificant both in the pre and post-ETF periods. Belgium and Switzerland in the 
turn, exhibit significant 
0
  and 3  coefficients in the pre-ETF period, however these turn 
insignificant in the post-ETF period; hence signaling that the changes in market dynamics 
are due to improvement in market efficiency. Finland in its turn has significant 
0
  and 1  
coefficients in the pre-ETF period, whereas in the post-ETF period, only the 
0
  
coefficient remains significant; hence indicating that the reduction in noise trading leads 
to changes in market dynamics. Also, in the case of Sweden, both the 
0
  and 3
coefficients are significant in the pre-ETF period indicating significant inefficiencies, 
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whereas the 4  coefficient is also significant. However, in the post-ETF period, only the 
3 coefficient is significant, signaling that the change in market dynamics is due to the 
reduction of noise trading and market inefficiencies as well. 
Finally, we examine the ETF series in order to test whether the decline in noise trading is 
due to the hypothesis that ETFs attract noise traders. Table 4.11 shows the results from 
the original model and as we can see that the 1  coefficient is insignificant for all the 
markets, hence suggesting that the hypothesis that the ETFs attract noise traders is 
rejected. What is more, the 0 coefficient is insignificant in all markets indicating that the 
ETF markets are characterized by efficiency. Summarizing the findings of our tests, we 
can draw the conclusion that the introduction of the ETFs can have a beneficiary effect in 
the markets introduced in terms of improving market efficiency. Particularly, our results 
suggest four main findings: a) ETF markets are not dominated by noise traders, b) ETFs 
improve the market efficiency of the markets being introduced in, c) ETFs appear to 
depress noise trading, and d) ETFs do have any impact upon market volatility. 
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Table 4.8 - Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) Model: Test for parameter changes in the Post-ETF Spot Market Indexes Daily Returns pre versus post crisis 
   
Conditional Mean Equation:
              ttttttttt
rDDrDDr    1
2
2,11,112,01,0
2 )]1([)]1([                              
   
Conditional Variance Specification:
  
2
11
2
1
2
12,01,0
2 )1(   ttttttt SDD                                          
Parameters BEL 20 OMXH25 CAC 40 DAX 30 AEX OMXS30 SWISSMI FTSE 100 
α 
0.0487  
(0.0225)*       
0.0267 
 (0.0289)       
-0.0177 
  (0.0239)      
0.0074 
  (0.0250)       
-0.0005 
  (0.0213)      
0.0015 
  (0.0289)       
0.0011 
  (0.0211)       
-0.0133 
  (0.0192)      
θ 
0.0095   
(0.0178)      
0.0009 
  (0.0179)       
0.0097 
  (0.0135)      
0.0054 
  (0.0132)       
-0.0004 
  (0.0126)      
0.0046 
 (0.0146)       
0.0030 
  (0.0177)       
0.0127 
  (0.0162)       
φ0,1 
0.0128 
(0.0375)       
0.0931 
  (0.0486)       
-0.0465 
  (0.0353)      
-0.0055 
  (0.0350)      
0.0251 
  (0.0330)       
0.0353 
  (0.0375)       
-0.0181 
  (0.0315)      
-0.0428 
  (0.0307)     
φ0,2 
0.0238 
 (0.0399)       
-0.0019 
  (0.0526)      
-0.0144 
  (0.0420)      
-0.0071 
  (0.0439)      
0.0210 
  (0.0423)       
-0.0374 
  (0.0493)      
0.0230 
  (0.0357)       
-0.0234 
  (0.0425)      
φ1,1 
-0.0177 
(0.0124)      
-0.0204 
 (0.0291)      
0.0002 
 (0.0109)       
-0.0057 
  (0.0084)      
-0.0089 
 (0.0071)     
-0.0111 
  (0.0110)      
0.0042 
  (0.0116)      
-0.0067 
  (0.0146)      
φ1,2 
0.0000 
(0.0085)  
0.0012 
  (0.0112)       
-0.0016 
  (0.0073)      
0.0016 
  (0.0080)       
-0.0032 
  (0.0069)      
0.0023 
  (0.0095)       
0.0000 
 (0.0074)      
-0.0020 
  (0.0090) 
β0,1 
0.0229 
(0.0033)**       
0.0204 
  (0.0035)**      
0.0247 
  (0.0037)**       
0.0257 
  (0.0036)**       
0.0168 
  (0.0027)**       
0.0213 
  (0.0036)       
0.0207 
  (0.0031)**       
0.0177 
  (0.0025)**       
β 0.2 
0.0513  
(0.0099)**     
0.0365 
  (0.0096)**      
0.0415 
  (0.0082)**      
0.0321 
  (0.0060)**      
0.0290 
  (0.0050)**     
0.0267 
  (0.0056)**      
0.0253 
  (0.0052)**      
0.0398 
  (0.0058)**       
γ 
0.8769 
(0.0104)**   
0.9204 
  (0.0089)**    
0.9145 
  (0.0080)**     
0.9170 
 (0.0089)**    
0.9233 
 (0.0074)**   
0.9338 
  (0.0069)**     
0.9012 
 (0.0088)**     
0.9143 
  (0.0084)**     
β 
0.0079 
(0.0090)       
0.0130 
  (0.0086)      
-0.0259 
  (0.0062)**      
-0.0202 
  (0.0085)*      
-0.0202 
  (0.0082)*      
-0.0110 
  (0.0067)      
-0.0149 
 (0.0072)*      
-0.0242 
  (0.0086)**      
δ 
0.1764 
(0.0169)**      
0.1005 
  (0.0127)**       
0.1884 
  (0.0146)**      
0.1751 
  (0.0138)**      
0.1671 
  (0.0129)**      
0.1322 
  (0.0116)**      
0.1895 
  (0.0148)**      
0.1721 
  (0.0131)**     
(β δ)/β 23.3291 8.7308 -6.2741 -7.6683 -7.2723 -11.0182 -11.7181 -6.1116 
Half Life 25.3 42.0 40.0 43.9 51.6 62.1 36.2 28.7 
Wald 
tests 
statistics 
H0: φ0,1  φ0,2 0.0400 1.764607  0.3448 0.0008 0.0056 1.3904 0.7515 0.1379 
H0: φ1,1  φ1,2 1.4248 0.4885 0.0230 0.4382 0.3684 0.9152 0.1010 0.0775 
H0: β0,1 = β0,2 12.3482**  4.3937*  6.8175*  1.9546 9.9485*  1.7489 1.5009  23.9439**  
** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, * denotes significance at the 5 percent level. Parentheses include the standard errors of the estimates. 
Wald-test statistics are represented here through their chi-square values. 
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Table 4.9 - Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) Model: Controlling for higher-order feedback traders’ demand (Pre-ETF) 
Conditional Mean Equation:      ttttttt rrr    222431210  
Conditional Variance Specification:  
2
11
2
1
2
1
2
  ttttt S   
Parameters 
BEL 20 
(2/1/1990 - 
1/10/2002) 
OMXH25 
(2/1/1990 - 
10/2/2002) 
CAC 40 
(2/1/1990 - 
21/1/2001) 
DAX 30 
(2/1/1990 - 
2/1/2001) 
AEX 
(2/1/1990 -
29/5/2001) 
OMXS30 
(2/1/1990 - 
29/10/2000) 
SWISSMI 
(2/1/1990 - 
14/3/2001) 
FTSE 100 
(2/1/1990 - 
27/4/2000)  
α 
-0.0053 
(0.0200)      
0.0563 
(0.0428)       
-0.1030 
  (0.0516)*     
-0.0007 
  (0.0394)      
0.0182 
  (0.0272)       
0.0522 
  (0.0363)      
0.0042 
 (0.0360) 
0.0036 
  (0.0299)       
θ 
0.01452 
(0.0252)       
-0.0116 
(0.0207)      
0.0936 
  (0.0384)*      
0.0298 
  (0.0290)      
0.0297 
  (0.0297)       
-0.0003 
  (0.0231)      
0.0353 
  (0.0388)       
0.0358 
  (0.0411)       
φ0 
0.1671 
(0.0247)**       
0.2110 
(0.0316)**       
0.0708 
  (0.0383)       
0.0640 
  (0.0338)       
0.0290 
  (0.0295)       
0.1192 
  (0.0305)**       
0.0975 
 (0.0290)**       
0.0535 
  (0.0370)       
φ1 
-0.0194 
 (0.0126)      
-0.0292 
(0.0083)**      
-0.0124 
  (0.0188)      
-0.0170 
  (0.0133)      
-0.0020 
  (0.0148)      
-0.0152 
  (0.0098)      
-0.0171   
(0.0137)      
0.0079 
  (0.0331)      
φ3 
0.0581 
 (0.0265)*       
0.0302 
  (0.0341)       
0.0583 
  (0.0366)       
0.0567 
  (0.0334)       
0.0261 
  (0.0289)       
0.0782 
  (0.0292)**       
0.0586 
  (0.0279)*      
0.0866 
  (0.0359)*       
φ4 
-0.0257   
(0.0136)      
-0.0138 
  (0.0091)      
-0.0283 
  (0.0179)      
-0.0253 
  (0.0137)      
-0.0266 
  (0.0156)      
-0.0235 
  (0.0091)**      
-0.0214 
  (0.0136)      
-0.0976 
 (0.0337)**     
ω 
0.0345 
(0.0028)**      
0.0907 
  (0.0096)**       
0.0630 
  (0.0087)**      
0.0440 
  (0.0056)**       
0.0195 
  (0.0025)**      
0.0480 
  (0.0084)*      
0.1019 
  (0.0092)**     
0.0063 
  (0.0016)**       
γ  
0.8450 
(0.0111)**    
0.8629 
  (0.0093)**     
0.9040 
  (0.0113)**      
0.8992 
  (0.0101)**     
0.9084 
  (0.0085)**     
0.8718 
  (0.0115)     
0.7761 
  (0.0194)**      
0.9558 
  (0.0052)**     
β 
0.0558   
(0.0099)**       
0.0825   
(0.0077)**      
0.0140 
  (0.0087)      
0.0412 
  (0.0090)**       
0.0481 
  (0.0079)**       
0.0473 
  (0.0072)**       
0.0343 
  (0.0118)*       
0.0125 
  (0.0057)*       
δ 
0.1223 
(0.0143)** 
0.0370 
  (0.0119)**       
0.0728 
  (0.0119)**       
0.0576 
  (0.0110)**       
0.0477 
  (0.0085)**       
0.1158 
  (0.0148)**       
0.1792 
 (0.0165)**      
0.0484 
  (0.0083)**       
(β  δ)/ β 3.1918 1.4485 6.2000 2.3981 1.9917 3.4482 6.2245 4.8720 
Half Life 17.9 18.9 14.9 22.2 34.9 29.8 6.6 92.1 
** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, * denotes significance at the 5 percent level. Parentheses include the standard errors of the estimates. 
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Table 4.10 - Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) Model: Controlling for higher-order feedback traders’ demand (Post-ETF) 
Conditional Mean Equation:      ttttttt rrr    222431210  
Conditional Variance Specification:  
2
11
2
1
2
1
2
  ttttt S   
Parameters 
BEL 20 
(2/10/2002-
12/12/2011) 
OMXH25 
(11/2/2002-
12/12/2011) 
CAC 40 
(22/1/2001-
12/12/2011) 
DAX 30 
(3/1/2001-
12/12/2011) 
AEX 
(30/5/2001-
12/12/2011) 
OMXS30 
(30/10/2000-
12/12/2011) 
SWISSMI 
(15/3/2001-
12/12/2011) 
FTSE 100 
(28/4/2000-
12/12/2011) 
α 
0.0501 
 (0.0230)*       
0.0814 
  (0.0262)*       
-0.0103 
  (0.0243)      
0.0093 
  (0.0251)       
0.0011 
  (0.0217)       
0.0110 
  (0.0292)       
0.0055 
  (0.0215)       
-0.0013 
  (0.0202)      
θ 
-0.0165 
 (0.0187)      
-0.0181 
  (0.0137)      
0.0026 
  (0.0139)       
0.0022 
  (0.0133)       
-0.0062 
  (0.0128)      
-0.0004 
  (0.0149)      
-0.0027 
  (0.0182)      
0.0002 
  (0.0175)       
φ0 
0.0068 
 (0.0262)       
0.0593 
  (0.0230)*       
-0.0378 
  (0.0264)      
-0.0104 
  (0.0271)      
0.0173 
  (0.0259)      
0.0047 
  (0.0288)       
-0.0058 
  (0.0239)      
-0.0409 
  (0.0246) 
φ1 
0.0011 
(0.0072)      
-0.0080 
  (0.0060)      
-0.0003 
  (0.0064)      
-0.0017 
  (0.0061)     
-0.0047 
  (0.0052)     
-0.0042 
  (0.0070)      
0.0037 
  (0.0077)       
-0.0027 
  (0.0081)      
φ3 
0.0194   
(0.0258)       
0.0217 
  (0.0243)       
-0.0016 
  (0.0247)      
0.0148 
  (0.0249)       
0.0288 
  (0.0246)      
-0.0135 
  (0.0260)*     
-0.0104 
  (0.0249)      
-0.0059 
  (0.0235)     
φ4 
-0.0076   
(0.0074)      
-0.0083 
  (0.0061)      
-0.0061 
  (0.0057)      
-0.0049 
  (0.0053)     
-0.0047 
  (0.0046)      
-0.0070 
  (0.0067)      
-0.0094 
  (0.0080)     
-0.0097 
  (0.0075)      
ω 
0.0194 
(0.0029)**      
0.0209 
  (0.0031)**       
0.0232 
  (0.0036)**      
0.0261 
  (0.0037)**       
0.0161 
  (0.0027)**      
0.0213 
  (0.0037)**       
0.0205 
  (0.0032)**       
0.0157 
 ( 0.0024)**       
γ  
0.8913 
(0.0076)**     
0.9125 
  (0.0051)**     
0.9191 
  (0.0076)**     
0.9187 
  (0.0087)**     
0.9279 
  (0.0070)** 
0.9343 
  (0.0068)**     
0.9025 
  (0.0083)**     
0.9169 
  (0.0079)**     
β 
0.0086 
(0.0083)      
0.0526 
  (0.0060)**       
-0.0221 
  (0.0068)**      
-0.0195 
  (0.0085)**      
-0.0189 
  (0.0078)*      
-0.0093 
  (0.0066)      
-0.0128 
  (0.0071)     
-0.0091 
  (0.0081)      
δ 
0.1737 
(0.0158)      
0.0561 
  (0.0086)**      
0.1813 
  (0.0137)**      
0.1734 
  (0.0134)**      
0.1640 
  (0.0125)**      
0.1297 
  (0.0115)**      
0.1864 
  (0.0141)**      
0.1556 
  (0.0117)** 
(β  δ)/ β 21.1977 2.0665 -7.2036 -7.8923 -7.6772 -12.9462 -13.5625 -16.0989 
Half Life 52.0 100.8 55.8 48.8 76.7 67.9 40.2 47.8 
** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, * denotes significance at the 5 percent level. Parentheses include the standard errors of the estimates. 
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Table 4.11 - Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) Model: ETF Daily Returns 
Conditional Mean Equation:    ttttt rr    21210  
Conditional Variance Specification:
 
2
11
2
1
2
1
2
  ttttt S   
Parameters 
LYXOR ETF  
BEL 20 
(2/10/2002-
12/12/2011) 
SLG OMXH25 
(11/2/2002-
12/12/2011) 
LYXOR ETF  
CAC 40 
(22/1/2001-
12/12/2011 
 
DAX
EX
 
(3/1/2001-
12/12/2011) 
AEXT  
STREETTRACKS 
(30/5/2001-12/12/2011) 
XACT 
 OMXS30 
(30/10/2000-
12/12/2011) 
XMTCH 
 ON SMI 
(15/3/2001-
12/12/2011) 
iSHARES  
FTSE 100 
(28/4/2000-
12/12/2011) 
α 
0.0526 
(0.0218)*       
-0.1324 
  (0.0680)      
-0.0041 
  (0.0252)      
-0.0028 
  (0.0241)      
0.0119 
  (0.0232)       
0.0142 
  (0.0304)       
0.0034 
  (0.0220)       
-0.0022 
  (0.0204)      
θ 
-0.0133   
(0.0205)      
0.0593 
  (0.0288)*       
0.0005 
  (0.0140)       
0.0096 
  (0.0126)      
-0.0140 
 (0.0131)      
-0.0014 
  (0.0144)      
0.0002 
  (0.0183)       
0.0019 
  (0.0166)       
φ0 
-0.0006  
(0.0284)      
0.0128 
  (0.0203)       
-0.0413 
  (0.0263)      
0.0062 
 (0.0271)      
0.0064 
  (0.0253)      
-0.0226 
  (0.0302)      
-0.0139 
  (0.0240)      
-0.0457 
  (0.0239)      
φ1 
0.0082 
(0.0098)       
0.0000 
  (0.0156)       
0.0008 
  (0.0064)       
0.0008 
  (0.0060)       
-0.0037 
  (0.0052)     
-0.0017 
  (0.0077)      
0.0028 
  (0.0072)      
-0.0070 
 (0.0060)      
ω 
0.0176 
(0.0027)**      
0.1477 
  (0.1452)       
0.0223 
  (0.0036)**      
0.0267 
  (0.0030)**       
0.0144 
  (0.0027)**     
0.0170 
  (0.0031)**     
0.0193 
  (0.0028)**       
0.0162 
  (0.0024)**       
γ 
0.8972 
(0.0083)** 
0.8989 
  (0.0351)**      
0.9189 
  (0.0077)**     
0.9217 
  (0.0076)**     
0.9300 
  (0.0073)**     
0.9465 
  (0.0058)**     
0.9118 
  (0.0079)**     
0.9161 
  (0.0071)**     
β 
0.0062 
(0.0080)       
-0.0012 
  (0.0012)      
-0.0184 
  (0.0071)**      
-0.0280 
  (0.0078)**      
0.0170 
  (0.0082)*      
-0.0101 
  (0.0055)      
-0.0157 
  (0.0071)*     
-0.0028 
  (0.0076)     
δ 
0.1636  
(0.0148)**      
0.0886 
  (0.0276)**     
0.1753 
  (0.0139)**      
0.1820 
  (0.0130)**      
0.1590 
  (0.0117)**      
0.1104 
  (0.0100)**      
0.1722 
  (0.0143)**      
0.1442 
  (0.0110)**      
(β  δ)/ β 27.3871 -72.8333 -8.5272 -5.5000 10.3529 -9.9307 -9.9682 -50.5000 
Half Life 46.5 11.6 58.1 45.0 -26.5 82.2 38.6 47.1 
** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, * denotes significance at the 5 percent level. Parentheses include the standard errors of the estimates. 
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4.9 Further Discussion of the Results 
Let us now try to produce a synthesis of our results from tables 4.1-4.11. If there is 
one thing that is reflected through our results, it is the rather scant presence of 
feedback trading in European markets, both in their spot and ETF segments. The 
above indicate the prevalence of rational investors and the absence of significant 
feedback traders in these markets. It is interesting to further note that any presence 
of significant feedback trading is confined to the pre-ETF period, with almost no 
evidence of significant feedback trading being detected post-ETF. These findings 
suggest that the advent of ETFs in European markets led to the depression of any 
existing pre-ETF feedback trading significance, something we get to notice in the 
cases of Belgium and Finland. A possible explanation for this is that ETFs are 
dominated by rational investors and that their launch endowed rational traders with 
the opportunity to curtail noise trading. This is further corroborated through our 
results from the ETF-series, which further allow us to refute the possibility of noise 
traders migrating to the ETF-segment following the launch of ETFs. This is a 
particularly encouraging finding, both for the investment community as well as for 
the regulatory authorities. As far as investors are concerned, the absence of noise 
traders from the ETF-segment implies greater efficiency in their pricing and 
reduced risk, both of which are particularly important considering the fact that 
rational investors tend to employ ETFs for risk management purposes. On the other 
hand, the insignificance of noise trading should be welcome for regulators and 
policymakers alike, since it indicates that this prolifically popular financial 
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innovation has succeeded in constituting another channel of rational trading 
towards the market, thus rendering markets more complete.  
The beneficial impact of ETFs over market dynamics is further suggested through 
the reduction of predictability traits in the return-generation process. As our results 
have indicated, the significance of the first-order autocorrelations of returns is 
confined to the pre-ETF period, with overall evidence of predictability appear 
extremely scant post-ETF even when second-order lags are taken into account. The 
overall picture is that the efficiency of European markets grew following the 
introduction of ETFs. Although one may find hard to assert whether this was 
exclusively due to their launch, the fact that they are found to be dominated by 
rational investors certainly confirms their contribution to enhancing market 
efficiency itself. If noise investors help induce mispricing and rational investors can 
counter this through the use of ETFs as one route, then our results provide evidence 
in favor of ETFs improving pricing at the spot segment. 
If rational investors dominate ETFs (and reduce noise trading post-ETF at the spot 
level where it was found to be significant pre-ETF) and if efficiency improves post-
ETF and given that rational investors trade on the basis of information, the above 
combined would imply an increase in the flow of information to the spot-segment 
through rational trades in the ETF-market. In view of that and in line with Ross 
(1989) this would be expected to translate in a rise in volatility post-ETF; however, 
this is not what we witness. The significant drop in the average volatility level post-
ETF is an interesting finding here and may be taken to imply that the lower costs 
associated with ETF-trading ended up attracting more rational investors to the ETF-
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segment who, in turn, helped dampen spot volatility through improved risk 
management induced by the addition of ETFs in their arsenal of investment 
choices.  
In addition, the ongoing credit financial crisis that started in the late 2007 appears 
to have no impact over our results. More specifically, when accounting for the 
impact of the financial crisis, both the first-order return autocorrelation and 
feedback trading remain insignificant in the post ETF period. What is more, there 
appears to be a slight increase in the levels of volatility in some markets; 
particularly, in the cases of Belgium, Finland, France, the Netherlands and the 
U.K., there is a significant rise in the average level of volatility (at 5% level), 
whereas in the rest of the markets examined is insignificant. 
Summarizing our findings, we believe that there are important implications for both 
the market regulators and the investors. Particularly, given the fact that our sample 
consisted of developed markets, our findings can be of great importance to the 
regulatory authorities of emerging or relatively new established markets as the 
launch of ETFs could essentially contribute towards the completion of these 
markets and the attraction of sophisticated investors. Since the launch of the ETFs 
in the developed markets enhanced their pricing efficiency and depressed the levels 
of noise trading, this could be amplified under the premises of the non developed 
markets. As it concerns the investors’ side and how these could benefit from the use 
of the ETFs, there are important implications as well.  Our findings indicate that the 
ETF segment is characterized by pricing efficiency and the absence of noise 
trading; hence, this enhances confidence among the investment community 
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regarding these financial products and makes them more appealing to them. Having 
said that, it is the case that the ETFs are products whose trading volume is 
dominated by the institutional investors; thus making them less prone to mispricing. 
Finally, since the use of the ETFs have no destabilizing effect on the spot prices, in 
fact the opposite is true, these products can be successfully used as hedging tools on 
behalf of the investors.    
 
4.10 Conclusion 
Noise trading has been found to play a significant role against the completeness of 
the markets and the efficiency of their prices. As such, it is important for both the 
market regulators and the investing community to try to identify ways to depress 
the effect of noise trading upon the pricing efficiency of the markets. Since the 
establishment of the stock markets and their development throughout the years, 
there has been a plethora of financial instruments, out of which investors can 
choose the ones that best fit to their risk and return preferences. The role of these 
instruments is twofold; first they offer investors an alternative investing option, 
sometimes unique according to each instrument’s characteristics and secondly, they 
can contribute towards the depression of noise trading in the markets making asset 
prices more efficient. Research has identified the beneficial effect the introduction 
of some financial instruments had towards the efficiency of the markets where 
these have been introduced [Antoniou et al. (2005), Chau et al. (2008)].  The gap 
we identified and tried to examine in this chapter was the impact of the introduction 
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of the Exchange Traded Funds over the levels of noise trading. In order to do so, 
we used data from a span of developed markets, more specifically eight European 
markets, and we employed the established methodology of Sentana and Wadhwani 
(1992) that assumes two types of traders, namely rational and feedback trader.  
The results of our empirical analysis outline the impact the introduction of the 
Exchange Traded Funds had over the market dynamics, in terms of noise trading, 
efficiency and volatility. More specifically, our findings suggest two important 
implications regarding the impact of ETFs’ introduction over noise trading. Firstly, 
the ETFs are found to depress noise trading since in all the markets of our sample 
the significance of feedback trading appeared to dissipate after the launch of the 
ETFs. Secondly, the segment of the ETFs appears to be in the hands of rational 
investors; our results indicated no evidence of feedback trading strategies in the 
segment of the ETFs. As such, ETFs are less prone to noise trader risk, hence more 
efficiently priced, and can be considered as a very useful and safe tool for risk- and 
portfolio management purposes.  
What is more, ETFs appear to have a beneficiary impact on the overall efficiency of 
the markets these have been introduced to. More specifically, in the majority of the 
markets examined in our sample there is evidence of first-order autocorrelation in 
the pre-ETF period, this implying predictability on the stock prices. However, this 
predictability appears to diminish after the launch of the ETFs in these markets. 
This suggests that ETFs promote efficiency on the spot markets and provides 
supporting evidence to previous researches such as those of Switzer et al. (2000) 
and Kurov and Lasser (2002) which found that the introduction of the ETFs 
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contributed to the improvement of the efficiency of the markets where these were 
introduced. Furthermore, the introduction of the ETFs appears to have no 
significant impact over the volatility of the market, since volatility is highly 
persistent and asymmetric in both the pre and post ETF periods.  
Concluding, we believe that our results bear important implications for both the 
market regulators and the investors. In the first case, since our sample consisted of 
developed markets, our results can be of great importance to the regulatory 
authorities of relatively new established or emerging markets as the launch of ETFs 
could essentially increase the informational efficiency of these markets and 
contribute to their further completion. Since the introduction of the Exchanged 
Traded Funds in the developed markets can have a beneficial role improving their 
pricing efficiency and depressing the levels of noise trading, this could be amplified 
under the premises of the non developed markets. As it concerns the investment 
community, our findings suggest that the ETF segment is characterized by pricing 
efficiency and the absence of noise trading; hence, these characteristics enhance the 
confidence of the investment community regarding ETFs and the latter become 
more appealing to the investors. Having said that, it is the case that the trading 
volume of the ETFs is dominated by the institutional investors; thus making them 
less prone to mispricing. Finally, since the ETFs have found to bear no 
destabilizing effect on the spot prices (on the contrary, they have the opposite 
effect), these products can be successfully used as hedging tools on behalf of the 
investment community.    
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Chapter 5 
 
 5.1 Introduction  
The endeavor to identifying whether institutional investors herd intentionally or not, is of 
key interest to academics, investors and regulators alike. In academic terms, a wealth of 
empirical studies [see the excellent review by Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003)] has confirmed 
the presence of herding among fund managers internationally, without however assessing 
empirically the extent to which this herding is due to intent. From the investors’ 
viewpoint, establishing intent behind fund managers’ herding can help investors decipher 
between “leaders” and “followers” in the investments’ industry and entrust their savings 
with those funds whose managers are of high ability (as opposed to those who resort to 
imitation to conceal their low competence). Finally, regulators have every interest in 
identifying the factors leading fund managers to herd intentionally in order to devise 
measures aiming at reducing their impact; this is because any herding tendencies on 
behalf of fund managers can give rise to destabilizing outcomes and amplify systemic 
risk [Goodhart et al. (1998)] given funds’ dominance in equity turnover internationally. 
Holmes et al. (2011) were the first to raise the issue of herding intent in the empirical 
dimension by drawing upon the documented motives in the literature underlying 
institutional herding, which they classified into intentional (information-related; career-
related) and unintentional (relative homogeneity; characteristic trading). They then 
employed a series of market states (based on variables, such as, for example, market 
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performance and market volatility) and put forward a series of hypotheses linking the 
various states with fund managers’ propensity to herd intentionally. In essence, their 
research rested upon the notion that if fund managers herd intentionally, their herding 
should exhibit differences in its significance between periods characterized by varying 
conditions. If fund managers herd spuriously, their herding would be expected to be 
significant irrespective of the market states accounted for. Estimating institutional 
herding at the market level conditional upon different market states in the context of the 
Portuguese stock exchange, they showed that fund managers there did not herd 
indiscriminately but rather that their herding grew in significance when the market 
underwent specific conditions (i.e. that they herded intentionally). 
Our present chapter extends the approach proposed by Holmes et al. (2011) by 
investigating whether institutional investors herd intentionally at the sector level. Fund 
managers have been found to herd significantly when investing in different industries 
[e.g.Voronkova and Bohl (2005); Choi and Sias (2009) ; Chen et al. (2012)], yet no study 
to date has concluded whether their herding is the result of intent or is spurious in nature. 
A key feature of our work is that we assess the presence of intent in sector herding on the 
premises of variables (returns; volatility; volume; concentration of trading) using both 
their market and sector expressions to gauge whether herding intent at the sector level is 
more relevant to conditions prevailing in a sector or the market as a whole. The rationale 
here is that sector conditions reflect states of a sector’s environment not necessarily 
similar to those of the market. It is possible, for example, that, while the market is rising 
for a given time-window, a sector exhibits a particularly negative performance during the 
same window, due to adverse industry-specific fundamentals, be they domestic or global. 
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If this is the case, that sector’s institutional herding estimates for periods of positive 
(negative) market performance will differ from the estimates obtained for periods of 
positive (negative) sector performance
32
 and lead us to generate different inferences with 
regards to fund managers’ herding intent. This approach allows us, therefore, to control 
for the impact of different possible environmental states (market as well as sector ones) 
over institutional herding and their relation to the intent underlying it. 
We test for institutional herding intent at the sector level drawing upon a unique database 
of quarterly portfolio holdings of Spanish mutual funds for the period 06/1995-09/2008. 
Our results indicate that Spanish fund managers herd significantly at the overall market 
level, with the significance of their herding identified with certain sectors (Consumer 
Services; Industrials; Technology) for the full sample-period. Controlling for a variety of 
market and sector states, we denote that their herding exhibits clear signs of intent for a 
series of industries including Basic Materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, 
Financials and Industrials. Technology as a sector is characterized by significant 
institutional herding irrespective of the environmental states tested for, indicating that 
intent is absent in fund managers’ herding there, while some sectors (Healthcare; Oil & 
Gas; Utilities) exhibit no herding at all.  
The next section will present initially an overview of herd behavior in terms of 
motivations, both intentional and unintentional and will then proceed to discuss the 
specific issues related to sector herding. Section 3 will introduce the data employed in 
                                                          
32
 For the obvious reason that the market-states herding estimates will be based on a different period 
compared to the sector-states herding estimates.  
210 
 
this chapter, delineate the empirical design and present some descriptive statistics. 
Section 4 presents and discusses the results and section 5 concludes.   
   
5.2 Literature Review 
 
5.2.1 Definition and Sources 
 
According to Hwang and Salmon (2004) herding occurs when investors choose to mimic 
their peers’ actions disregarding their own beliefs and informational sets. In addition, 
Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) identified two kinds of herding, namely “spurious” and 
“intentional”; the first one arises when investors act in the same way due to their similar 
reaction to commonly perceived information or market conditions and the latter when 
investors intentionally disregard their own beliefs and choose to copy other investors’ 
actions.  
Possible sources of spurious herding include characteristic trading and the relative 
homogeneity of investment professionals. More specifically, characteristic trading, the 
term being first introduced by Falkenstein (1996), involves institutional investors trading 
in stocks with specific characteristics; these could be size, past returns (momentum or 
contrarian trading), or industry. As such, the selection of stocks with similar 
characteristics may lead to similar trading behavior on behalf of the fund managers. The 
latter may also engage in similar trading behavior due to their common background; 
typically, investment professionals share common educational and professional skills that 
may lead them to trade similarly. For example, most of the fund managers are graduates 
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from business schools or holders of various accredited professional certificates; hence 
they may use the same evaluation techniques or tools to form their own trading strategies. 
This relative homogeneity on the educational background of the fund managers along 
with their performance-based assessment may drive them into parallel trading behavior; 
however this kind of behavior would not be the product of intent. 
Moving on to intentional herding, this could be the result of the informational asymmetry 
among the investors. It is usually the case that not all the investors, be they professionals 
or not, have the same access to information. So, some fund managers may decide to copy 
the actions of their peers which are considered to be better informed than they are. In 
addition, fund managers may herd on others’ actions even if they themselves possess 
information; particularly, if they believe that some of their peers have better information 
than they do, they may choose to disregard their own informational sets and herd on the 
others’ trades. The decision of some fund managers to follow the trades of their peers 
may lead to a pattern of correlated trading among the investors. As such, the 
informational asymmetry among the investment professionals may be a possible source 
of herd behavior and it was defined by Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992) as 
informational cascading; the latter can have great implications on the efficiency of the 
stock markets. More specifically, since fund managers may choose to disregard their own 
information and trade on their peers’ informational sets, the latter reflected through their 
actions, this could mean that not all the information is conveyed to the market. However, 
what should be the case in an efficient market is that all available information should be 
reflected on the stock prices; Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) posited that this phenomenon 
causes informational blockages since not all the available information is conveyed to the 
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market. There is a plethora of empirical evidence supporting the theory of informational 
cascades. Calvo and Mendoza (1997) and Calvo and Mendoza (2000) examined portfolio 
managers’ diversification strategies and found evidence of informational cascading; 
more specifically, the authors found that managers would prefer to herd on their peers’ 
actions rather than trying to acquire their own information. In order to support their 
argument, the researchers used the example of the Mexican crisis in 1994 where countries 
with similar characteristics such as Brazil, Chile and Mexico were impacted by investors’ 
herding. More specifically, instead of examining each country’s specific fundamentals, 
investors assumed that every country similar to Mexico, i.e. the Latin countries, would 
follow; as such after the devaluation of the Mexican Peso, these countries’ currencies 
were also severely devaluated. 
Apart from the informational reasons discussed above, another potential source of 
intentional herding is professional reasons which are derived by the principal-agency 
problem between fund managers and their employers/clients. More specifically, it could 
be the case that fund managers may choose to follow the market consensus in order to 
protect their interests, even though this could be against their clients’ best interest. Fund 
managers are evaluated according to their performance and in comparison to their peers’ 
performance; if things are bad in the market then a fund manager having a poor 
performance is not that bad if everyone else performed poorly as well. In that case “bad 
luck” or adverse market conditions could be blamed rather than him. Furthermore, as 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) argued, it could be the case that less experienced or less 
capable managers would choose to herd on the actions of their peers that are considered 
as good or experienced in order to upgrade their status to that of the good ones. 
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Moreover, even the good managers have an incentive to herd in order for them to protect 
their good status; the cost of bad performance when acting alone is greater than the gain 
from it.  Finally, several studies such as those by Trueman (1994), Graham (1999) and 
Welch (2000) provide evidence that analysts would herd on their good peers and the 
market consensus and attributed this phenomenon to reputational incentives.  
 
5.2.2 Sector Herding 
 
After discussing the different kinds of herding and their possible sources, we now move 
on to the crux of this study, namely industry herding. The importance of the specific 
elements that characterize each industry and differentiate it from the rest has been notably 
identified by the investors over the last years, both practically and theoretically. For 
example, it is quite often the case that a single industry can affect the whole market either 
upwards or downwards; the rise of the technology sector in the 1990s that boosted the 
rest of the stocks worldwide is a well documented example of the significance that 
industries can have on market returns. Similarly, but on the downward side, the recent 
collapse of Lehman Brothers and a number of other banks as well had a great impact on 
financial markets worldwide. These two notable examples of the importance of sectors 
for the investment community and particularly the technology sector are what gave rise to 
a particular investment style, namely the sector investment style. The creation of financial 
products, mostly mutual funds, which invest in specific sectors, has been quite popular 
over the last decades. In addition, in their groundbreaking paper about style investing, 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003) also include sector investing as a style. Moreover, there has 
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been a plethora of research papers studying trading strategies in various sectors. 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) examined the presence of industry momentum in the 
U.S market. Particularly, the authors composed twenty value-weighted portfolios for the 
period 1963-1995 and they found that industry momentum strategies were more 
profitable than momentum strategies based on individual stocks; in fact, it was found that 
most of the profitability of individual stock momentum returns was explain by the 
industry momentum profitability. Furthermore, O'Neal (2000) using a sample of 31 sector 
mutual funds for the 1989-1999 period found evidence of momentum profits in the 
industry level. More specifically, especially in the 12-month period, the portfolios of 
mutual funds that exhibited higher returns during the past were found to outperform those 
portfolios that consisted of mutual funds that performed poorly. Another study by 
Swinkels (2002) examined the presence of industry momentum in the markets of Europe, 
Japan and the U.S.; his findings revealed evidence of industry momentum in the 
European and the U.S markets, yet not in the Japanese one. More recently, Ji and 
Giannikos (2010) examined the presence of industry momentum in a span of countries 
worldwide. Particularly, the authors using data for 35 countries during the period 1970-
2006 found significant evidence of industry momentum in most of the sample countries, 
especially during the month of January.  
The above studies indicate that investors do invest in sectors; however we will now try to 
understand the underlying reasons that lead investors to invest according to the industry 
classification of the stocks. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) suggested several reasons 
why this could be the case; one of the them, was that there are sectors in the economy 
that are “hot” and “cold”, like the case with the biotechnology and internet firms, leading 
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investors to herd into and out of these sectors; hence creating persistent returns. In 
addition, the authors also suggested some behavioral reasons in their effort to explain this 
phenomenon; one of them could be the presence of the overconfidence and self-
attribution biases [both presented in the Daniel et al. (1998) model] on behalf of the 
investors. Particularly, as it may be more difficult for investors to update and evaluate 
new information about the industries they already invest in, investors may be more 
overconfident or exhibit more self-attribution bias in certain industries of the market, 
hence creating mispricing in these industries. Similarly, based on the theory of Barberis 
et al. (1998), industry momentum could be the product of the conservatism bias and the 
representativeness heuristic. In the first case, investors, upon the arrival of new 
information in the market, may be reluctant to update their beliefs about certain 
industries, thus leading to the under-reaction of prices. In the case of the 
representativeness heuristic, investors may become very optimistic in the presence of 
repetitive good news (or pessimistic in the case of bad news); hence industry-focused 
investors may extrapolate this news for the whole industry causing return reversals in 
these industries. More specifically, in the latter case, the overreaction of investors to 
specific news and their extrapolation to the whole industry causes prices to deviate from 
their fair values, though in the long run these revert to their fair values. Furthermore, 
Hong et al. (2000) found evidence of stronger momentum effect in small firms with low 
coverage from the analysts and this could be due to slower information transmission into 
this kind of firms. So, it could be the case that information is not dispersed equally among 
the firms of the same industry. First the information affects the larger firms and then it is 
spread among the smaller ones as investors may interpret the information as 
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representative for the whole industry; hence, this could result into momentum effects 
with smaller firms following the larger ones.  
Apart from the behavioral reasons stated above, Berk et al. (1999) suggested that 
systematic risk is responsible for the firms’ growth options and this could lead to 
momentum effect on their returns. Moreover, it is more likely that firms in the same 
industry face similar growth opportunities, hence there is greater possibility for them to 
exhibit momentum returns. Finally, Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999)  outline the 
importance of sector investing through the high correlation among the firms belonging in 
the same industry in terms of similar regulatory and corporate environment, responses to 
macroeconomic news and supply and demand variations. 
So far we discussed whether investors engage in sector/industry investing and the 
underlying reasons for it. Now, we will examine whether investors herd at the industry 
level and if they do, whether their herd behavior is driven by intent or not. Early research 
by Lakonishok et al. (1992) found no evidence that institutional investors herd more on 
the stocks of specific industries than others. More specifically, the authors, using 
quarterly data on 769 U.S equity funds for the period 1985-1989, found that the mutual 
funds of their sample did not herd more on the stocks of a particular industry. However, 
another research by Sharma et al. (2006), which examined the case of the internet bubble 
in the U.S market found different results. The authors, examining a sample of 430 
technology firms and their institutional holdings for the period 1998-2001, found that 
institutions as a group did herd in and out of the internet stocks. The above mentioned 
studies examined whether institutional investors herd more on individual stocks of 
specific industries; however, the study by Choi and Sias (2009) examined whether 
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institutional investors herd across industries (i.e. whether institutional investors follow 
each other into and out of specific industries). The authors, using quarterly data of U.S 
institutions for the period 1983-2005, found strong evidence that institutional investors 
herd into and out of the same industries. 
Choi and Sias (2009) suggested various reasons why institutional investors may industry 
herd. First of all, according to the authors, this could be due to the underlying investors’ 
flows; retail investors’ flows from certain funds to others may be able to explain 
institutional industry herding. More specifically, if there is an increasing number of 
investors choosing to invest in a specific mutual fund, then the other fund managers may 
interpret this as a signal of informational or skill superiority (if many investors keep 
investing in a specific fund, then the fund manager must be good); hence, the other fund 
managers may herd on his actions. Another reason why institutions herd at the industry 
level could be momentum-related; institutional investors may be attracted by industries 
with high past returns and pull out from industries with low past returns. Furthermore, if 
fund managers herd due to professional/reputational reasons, it could be the case that it is 
more likely for them to follow similarly classified funds. Choi and Sias (2009) also 
suggested that institutional industry herding could be due to herding into size and Book-
to-Market styles; it is very often the case that stocks in the same industry share similar 
market capitalization and B/M ratios. For example, the technology sector is dominated by 
stocks with low B/M ratios; so if institutional investors follow a low B/M investment 
style, then they may appear to industry herd, whereas in reality they could herd due to the 
B/M style they follow (e.g. a low B/M ratio indicates growth strategies). Finally, Choi 
and Sias (2009) suggested that investigative herding could drive institutional industry 
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herding; institutional investors may trade on correlated signals at different times, thus this 
could be the source of their herd behavior. After testing for all the above mentioned 
possible reasons, Choi and Sias (2009) concluded that the correlated signals explanation 
is more likely to explain the phenomenon of institutional industry herding. 
Our study examines the presence of industry herding on the premises of the Spanish 
mutual funds’ market. What is more, building upon Holmes et al. (2011), we aim to shed 
light on whether institutional industry herding in the Spanish market is intentional or not 
and whether any evidence of intent is due to market- or industry-specific conditions. 
Holmes et al. (2011), using monthly data of Portuguese mutual funds for the period 1998-
2005, found significant evidence of herding and concluded that this was due to intent on 
behalf of fund managers. More specifically, after testing for several market conditions 
(such as market direction and market volatility), they attributed the intent of fund 
managers to herd to professional reasons. We take this approach a step further and 
examine whether the intent of fund managers to herd at the industry level is the result of 
market or industry conditions. 
At this stage, we will try to analyze why we would expect industry conditions to affect 
institutional investors’ intent to herd at the sector level more than market conditions. First 
of all, industry conditions are more representative of the fundamentals of an industry’s 
constituent stocks; it could be the case that a particular sector of the economy has better 
growth opportunities than the rest of the economy, and vice versa. So, industry specific 
news should have a greater effect upon the decision of fund managers to herd into and out 
of an industry. What is more, the type of information that affects the entire market has 
primarily to do with macroeconomic variables, hence it is easy for fund managers (and 
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investors generally) to acquire and interpret this kind of information. On the other hand, 
industry or firm-specific information is not always widely available to all investors and it 
often requires high processing skills in order to correctly interpret them. As such, fund 
managers that do not possess the required skills to analyze the information may be more 
willing to follow the actions of their peers; hence, this could imply more intent on their 
herd behavior. Finally, most of the analysts make industry recommendations (e.g. 
overweight or underweight a specific industry); hence, fund managers in order to protect 
their professional/reputational interests may decide to herd following the consensus of the 
market.      
 
5.3 Data - Methodology 
Our study uses quarterly portfolio holdings of Spanish mutual funds covering the 
December 1995 - September 2008 period which was obtained from the Spanish Securities 
Markets Commission; our sample consists of 1543 mutual funds and 245 stocks. More 
specifically, what our sample consists of is the code and the name of the fund, its 
description, the code and the name of the assets and the number of stocks each fund holds 
for every quarter of our sample period.  
In order to identify any possible signs of herd behavior on behalf of mutual fund 
managers we employ the methodology proposed by Sias (2004). Accordingly, the first 
thing to do is to calculate the fraction of institutions of each security that are buyers for it 
every quarter. The author named that ratio the “raw fraction of institutions buying” for 
security k at quarter t: 
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Afterwards, he assumed this ratio and standardized it as follows: 
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where,      ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the cross-sectional average raw fraction of institutions buying in quarter 
t and             is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the raw fraction of 
institutions buying in quarter t. In order to gauge the existence of herding, Sias assumed 
institutional demand to follow an autoregressive process of order one (AR-1) as follows: 
                                                                                                                         (3) 
The autocorrelation coefficient ( t) here indicates the quarter-on-quarter cross-sectional 
correlation between institutional demand in quarter t and the previous quarter (t-1), given 
that both sides of equation (3) are standardized and there is only one independent variable 
on the right-hand side of the equation. The next step is the decomposition of this 
correlation between institutional demand this quarter and institutional demand the 
previous quarter into two components, namely one showing whether the correlation 
observed is due to institutional investors following “their own trades” and another one 
showing whether the correlation observed is due to institutional investors following “the 
trades of others”. So, the slope coefficient of the above equation is decomposed as 
follows: 
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where Nk,t is the number of investors trading security k in quarter t and Dn,k,t is a dummy 
variable taking the value of one when trader n is a buyer of security k in quarter t and 
zero when trader n is a seller of security k in quarter t. Likewise, Nk,t-1 is the number of 
investors trading security k in quarter t-1 and Dn,k,t-1 is a dummy variable equal to one 
when trader n is a buyer of security k in quarter t-1 and zero when trader n is a seller of 
security k in quarter t-1. Dm,k,t-1 is a dummy variable that equals one when investor m 
(m≠n) is a buyer of security k in quarter t-1 and zero when investor m (m≠n) is a seller of 
security k in quarter t-1. 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (4) is the portion of the correlation 
attributable to investors following their own trades. If it is positive, then institutional 
investors tend to follow their own trades over adjacent quarters. Otherwise, if investors’ 
transactions in quarter t are independent of their own transactions in the previous quarter, 
the first term will be zero. In case the term is negative, then investors reverse their 
transactions of the previous quarter. The second term on the right-hand side equation (4) 
is the portion of the correlation attributable to institutional investors following other 
investors. If it is positive, then institutional investors tend to follow each other over 
adjacent quarters. If investors buy (sell) the securities that other investors sell (buy) over 
the previous quarter, the term will be negative. Finally, if investors’ trades are 
independent of other investors’, the term will be zero.  
Table 5.1 presents some descriptive statistics regarding Spanish funds’ holdings both for 
the full sample (market level) as well as each individual sector.
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Table 5.1 - Descriptive Statistics 
 
Total  
Market 
Basic  
Materials 
Consumer 
 Goods 
Consumer  
Services Financials Healthcare Industrials 
Oil & 
 Gas Technology Utilities 
     
No. of Stocks 245 23 33 28 65 10 54 6 6 20 
     
No. of Funds 1543 1003 874 1189 1241 839 1176 1235 967 1409 
     
No. of Quarter- 
holdings positions 647045 36512 25472 75717 148810 12804 123648 41477 19394 151915 
     
No. of Stock-Quarters 15190 1426 2046 1708 4030 620 3348 372 242 1240 
     
Average No of active stocks per 
quarter traded  by  ≥1 fund 
Jun 1995- 
Sep 2008 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total Market 79,87 36,83 40,62 66,78 82,07 100,11 94,16 81,54 81,30 77,28 85,34 94,77 96,09 98,02 83,20 
Basic Materials 15,64 15,67 15,50 16,25 18,50 18,50 17,00 17,00 15,50 14,75 14,25 14,25 13,75 14,00 14,00 
Consumer Goods 19,07 20,00 17,50 21,25 24,00 23,75 21,00 20,50 18,50 17,00 17,00 16,75 17,00 16,50 16,25 
Consumer Services 12,38 6,00 7,50 9,50 11,25 12,50 15,00 16,50 15,75 15,00 14,50 13,50 12,00 12,00 12,25 
Financials 34,19 30,67 33,00 33,25 37,25 38,00 34,25 34,00 33,75 33,50 33,00 31,00 33,25 37,50 36,25 
Healthcare 4,66 3,00 3,25 4,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 4,50 5,75 7,75 9,00 
Industrials 31,40 33,67 33,25 36,25 35,50 37,25 33,50 31,75 31,75 29,75 27,75 28,75 28,00 25,75 26,75 
Oil & Gas 3,80 2,67 3,25 4,00 3,25 3,00 3,25 4,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 4,00 4,75 5,00 
Technology 3,54 1,33 1,00 1,00 1,75 3,50 5,00 5,00 4,75 4,50 5,00 4,75 4,00 4,00 4,00 
Utilities 11,25 14,00 14,50 14,50 15,00 14,50 9,00 8,50 9,00 9,00 9,00 9,00 9,50 10,25 11,75 
Average No of active funds per 
stock per quarter traded by ≥1 
fund 
Jun 1995- 
Sep 2008 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total Market 136,55 128,00 129,75 141,00 151,50 156,00 143,00 142,25 138,00 132,25 128,50 126,50 127,25 132,50 135,25 
Basic Materials 43,04 26,87 23,55 50,75 52,05 55,89 50,75 38,81 29,95 25,29 32,69 48,97 64,45 58,70 43,89 
Consumer Goods 25,89 14,19 14,42 27,17 31,99 33,43 25,38 21,50 20,92 21,29 24,88 32,92 32,38 34,06 27,98 
Consumer Services 113,60 54,92 53,74 114,54 123,38 156,70 139,60 107,63 103,66 110,15 130,15 150,52 135,31 119,48 90,69 
Financials 38,14 21,83 21,04 42,35 50,74 56,86 35,89 24,10 34,15 34,16 39,88 52,07 51,88 43,08 25,87 
Healthcare 40,33 2,67 3,13 19,88 31,19 32,69 64,44 64,00 56,31 45,88 40,56 35,55 42,19 65,00 61,17 
Industrials 46,15 37,01 36,77 48,71 69,68 82,02 46,15 25,12 28,83 29,00 33,78 48,81 56,56 55,40 48,22 
Oil & Gas 182,24 71,50 81,13 116,56 161,75 269,58 198,50 221,19 197,50 195,25 210,06 233,63 229,75 189,27 175,70 
Technology 94,24 16,83 54,00 137,25 61,96 109,33 166,65 151,40 119,03 96,80 64,35 68,00 101,81 97,19 74,81 
Utilities 248,49 89,86 117,28 159,08 198,30 217,13 345,25 317,22 303,58 317,17 318,19 312,47 273,55 271,27 238,49 
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The total number of active funds is 1543 and the total number of stocks they invest in 
at any point during our sample period is 245. In addition, the average number of 
stocks traded actively by at least one fund is 79.87 for the whole period, peaking in 
1999 to 100.11 and declining to 83.20 at the end of our sample period (September 
2008). Likewise, the average number of active funds per stock for the whole period is 
136.55, reaching a peak in 1999 with a number of 156 and falling to 135.25 at the end 
of our sample period. The pattern witnessed above tracks the course of the Spanish 
stock market (which peaked in early 2000 only to crash later following the burst of 
the Dot Com bubble in the spring of year 2000 in the US) and is encountered in most 
of our sample sectors as well. 
In order to examine whether institutional investors in Spain herd intentionally or 
unintentionally at the sector-level we will follow the same approach with Holmes et 
al. (2011) which accounts for different market states; in our case we take into 
consideration the returns, volatility, volume and concentration, both for the total 
market and each sector. If the herd behavior of fund managers is unintentional then 
we would expect to trace no effect on its significance over different market 
conditions. However, if herding is indeed intentional then different market conditions 
would have an effect on the significance of herding. 
Starting with market/sector returns, as Holmes et al. (2011) suggested, intentional 
herding on behalf of fund managers should be more prominent during periods of 
negative returns (down markets). The authors’ argument is in line with the findings of 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) which relate fund managers’ herding with career and 
reputational reasons. The concept here involves the presence of both “good” and 
“bad” fund managers in the market; since it is more likely for managers to generate 
losses during bearish markets, bad managers may herd on the actions of their more 
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experienced peers in order to share the blame with them. Put it simple, if everyone in 
the market has performed similarly poorly, it is very difficult for the assessors of the 
fund managers to distinguish between good and bad managers, i.e. tell between those 
who performed poorly because of their bad skills and those who performed poorly 
because of the adverse market conditions. In addition, intentional herding could be the 
case even during bullish markets. Again, the fear of underperformance relative to the 
other fund managers and their assessment by their employers/clients may drive “bad” 
fund managers to follow their more successful peers. As such, if institutional herding 
is intentional, we would expect to find a relationship between market/sector returns 
and herding, i.e. difference in the levels of herding between bearish and bullish 
markets. However, if herding among fund managers is unintentional (spurious), we 
would not expect to find any difference in the significance of herding under different 
market conditions. 
In order to test for the effect of market returns over herding we use the quarter-end 
closing prices of the Madrid Stock Exchange General Price Index
33
 and estimate its 
quarterly log-differenced returns; then we rank them in ascending order. After that, 
since we have already calculated the  t coefficient and split it into the two sub-
coefficients (namely the one showing funds following their own trades and the other 
showing funds following others’ trades), we divide these series into two parts upon 
the condition on whether the market had positive or negative returns in each quarter. 
In addition, we rank the time series once again in ascending order and we split them 
in three parts, namely high returns, mid returns and low returns and examine the 
significance of herding on these three categories. Similarly, we follow the same 
                                                          
33
 The data on the Madrid Stock Exchange General Price Index and the sector indices have been 
obtained from Thomson DataStream. 
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procedure for each of the sector indices
34
; by using their quarter-end closing prices, 
we calculate the quarterly log-differenced returns for each sector and rank them in 
ascending order. After that, we again split the series of the  t coefficient and its two 
sub-coefficients, calculated for each sector, into two parts, one with positive sector 
returns and one with negative sector returns. Furthermore, after we rank again the 
series in ascending order according to sector returns, we split the series into high, mid 
and low returns. 
The next factor we consider in order to test for herding intent is market/sector 
volatility. During periods of high turbulence, hence of higher volatility, what prevails 
in the market is uncertainty; that means that it is harder for fund managers to assess 
and interpret correctly the available information. As such, it may be more convenient 
for them to follow the consensus of the market and herd on the trades of the other 
fund managers. However, according to Ross (1989) high levels of volatility lead to 
more informational disclosure to the market, thus fund managers may have less 
incentives to copy the actions of their peers as they possess more information to trade 
on. This is more so the case since fund managers are the prime candidates for 
“rational”, sophisticated investors in the market (Barber and Odean, 2009), since they 
bear the capacity to process large amounts of information. Nevertheless, fund 
managers may also herd during calm periods; this is due to the fact that in such 
periods it might be easier for the “bad managers” to visualize the trades of the “good” 
managers. So, if there is a relationship between fund managers’ herd behavior and 
market/sector volatility this could be evidence of intent. On the other hand, if there is 
                                                          
34
 The sector indices along with their Datastream mnemonics in the parentheses used are: Basic 
Materials (BMATRES), Consumer Goods (CNSMGES), Consumer Services (CNSMSES), Financials 
(FINANES), Healthcare (HLTHCES), Industrials (INDUSES), Oil & Gas (OILGSES), Technology 
(TECNOES) and Utilities (UTILSES). 
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no intent in the herd behavior of fund managers there should be no effect on the 
significance of herding between periods of high and low volatility. 
In order to extract market volatility we use daily closing prices of the Madrid Stock 
Exchange General Price Index, and calculate its quarterly volatility using the 
approach of Schwert (1989). Afterwards, we calculate the first difference between the 
values from one quarter to the next and then split the beta and its two components. 
We then rank these differences where the positive ones correspond to “increase” 
quarters and the negative ones to “decrease” quarters. After ranking the volatility 
values in ascending order, we split the  t coefficient and its two sub-coefficients into 
those quarters where market volatility has increased and those quarters where market 
volatility has decreased. The next step is to rank the quarterly volatility values in 
ascending order and split the series of the  t coefficient and its two sub-coefficients in 
equal three parts, namely high, mid and low volatility periods. Similarly, we follow 
the same approach to calculate each sector’s volatility. By using the sector indices’ 
daily prices we calculate the quarterly volatility for each and then split the series of 
the  t coefficient and its two sub-coefficients into two parts, namely whether there is 
an increase of volatility over two quarters or a decline. In addition, we rank the 
quarterly volatility values in ascending order and split the series of the  t coefficient 
and its two sub-coefficients into three parts, namely high, mid and low sector 
volatility periods. 
The next factor we take into consideration when we account for herding intent is 
market/sector volume. High trading volume minimizes liquidity risk, thus informed 
investors such as fund managers can more easily trade on their information. The 
increased trading activity of the fund managers makes the trades of the “good” fund 
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managers more visible to their peers, so it is easier for “bad” managers to copy the 
actions of their peers. Conversely, in periods of low trading volume, fund managers 
may also engage in herd behavior intentionally. In this case, where there is low 
trading volume, this may be an obstacle for fund managers to trade on the stocks they 
wish to (either buy or sell their own stocks); as such, trading on stocks that their peers 
trade, ensures that their orders have more chances of being executed. Consequently, if 
there is intent on behalf of fund managers to herd, we would expect to find a 
relationship between herding and different levels of trading volume. However, if there 
is no intent in herding, there will be no difference in the significance of herding 
between high and low volume periods. 
In order to gauge the effect of market volume on the level of herding, we use daily 
volume observations of the Madrid Stock Exchange General Price Index in order to 
calculate the market volume for each quarter (we aggregate the daily volume 
observations each quarter) and then we rank the quarterly figures of volume in 
ascending order. Afterwards, we calculate the first difference between the values from 
one quarter to the next and then split the beta and its two components. We then rank 
these differences where the positive ones correspond to “increase” quarters and the 
negative ones to “decrease” quarter. Then, we split the  t coefficient and its two sub-
coefficients into those quarters where market volume has increased and those quarters 
where market volume has decreased. The next step is to rank the quarterly volume 
values in ascending order and split the series of the  t coefficient and its two sub-
coefficients in equal three parts, namely high, mid and low market volume periods.  A 
similar approach we follow when we account for the effect of sector volume over the 
level of herding. By using daily volume figures for each of the sectors we calculate 
quarterly volume figures and then rank them in ascending order. Then, for each sector 
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we split the series of  t coefficient and its two sub-coefficients into two parts, the one 
where sector volume has increased over the quarters and the other one where sector 
volume has decreased. In addition, we rank the quarterly sector volume values in 
ascending order and split the series of the  t coefficient and its two sub-coefficients 
into three parts, namely high, mid and low sector volume periods. 
The final factor we take into consideration in order to examine whether fund 
managers in the Spanish market herd intentionally is market/sector concentration. 
Highly concentrated markets are typified by the domination of a few big companies in 
their volume. On the contrary, the volume of less concentrated markets is spread 
along a large number of stocks. Typically, we would expect that the higher the 
concentration of a market, the more the fund managers would engage in herding; the 
intuition behind that is similar to the case of volume discussed previously. High 
market concentration implies that there is a limited number of stocks that investors 
could trade feasibly on. As such, we would expect that if there was intent in herding 
on behalf of fund managers that would be higher in periods of high market/sector 
concentration than in periods of low market/sector concentration. 
In order to calculate market/sector concentration, we use the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index which is the sum of the squared shares of each stock in total market/sector 
sales; in our case the market/sector share of a stock is substituted by its share in the 
total market/sector volume and takes the following form: 
     ∑   
  
            (5) 
Where 
    
                                                     
                                                                  
  (6) 
229 
 
In order to calculate market/sector concentration we use daily market/sector volume 
data on all listed stocks, be they active, dead or suspended. Now, for each of the 
stocks we calculate its quarterly volume by summing each quarter’s daily 
market/sector volume of each stock. Afterwards, we calculate the sum of the quarterly 
market volumes for all market/sector stocks in quarter t and divide each stock’s 
quarterly market/sector volume by that sum and acquiring each stock’s share in the 
total market/sector volume for the quarter. In addition, we calculate the first 
difference between the values from one quarter to the next and then split the beta and 
its two components. We then rank these differences where the positive ones 
correspond to “increase” quarters and the negative ones to “decrease” quarter. After 
this procedure we split the series of  t coefficient and its two sub-coefficients, for the 
market and for each sector, into two parts, the one where market/sector concentration 
has increased over the quarters and the one where market/sector concentration has 
decreased. Finally, we rank the quarterly market/sector concentration values in 
ascending order and split the series of the  t coefficient and its two sub-coefficients 
into three parts, namely high, mid and low market/sector concentration periods. 
 
5.4 Research Hypothesis 
There has been very little attention devoted to the empirical identification of intent 
underlying herding in the Finance literature so far. The only research, to our 
knowledge, is that by Holmes et al. (2011) which suggested that if institutional 
herding is intentional, its significance will exhibit variations between different states 
of the market. However, if the propensity of fund managers to herd at the market level 
varied across different market conditions, we would expect the same to hold at the 
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industry level as well; in addition we would expect that both market and sector 
conditions should be relevant. That is because sector conditions are more 
representative of the activity surrounding an industry and should be more relevant to 
the investment decisions of fund managers relative to that sector. 
More formally, we distinguish between two hypotheses: 
 
H0: institutional industry herding is spurious (i.e. it does not depend on market/sector 
conditions). 
H1: institutional industry herding is intentional (i.e. it depends on market/sector 
conditions).  
 
5.5 Empirical Results 
In this section we present the results of our empirical analysis, starting with the results 
for herding from equations 3 and 4, for the whole market and the industries (table 
5.2). Particularly, we can see that the    coefficient for the whole market is positive 
and significant at the 5 percent level with a value of 0.0426; this means that the 
institutional demand in the current quarter is highly dependent on the institutional 
demand of the previous quarter. 
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Table 5.2 - Test of Herding 
The table presents the results from equation (3) and (4): 
                    
Market 
Average 
Coefficient 
(β) 
Funds 
following their 
own trades 
Funds following 
the 
 others' trades 
Average 
R² 
All Sectors 
0,0426 
(0.0206)* 
-0,0112 
(0.2005) 
0,0538 
(0.0001)** 0,0181 
Basic Materials 
0,0017 
(0.9687) 
-0,0425 
(0.0525) 
0,0442 
(0.2619) 0,0987 
Consumer Goods 
0,0220 
(0.5967) 
-0,0484 
(0.2430) 
0,0704 
(0.1456) 0,0867 
Consumer 
Services 
0,1052 
(0.0658) 
-0,0439 
(0.0694) 
0,1492 
(0.0045)* 0,1673 
Financials 
0,0376 
(0.2466) 
0,0004 
(0.9820) 
0,0372 
(0.0612) 0,0525 
Healthcare 
0,0324 
(0.6894) 
0,0724 
(0.1416) 
-0,0400 
(0.6113) 0,3318 
Industrials 
0,0572 
(0.0560) 
-0,0062 
(0.6878) 
0,0634 
(0.0121)* 0,0463 
Oil & Gas 
-0,0527 
(0.5697) 
-0,0021 
(0.9446) 
-0,0505 
(0.5813) 0,4401 
Technology 
0,7775 
(0.0000)** 
-0,1013 
(0,0146)* 
0,8788 
(0.0000)** 0,4275 
Utilities 
0,0601 
(0.2755) 
0,0105 
(0.4736) 
0,0496 
(0.3559) 0,1538 
*indicates significance at the 5 percent level and **indicates significance at the 1 percent 
level. The p-values are shown in the brackets. 
 
The partition of the    coefficient reveals that the quarter-on-quarter dependence of 
institutional demand is mostly due to institutions following other institutions 
(herding). More specifically, the sub-coefficient that indicates institutions following 
themselves is -0.0112 (insignificant) and the sub-coefficient that indicates institutions 
following each other is 0.0538 (significant at the 1 percent level); hence, the demand 
of Spanish funds for stocks quarter-on-quarter is mainly due to herding. Looking 
under the lenses of industry classification, we find weak evidence of herding behavior 
in all sectors but that of technology. More specifically, there is scarce evidence of 
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herding for Consumer Services and Industrials; however, herding becomes more 
evident in the Technology sector where it is highly significant (1 percent level). 
We now move to examine whether it is the market or sector conditions that have a 
greater impact on the levels of herding. We start with the market conditions and 
particularly the direction of the market; table 5.3 indicates the findings for the whole 
market and the industry sectors for the    coefficient and its two sub-coefficients.     
 
Table 5.3 - Tests for herding conditional upon market returns (Positive-Negative) 
Market 
Average Coefficient 
(β) 
Funds following 
their own trades 
Funds following the 
 others' trades 
Average R² 
Positive 
Market 
Returns 
Negative 
Market 
Returns 
Positive 
Market 
Returns 
Negative 
Market 
Returns 
Positive 
Market 
Returns 
Negative 
Market 
Returns 
Positive 
Market 
Returns 
Negative 
Market 
Returns 
All Sectors 
0,0196 
(0.3971) 
0,0794 
(0.0086)* 
-0,0183 
(0.1107) 
0,0001 
(0.9904) 
0,0380 
(0.0302)* 
0,0792 
(0.0003)** 0,0167 0,0200 
Basic Materials 
-0,0401 
(0.5065) 
0,0687 
(0.3055) 
-0,0580 
(0.0751) 
-0,0177 
(0.4622) 
0,0179 
(0.7080) 
0,0864 
(0.2178) 0,1028 0,0877 
Consumer Goods 
0,0537 
(0.2976) 
-0,0287 
(0.6924) 
-0,0533 
(0.4133) 
-0,0404 
(0.1948) 
0,1070 
(0.1350) 
0,0118 
(0.8267) 0,0810 0,0960 
Consumer 
Services 
0,1478 
(0.0605) 
0,0371 
(0.6490) 
-0,0198 
(0.4023) 
-0,0825 
(0.1063) 
0,1676 
(0.0259)* 
0,1196 
(0.0840) 0,1908 0,1299 
Financials 
-0,00716 
(0.8628) 
0,1094 
(0.0369)* 
-0,0237 
(0.3359) 
0,0392 
(0.2342) 
0,0166 
(0.5258) 
0,0702 
(0.0224)* 0,0499 0,0567 
Healthcare 
-0,0021 
(0.9840) 
0,0878 
(0.4708) 
0,0964 
(0.1842) 
0,0341 
(0.5512) 
-0,0986 
(0.3485) 
0,0537 
(0.6546) 0,3651 0,3319 
Industrials 
0,0403 
(0.3200) 
0,0841 
(0.0586) 
-0,0004 
(0.9832) 
-0,0154 
(0.4785) 
0,0408 
(0.2461) 
0,0995 
(0.0040)* 0,0517 0,0379 
Oil & Gas 
0,0839 
(0.5030) 
-0,2714 
(0.0397)* 
0,0169 
(0.7371) 
-0,0328 
(0.0140)* 
0,0669 
(0.5952) 
-0,2386 
(0.0601) 0,4885 0,3627 
Technology 
0,8350 
(0.0002)** 
0,6962 
(0.0047)* 
-0,0908 
(0.0630) 
-0,1162 
(0.1233) 
0,9258 
(0.0001)** 
0,8125 
(0.0056)* 0,4068 0,4569 
Utilities 
0,0232 
(0.7325) 
0,1193 
(0.2150) 
0,0160 
(0.4324) 
0,0017 
(0.9321) 
0,0071 
(0.9185) 
0,1175 
(0.1679) 0,1295 0,1928 
*indicates significance at the 5 percent level and **indicates significance at the 1 percent 
level. The p-values are shown in the brackets. 
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Starting with the whole market, the quarter-on-quarter institutional demand is higher 
and significant (5 percent level) during quarters of negative market returns. The 
partitioning of the    coefficient reveals some interesting facts. Even though the 
coefficient, indicating funds following the trades of others, is significant during 
positive (5 percent level) market returns, it is during negative market returns that it 
becomes significantly higher (significant at the 1 percent level); what is more, the 
herding coefficient has a value of 0.0792, which means that it accounts for 99.7 
percent of the quarter-on-quarter institutional demand, which is quite impressive. 
What is next is to examine whether there is a change in the significance of herding 
level during high, mid and low market returns. As table 5.4 shows, there is evidence 
of herding during mid and low market returns (both significant at 5 percent level), 
however the overall institutional demand over quarters is insignificant at all three 
levels.   
When it comes to the sector level during positive or negative market returns (table 
5.3), we can see that there is mixed evidence of herding. Particularly, the quarter-on-
quarter institutional demand is significant (5 percent level) during negative market 
returns for Financials and Oil & Gas companies while for the Technology sector it is 
significant during both positive (1 percent level) and negative (5 percent level) market 
returns. Similarly, the herding coefficient for the Technology sector is significant 
during both positive (1 percent level) and negative (5 percent level) market returns. In 
addition, the herding coefficient is also significant (5 percent level) during negative 
returns for Financials, accounting for 64% of the institutional demand over the 
quarters. 
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Table 5.4 - Tests for herding conditional upon market returns (High-Mid-Low) 
Market 
Average Coefficient 
(β) 
Funds following their own 
trades 
Funds following the 
 others' trades 
Average R² 
High 
Market 
Returns 
Mid 
Market 
Returns 
Low 
Market 
Returns 
High 
Market 
Returns 
Mid 
Market 
Returns 
Low 
Market 
Returns 
High 
Market 
Returns 
Mid 
Market 
Returns 
Low 
Market 
Returns 
High  
Market 
Returns 
Mid 
Market 
Returns 
Low 
Market 
Returns 
All Sectors 
0,0110 
(0.7507) 
0,0544 
(0.0814) 
0,0617 
(0.0526) 
-0,0105 
(0.0545) 
-0.0198 
(0.1302) 
-0,0027 
(0.8661) 
0,0216 
(0.3856) 
0,0742 
(0.0028)* 
0,0645 
(0.0041)* 0,0194 0,0168 0,0181 
Basic  
Materials 
0,0044 
(0.9648) 
-0,0380 
(0.5369) 
0,0411 
(0.5730) 
-0,0246 
(0.5732) 
-0,1003 
(0.0255) 
0,0008 
(0.9668) 
0,0291 
(0.7101) 
0,0622 
(0.3456) 
0,0403 
(0.5445) 0,1470 0,0601 0,0861 
Consumer  
Goods 
0,0359 
(0.6281) 
0,1010 
(0.1457) 
-0,0754 
(0.3231) 
0,0153 
(0.7218) 
-0,1096 
(0.3246) 
-0,0473 
(0.1440) 
0,0206 
(0.6550) 
0,2106 
(0.0851) 
-0,0281 
(0.6211) 0,0835 1,1022 0,0938 
Consumer  
Services 
0,0547 
(0.6459) 
0,0511 
(0.4994) 
0,2131 
(0.0454)* 
-0,0921 
(0.1732) 
-0,0131 
(0.1904) 
-0,0283 
(0.3762) 
0,1468 
(0.1812) 
0,0642 
(0.1812) 
0,2415 
(0.0112)* 0,2244 0,1008 0,1810 
Financials 
-0,0213 
(0.7271) 
0,0359 
(0.5332) 
0,0984 
(0.0630) 
-0,0262 
(0.4400) 
-0,0047 
(0.8971) 
0,0326 
(0.3301) 
0,0049 
(0.8953) 
0,0407 
(0.2402) 
0,0658 
(0.0481)* 0,0559 0,0519 0,0497 
Healthcare 
-0,0557 
(0.7441) 
0,0434 
(0.7106) 
0,1089 
(0.4480) 
0,1061 
(0.3623) 
0,0586 
(0.4498) 
0,0534 
(0.3862) 
-0,1619 
(0.2915) 
-0,0151 
(0.9035) 
0,0555 
(0.6931) 0,4458 0,2299 0,3260 
Industrials 
0,0734 
(0,1816) 
0,0200 
(0,7071) 
0,0803 
(0.1168) 
0,0062 
(0.8604) 
-0,0109 
(0.5960) 
-0,0136 
(0.5924) 
0,0672 
(0.1195) 
0,0309 
(0.5397) 
0,0093 
(0.0166)* 0,0517 0,0459 0,0416 
Oil & Gas 
0,0345 
(0.8403) 
0,0258 
(0.8809) 
-0,2231 
(0.1276) 
0,0659 
(0.4797) 
-0,0425 
(0.0747) 
-0,0276 
(0,0520) 
-0,0314 
(0.8546) 
0,0683 
(0.6894) 
-0,1955 
(0.1684) 0,4430 0,5114 0,3617 
Technology 
0,9726 
(0.0066)* 
0,8415 
(0.0093)* 
0,5085 
(0.0000)** 
-0,0227 
(0.5870) 
-0,1673 
(0.0286)* 
-0,1038 
(0.2584) 
0,9953 
(0.0077)* 
1,0089 
(0.0059)* 
0,6123 
(0.0009)** 0,4145 0,4752 0,3857 
Utilities 
0,0229 
(0.8240) 
0,0571 
(0.4971) 
0,1006 
(0.3499) 
0,0093 
(0.7825) 
0,0265 
(0.2249) 
-0,0051 
(0.8130) 
0,0136 
(0.9005) 
0,0305 
(0.7024) 
0,1057 
(0.2761) 0,1362 0,1232 0,2039 
*indicates significance at the 5 percent level and **indicates significance at the 1 percent 
level. The p-values are shown in the brackets. 
 
Furthermore, in the case of Oil & Gas, it is not the herding coefficient that is 
significant during negative returns but the one indicating institutions following 
themselves; as such, in this case the quarter-on-quarter institutional demand is mostly 
due to institutions following their own trades rather than herding on each other. 
Finally, there is some evidence of herding in the Consumer Services and the 
Industrials (significant at the 5 percent level) during positive and negative market 
returns respectively; however, overall the institutional demand over the quarters is 
insignificant for both cases. 
When we partition the coefficients according to high, mid and low market returns 
(table 5.4) we get to see that the Technology sector once again is dominated by high 
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quarter-on-quarter institutional demand and herding in all three market states. 
Particularly, during high and mid market returns, the institutional demand over 
quarters and the herding coefficient are both significant at the 5 percent level, whereas 
during low market returns these two indicators become even more significant at the 1 
percent level. With respect to the other sectors, Consumer Services exhibit significant 
(5 percent level) quarter-on-quarter institutional demand and herding during low 
market returns, whereas there is some evidence of significant herding (5 percent level) 
for Financials and Industrials during low returns; however in both cases the overall 
institutional demand over quarters is insignificant. 
The next market state we examine is volatility. Table 5.5 reports our findings for the 
whole market and the industries as well. Starting with the results at the aggregate 
market level, these indicate that there is significant (5 percent level) quarter-on-
quarter institutional demand during positive market volatility quarters; the partitioning 
of the    coefficient reveals evidence of herding during periods of both positive and 
negative volatility, however herding is more significant (1 percent level) during 
periods of positive market volatility (i.e. when market volatility has increased over 
two quarters).  
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Table 5.5 - Tests for herding conditional upon market volatility (Positive-Negative) 
Market 
Average Coefficient 
(β) 
Funds following 
their own trades 
Funds following the 
 others' trades 
Average R² 
Positive 
Market 
Volatility 
Negative 
Market 
Volatility 
Positive 
Market 
Volatility 
Negative 
Market 
Volatility 
Positive 
Market 
Volatility 
Negative 
Market 
Volatility 
Positive 
Market 
Volatility 
Negative 
Market 
Volatility 
All Sectors 
0,0598 
(0.0132)* 
0,0400 
(0.1783) 
-0,0068 
(0.5864) 
-0,0139 
(0.3089) 
0,0666 
(0.0001)** 
0,0539 
(0.0219)* 0,0190 0,0172 
Basic 
Materials 
0,0018 
(0.9740) 
0,0016 
(0.9810) 
-0,0812 
(0.0149)* 
-0,0067 
(0.8160) 
0,0830 
(0.1472) 
0,0083 
(0.88030 0,0751 0,1060 
Consumer  
Goods 
0,0524 
(0.4123) 
-0,0060 
(0.9132) 
-0,1003 
(0.2147) 
-0,0003 
(0.9905) 
0,1527 
(0.0936) 
-0,0057 
(0.8869) 0,0987 0,0757 
Consumer  
Services 
0,1382 
(0.0939) 
0,0747 
(0.3589) 
-0,0826 
(0.0747) 
-0,0080 
(0.6633) 
0,2209 
(0.0029)* 
0,0827 
(0.2735) 0,1725 0,1627 
Financials 
0,0656 
(0.1907) 
0,0118 
(0.7840) 
0,0195 
(0.5256) 
-0,0172 
(0.5014 
0,0460 
(0.1110) 
0,0291 
(0.3021) 0,0601 0,0455 
Healthcare 
0,0779 
(0.5213) 
-0,0096 
(0.9308) 
0,0787 
(0.3865) 
0,0666 
(0.1573) 
-0,0007 
(0.9947) 
-0,0763 
(0.5098) 0,3504 0,3147 
industrials 
0,0459 
(0.3631) 
-0,0100 
(0.0543) 
0,0075 
(0.3700) 
0,0133 
(0.8079) 
0,1284 
(0.1272) 
-0,0233 
(0.0378)* 0,0613 0,0326 
Oil & Gas 
0,0176 
(0.8837) 
-0,1179 
(0.4068) 
0,0121 
(0.8512) 
-0,0153 
(0.2604) 
0,0055 
(0.9650) 
-0,1025 
(0.4481) 0,3508 0,5228 
Technology 
0,9125 
(0.0047)* 
0,6297 
(0.0013)* 
-0,1020 
(0.1739) 
-0,1059 
(0.0819) 
1,0145 
(0.0060)* 
0,7357 
(0.0006)** 0,4069 0,4052 
Utilities 
0,1360 
(0.1334) 
-0,1528 
(0.8798) 
0,4544 
(0.6536) 
0,5582 
(0.5815) 
1,5786 
(0.1275) 
-0,3435 
(0.7340) 0,1898 0,1205 
*indicates significance at the 5 percent level and **indicates significance at the 1 percent 
level. The p-values are shown in the brackets. 
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When partitioning the    coefficient according to periods of high, mid and low market 
volatility (table 5.6) we get to see that there is no evidence of significant quarter-on-
quarter institutional demand, or herding during all market volatility states.   
 
Table 5.6 - Tests for herding conditional upon market volatility (High-Mid-Low) 
Market 
Average Coefficient 
(β) Funds following their own trades 
Funds following the 
 others' trades 
Average R² 
High 
Market 
Volatility 
Mid 
Market 
Volatility 
Low 
Market 
Volatility 
High 
Market 
Volatility 
Mid 
Market 
Volatility 
Low 
Market 
Volatility 
High  
Market 
Volatility 
Mid 
Market 
Volatility 
Low 
Market 
Volatility 
High 
Market 
Volatility 
Mid 
Market 
Volatility 
Low 
Market 
Volatility 
All Sectors 
-0,0002 
(0.9973) 
0,1550 
(0.1867) 
0,0202 
(0.8291) 
-0,0215 
(0.2775) 
0,0349 
(0.1273) 
0,0168 
(0.6139) 
0,0213 
(0.7479) 
0,1200 
(0.2835) 
0,0033 
(0.9732) 0,0827 0,2282 0,1462 
Basic  
Materials 
-0,0400 
(0.5781) 
0,0853 
(0.3267) 
-0,0449 
(0.5618) 
-0,0272 
(0.3190) 
-0,0611 
(0.2085) 
-0,0380 
(0.3019) 
-0,0127 
(0.8720) 
0,1465 
(0.0285)* 
-0,0069 
(0.9089) 0,0795 0,1243 0,0857 
Consumer 
 Goods 
0,0171 
(0.8434) 
0,0165 
(0.7719) 
0,0328 
(0.6745) 
-0,0337 
(0.3004) 
-0,0956 
(0.3897) 
-0,0130 
(0.7713) 
0,0509 
(0.4538) 
0,1121 
(0.3501) 
0,0458 
(0.3496) 0,1172 0,0535 0,0915 
Consumer 
 Services 
0,1019 
(0.1556) 
0,1156 
(0.2278) 
0,0975 
(0.4555) 
-0,0278 
(0.3491) 
-0,0263 
(0.4180) 
-0,0786 
(0.1958) 
0,1298 
(0.0767) 
0,1419 
(0.0976) 
0,1762 
(0.1371) 0,1011 0,1600 0,2416 
Financials 
0,1085 
(0.0755) 
0,0073 
(0.8858) 
-0,0010 
(0.9866) 
0,0458 
(0.2921) 
-0,0279 
(0.2896) 
-0,0149 
(0.6519) 
0,0626 
(0.0137)* 
0,0353 
(0.3469) 
0,0138 
(0.7335) 0,0640 0,0405 0,0538 
Healthcare 
0,0847 
(0.4590) 
0,0469 
(0.7730) 
-0,0352 
(0.8140) 
0,0512 
(0.3200) 
0,1150 
(0.3587) 
0,0486 
(0.4285) 
0,0335 
(0.7819) 
-0,0680 
(0.6641) 
-0,0839 
(0.5443) 0,2069 0,4391 0,3434 
industrials 
0,1160 
(0.0136)* 
0,0226 
(0.7246) 
0,0349 
(0.4191) 
0,0050 
(0.7759) 
-0,0162 
(0.6235) 
-0,0068 
(0.8117) 
0,1110 
(0.0081)* 
0,0388 
(0.4258) 
0,0388 
(0.3234) 0,0369 0,0671 0,0339 
Oil & Gas 
-0,2783 
(0.0361)* 
0,0845 
(0.6018) 
0,0275 
(0.8845) 
-0,0281 
(0.0123)* 
0,0368 
(0.6804) 
-0,0175 
(0.4474) 
-0,2501 
(0.0531) 
0,0476 
(0.7840) 
0,0450 
(0.7977) 0,3167 0,4386 0,5651 
Technology 
0,5660 
(0.0000)** 
0,7402 
(0.0040)* 
0,9365 
(0.0386)* 
0,0114 
(0.8315) 
-0,2244 
(0.0577) 
-0,0999 
(0.0567) 
0,5546 
(0.0002)** 
0,9647 
(0.0026)* 
1,0364 
(0.0331)* 0,3351 0,4571 0,4256 
Utilities 
-0,0002 
(0.9973) 
0,1550 
(0.1867) 
0,0205 
(0.8291) 
-0,0215 
(0.2775) 
0,0349 
(0.1273) 
0,0168 
(0.6139) 
0,0213 
(0.7479) 
0,1200 
(0.2835) 
0,0033 
(0.9732) 0,0827 0,2282 0,1462 
*indicates significance at the 5 percent level and **indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
The p-values are shown in the brackets. 
 
At the sector level, it is only the Technology sector that exhibits significant (5 percent 
level) quarter-on-quarter institutional demand during periods of both positive and 
negative market volatility. Similarly, there is significant level of herding during periods 
of positive and negative market volatility at the 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. 
Regarding the other sectors, there is some evidence of significant herding (5 percent 
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level) for Consumer Services and Industrials during periods of positive and negative 
market volatility respectively; however in both cases the institutional demand over 
quarters is overall insignificant. 
When partitioning the    coefficient according to periods of high, mid and low market 
volatility, there is mixed evidence of herding at the sector level. Particularly, the 
Technology sector exhibits once more significant quarter-on-quarter institutional demand 
and herding at all three market volatility states (at the 1 percent level during periods of 
high market volatility and at the 5 percent level during periods of mid and low market 
volatility). With respect to the other sectors, the Industrials and Oil & Gas industries 
exhibit significant (5 percent level) institutional demand over the quarters during periods 
of high market volatility. However, it is only in the Industrials’ sector where the herding 
component is significant (5 percent level); in the case of the Oil & Gas sector it is the 
coefficient indicating institutions following each other that is significant (5 percent level) 
during periods of high market volatility. Finally, some evidence of significant herding is 
exhibited in the Basic Materials’ sector (5 percent level) during periods of mid market 
volatility and in the Financials’ sector (5 percent level) during periods of high market 
volatility; however in both cases the overall institutional demand over quarters is 
insignificant. 
The next market state we are examining is that of market volume; table 5.7 illustrates our 
results for the aggregate market and the sectors during periods of increasing/decreasing 
market volume. As we can see, at the aggregate market level, the coefficient of herding is 
significant (5 percent level) during both periods of increasing and decreasing market 
volume; however in both cases the overall quarter-on-quarter institutional demand is 
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insignificant. When partitioning the    coefficient according to periods of high, mid and 
low market volume (table 5.8), we get to see that the institutional demand over the 
quarters at the aggregate market level is significant (5 percent level); however there is no 
significant evidence of herding. 
Table 5.7 - Tests for herding conditional upon market volume (Positive-Negative) 
Market 
Average Coefficient 
(β) 
Funds following 
their own trades 
Funds following the 
 others' trades 
Average R² 
Positive 
Market 
Volume 
Negative 
Market 
Volume 
Positive 
Market 
Volume 
Negative 
Market 
Volume 
Positive 
Market 
Volume 
Negative 
Market 
Volume 
Positive 
Market 
Volume 
Negative 
Market 
Volume 
All Sectors 
0,0457 
(0.0649) 
0,0389 
(0.2112) 
-0,0088 
(0.4608) 
-0,0197 
(0.1552) 
0,0545 
(0.0021)* 
0,0586 
(0.0173)* 0,0190 0,0167 
Basic Materials 
-0,0435 
(0.4732) 
0,0635 
(0.3471) 
-0,0489 
(0.1062) 
-0,0338 
(0.2989) 
0,0053 
(0.9172) 
0,0973 
(0.1201) 0,1002 0,0926 
Consumer Goods 
0,0539 
(0.3494) 
-0,0214 
(0.7265) 
-0,0606 
(0.3841) 
-0,0316 
(0.2594) 
0,1146 
(0.1316) 
0,0102 
(0.8385) 0,0955 0,0748 
Consumer 
Services 
0,1825 
(0.0135)* 
-0,0001 
(0.9985) 
-0,0145 
(0.5349) 
-0,0840 
(0.0798) 
0,1971 
(0.0075)* 
0,0838 
(0.2680) 0,1524 0,1879 
Financials 
0,0340 
(0.4296) 
0,0426 
(0.4062) 
-0,0006 
(0.9811) 
0,0019 
(0.9438) 
0,0347 
(0.1892) 
0,0407 
(0.1936) 0,0519 0,0534 
Healthcare 
-0,0075 
(0.9487) 
0,0869 
(0.4353) 
0,1184 
(0.1334) 
0,0098 
(0.8337) 
-0,1259 
(0.3038) 
0,0771 
(0.3594) 0,3857 0,2585 
industrials 
0,0555 
(0.2136) 
0,0594 
(0.1167) 
-0,0013 
(0.9531) 
-0,0128 
(0.4942) 
0,0569 
(0.0986) 
0,0722 
(0.0590) 0,0585 0,0298 
Oil & Gas 
0,0746 
(0.5338) 
-0,2264 
(0.1222) 
0,0284 
(0.5898) 
-0,0439 
(0.0200)* 
0,0462 
(0.6985) 
-0,1825 
(0.2098) 0,4213 0,4612 
Technology 
0,6925 
(0.0001)** 
0,8861 
(0.0037)* 
-0,0838 
(0.0732) 
-0,1238 
(0.1018) 
0,7763 
(0.0001)** 
1,009 
(0.0028)* 0,4206 0,4365 
Utilities 
0,0428 
(0.5394) 
0,0838 
(0.3623) 
-0,0055 
(0.7525) 
0,0325 
(0.2035) 
0,0484 
(0.4735) 
0,0512 
(0.5707) 0,1228 0,1961 
*indicates significance at the 5 percent level and **indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
The p-values are shown in the brackets. 
 
At the sector level, we get to see that the Technology sector appears to have significant 
quarter-on-quarter institutional demand and herding during both periods of increasing and 
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decreasing market volume (1 percent and 5 percent levels respectively). In addition, the 
Consumer Services sector also exhibits significant evidence of institutional demand over 
the quarters and herding (both at the 5 percent level) during periods of increasing market 
volume.  
Table 5.8 - Tests for herding conditional upon market volume (High-Mid-Low) 
Market 
Average Coefficient 
(β) 
Funds following their own 
trades 
Funds following the 
 others' trades 
Average R² 
High 
Market 
Volume 
Mid 
Market 
Volume 
Low 
Market 
Volume 
High 
Market 
Volume 
Mid 
Market 
Volume 
Low 
Market 
Volume 
High 
Market 
Volume 
Mid  
Market 
Volume 
Low 
Market 
Volume 
High 
Market 
Volume 
Mid 
Market 
Volume 
Low 
Market 
Volume 
All Sectors 
-0,0697 
(0.3361) 
-0,0305 
(0.6634) 
0,1696 
(0.0206)* 
-0,0689 
(0.0614) 
-0,0026 
(0.9276) 
-0,0763 
(0.5292) 
-0,0008 
(0.9866) 
-0,0279 
(0.6188) 
0,2459 
(0.0505) 
0,0843 0,0816 0,0946 
Basic  
Materials 
0,0655 
(0.4802) 
-0,0337 
(0.6384) 
-0,0244 
(0.7405) 
-0,0997 
(0.0646) 
-0,0019 
(0.9542) 
-0,0282 
(0.1525) 
0,1653 
(0.0500)* 
-0,0317 
(0.5515) 
0,0037 
(0.9548) 0,1293 0,0835 0,0791 
Consumer  
Goods 
-0,0697 
(0.3361) 
-0,0305 
(0.6634) 
0,1696 
(0.0206)* 
-0,0689 
(0.0614) 
-0,0026 
(0.9276) 
-0,0763 
(0.5292) 
-0,0008 
(0.9866) 
-0,0279 
(0.6188) 
0,2459 
(0.0505) 0,0843 0,0816 0,0946 
Consumer  
Services 
0,2359 
(0.0271)* 
0,0289 
(0.6930) 
0,0553 
(0.6426) 
-0,0291 
(0.3622) 
-0,0109 
(0.2971) 
-0,0936 
(0.1653) 
0,2651 
(0.0050)* 
0,0399 
(0.5755) 
0,1490 
(0.1757) 0,1856 0,0961 0,2247 
Financials 
-0,0064 
(0.9141) 
0,0597 
(0.3192) 
0,0584 
(0.2740) 
-0,0164 
(0.6459) 
0,0081 
(0.8273) 
0,0091 
(0.7731) 
0,0100 
(0.7719) 
0,0515 
(0.1428) 
0,0493 
(0.1746) 0,0555 0,0575 0,0443 
Healthcare 
0,0687 
(0.5680) 
0,0151 
(0.9156) 
0,0144 
(0.9313) 
0,0415 
(0.2136) 
0,1190 
(0.0663) 
0,0541 
(0.6886) 
0,0272 
(0.7827) 
-0,1039 
(0.5224) 
-0,0396 
(0.7891) 0,2267 0,3362 0,4325 
industrials 
0,0518 
(0,3339) 
0,0728 
(0.1569) 
0,0459 
(0.4052) 
0,0083 
(0.7762) 
0,0112 
(0.6832) 
-0,0392 
(0.1085) 
0,0434 
(0.4022) 
0,0616 
(0.0785) 
0,0852 
(0.0726) 0,0451 0,0435 0,0507 
Oil & Gas 
0,0650 
(0.7123) 
-0,0991 
(0.4397) 
-0,1213 
(0.5187) 
-0,0113 
(0.2232) 
-0,0145 
(0.0907) 
0,0201 
(0.8373) 
0,0763 
(0.6587) 
-0,0845 
(0.5008) 
-0,1414 
(0.4511) 0,4993 0,2797 0,5508 
Technology 
0,6911 
(0.0035)* 
0,5421 
(0,0000)** 
1,1354 
(0.0120)* 
-0,0565 
(0.1023) 
-0,0729 
(0.3358) 
-0,1790 
(0.0627) 
0,7476 
(0.0031)* 
0,6151 
(0.0001)** 
1,3144 
(0.0082)* 0,3940 0,3560 0,5487 
Utilities 
0,0416 
(0.6809) 
0,0704 
(0.4264) 
0,0678 
(0.5220) 
0,0043 
(0.8695) 
0,0439 
(0.1140) 
-0,0186 
(0.4086) 
0,0372 
(0.7131) 
0,0264 
(0.7789) 
0,0865 
(0.3461) 0,1695 0,1307 0,1626 
*indicates significance at the 5 percent level and **indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
The p-values are shown in the brackets. 
 
When accounting for periods of high, mid and low market volume, the Technology sector 
appears to have significant quarter-on-quarter institutional demand and herding at all 
three states (at the 5 percent level at high and low levels and the 1 percent level at mid 
levels of market volume). In addition, the Consumer Services sector also exhibits 
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significant institutional demand over the quarters and herding during periods of high 
market volume (both significant at the 5 percent level). The Consumer Goods sector in its 
turn appears to have significant (5 percent level) quarter-on-quarter institutional demand 
during periods of low market volume; however, there is no evidence of significant 
herding in any of the market volume levels. Finally, there is some evidence of herding in 
the Basic Materials sector which is significant (5 percent level) during periods of high 
market volume; nevertheless, the overall quarter-on-quarter institutional demand is 
insignificant. 
The last market state that we are examining is that of market concentration; table 5.9 
illustrates the results for both the aggregate market and the industries as well during 
periods of increasing and decreasing market concentration. As we can see, at the 
aggregate market level, there is significant level of herding (1 percent level) during 
periods of high market concentration; however the overall quarter-on-quarter institutional 
demand is insignificant. 
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Table 5.9 - Tests for herding conditional upon market Concentration (Positive-Negative) 
Market 
Average Coefficient 
(β) 
Funds following their own 
trades 
Funds following the 
 others' trades 
Average R² 
Positive  
Market 
Concentration 
Negative 
Market 
Concentration 
Positive  
Market 
Concentration 
Negative 
Market 
Concentration 
Positive 
 Market 
Concentration 
Negative 
Market 
Concentration 
Positive  
Market 
Concentration 
Negative 
Market 
Concentration 
All Sectors 
0,0420 
(0.0641) 
0,0347 
(0.2793) 
-0,0145 
(0.2028) 
-0,0083 
(0.5749) 
0,0565 
(0.0004)** 
0,0428 
(0.0901) 0,0165 0,0203 
Basic 
Materials 
-0,0337 
(0.5822) 
0,0541 
(0.4156) 
-0,0621 
(0.0369)* 
-0,0135 
(0.6777) 
0,0284 
(0.5782) 
0,0676 
(0.2923) 0,1041 0,0866 
Consumer  
Goods 
0,0174 
(0.7629) 
0,0288 
(0.6341) 
-0,0745 
(0.2707) 
-0,0097 
(0,7158) 
0,0920 
(0.2143) 
0,0386 
(0.4595) 0,0978 0,0704 
Consumer  
Services 
0,1455 
(0.0559) 
0,0457 
(0.6063) 
-0,0307 
(0.1894) 
-0,0634 
(0.2058) 
0,1762 
(0.0169)* 
0,1092 
(0.1458) 0,1587 0,1801 
Financials 
0,0377 
(0.3189) 
0,0375 
(0.5300) 
0,0048 
(0.8454) 
-0,0061 
(0.8540) 
0,0328 
(0.1651) 
0,0436 
(0.2229) 0,0422 0,0677 
Healthcare 
0,0521 
(0.6349) 
0,0033 
(0.9785) 
0,1181 
(0.1196) 
0,0049 
(0.9211) 
-0,066 
(0.5751) 
-0,00164 
(0.9860) 0,3549 0,2979 
industrials 
0,0545 
(0.1942) 
0,0611 
(0.1506) 
-0,0060 
(0.7697) 
-0,0064 
(0.7886) 
0,0605 
(0.0518) 
0,0676 
(0.1239) 0,0552 0,0334 
Oil & Gas 
0,0089 
(0.9408) 
-0,1438 
(0.3342) 
0,0265 
(0.6036) 
-0,0445 
(0.0252)* 
-0,0175 
(0.8839) 
-0,0993 
(0.4992) 0,4387 0,4422 
Technology 
0,7106 
(0,0006)** 
0,8718 
(0.0017)* 
-0,1052 
(0.0457)* 
-0,0958 
(0.1710) 
0,8159 
(0.0005)** 
0,9677 
(0.0013)* 0,4105 0,4516 
Utilities 
0,0721 
(0.2879) 
0,0425 
(0.6578) 
0,0016 
(0.9253) 
0,0237 
(0.3797) 
0,0705 
(0.2866) 
0,0187 
(0.8405) 0,1219 0,2009 
*indicates significance at the 5 percent level and **indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
The p-values are shown in the brackets. 
 
 
When partitioning the    coefficient according to periods of high, mid and low periods of 
market concentration (table 5.10), we can see that, at the aggregate market level, there is 
significant quarter-on-quarter institutional demand and herding during periods of high 
and low market concentration, both significant at the 5 percent level.  
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Table 5.10 - Tests for herding conditional upon market concentration (High-Mid-Low) 
Market 
Average Coefficient 
(β) 
Funds following 
 their own trades 
Funds following the 
 others' trades 
Average R² 
High  
Market 
Con/tion 
Mid 
Market 
Con/tion 
Low 
Market 
Con/tion 
High  
Market 
Con/tion 
Mid 
Market 
Con/tion 
Low 
Market 
Con/tion 
High  
Market 
Con/tion 
Mid 
Market 
Con/tion 
Low 
Market 
Con/tion 
High  
Market 
Con/tion 
Mid 
Market 
Con/tion 
Low 
Market 
Con/tion 
All  
Sectors 
0,0613 
(0.0284)* 
0,0023 
(0.9483) 
0,0667 
(0.0452)* 
-0,0098 
(0.4117) 
-0,0243 
(0.1351) 
0,0013 
(0.9422) 
0,0711 
(0.0022)* 
0,0266 
(0.2887) 
0,0654 
(0.0071)* 0,0146 0,0192 0,0203 
Basic  
Materials 
0,1019 
(0.2357) 
-0,0708 
(0.3123) 
-0,0216 
(0.7911) 
-0,0101 
(0.7166) 
-0,0491 
(0.3071) 
-0,0679 
(0.0641) 
0,1120 
(0.2180) 
-0,0217 
(0.6883) 
0,0464 
(0.4438) 0,1142 0,0752 0,1029 
Consumer  
Goods 
0,0238 
(0.7680) 
0,0589 
(0.3068) 
-0,0187 
(0.8227) 
-0,0071 
(0.8060) 
-0,0888 
(0.4291) 
-0,0469 
(0.2893) 
0,0310 
(0.6315) 
0,1477 
(0.2203) 
0,0282 
(0.5734) 0,0995 0,0550 0,1075 
Consumer  
Services 
0,0940 
(0.2908) 
0,1708 
(0.0922) 
0,0472 
(0.6769) 
-0,0044 
(0.9025) 
-0,0508 
(0.0545) 
-0,0762 
(0.2096) 
0,0984 
(0.2393) 
0,2216 
(0.0270)* 
0,1234 
(0.1966) 0,1540 0,1597 0,1889 
Financials 
0,0247 
(0.6311) 
-0,0425 
(0.4994) 
0,1356 
(0.0114)* 
-0,0098 
(0.7796) 
-0,0260 
(0.4513) 
0,0387 
(0.2727) 
0,0344 
(0.1843) 
-0,0165 
(0.6795) 
0,0969 
(0.0060)* 0,0406 0,0596 0,0570 
Healthcare 
0,1492 
(0.3072) 
0,0476 
(0.7448) 
-0,1004 
(0.4687) 
0,0466 
(0.5256) 
0,0286 
(0.6920) 
0,1448 
(0.1988) 
0,1026 
(0.4312) 
0,0191 
(0.8970) 
-0,2451 
(0.0683) 0,3424 0,3521 0,3000 
Industrials 
0,0704 
(0.1496) 
-0,0270 
(0.6405) 
0,1332 
(0.0053)* 
-0,0204 
(0.4504) 
-0,0207 
(0.4477) 
0,0233 
(0.3995) 
0,0908 
(0.0184)* 
-0,0063 
(0.8883) 
0,1099 
(0.0220)* 0,0352 0,0544 0,0490 
Oil & Gas 
-0,1650 
(0.3308) 
0,0354 
(0.8163) 
-0,0338 
(0.8452) 
0,0478 
(0.6085) 
-0,0180 
(0.3169) 
-0,0354 
(0.1455) 
-0,2127 
(0.2362) 
0,0534 
(0.7183) 
0,0015 
(0.9924) 0,4624 0,3986 0,4618 
Technology 
0,6581 
(0.0050)* 
1,1242 
(0.0043)* 
0,4970 
(0.0000)** 
-0,0968 
(0.0826) 
-0,1352 
(0.0464)* 
-0,0669 
(0.4847) 
0,7548 
(0.0030)* 
1,2594 
(0.0033)* 
0,5639 
(0.0017)* 0,3792 0,5167 0,3730 
Utilities 
0,1789 
(0.0620) 
0,0924 
(0.3388) 
-0,0926 
(0.3387) 
-0,0050 
(0.8125) 
0,0575 
(0.0997) 
-0,0236 
(0.1073) 
0,1839 
(0.0345)* 
0,0348 
(0.7340) 
-0,0690 
(0.4485) 0,1398 0,1541 0,1676 
*indicates significance at the 5 percent level and **indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
The p-values are shown in the brackets. 
 
At the sector level, we get to see that the Technology industry exhibits strong institutional 
demand over the quarters at all states of market concentration (significant at the 5 percent 
level for high and mid levels of market concentration and at the 1 percent level for the 
low level of market concentration). In addition, the coefficient indicating institutions 
following themselves is significant (5 percent level) for the mid level of market 
concentration. The herding coefficient in its turn is always significant (at the 5 percent 
level) at all three market concentration levels. Moving to the Consumer Services sector, 
there is some evidence of herding (significant at the 5 percent level) for the mid level of 
market concentration; however, the overall quarter-on-quarter institutional demand is 
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insignificant at all levels of market concentration. The Financials sector in turn exhibits 
significant (5 percent level) institutional demand over the quarters for low levels of 
market concentration, accompanied by significant (5 percent level) evidence of herding at 
the same level of market concentration. In addition, the Industrials sector appears to have 
significant (5 percent level) quarter-on-quarter institutional demand for low levels of 
market concentration and the coefficient indicating herding is significant (5 percent level) 
at the low and high levels of market concentration. Finally, there is some significant (5 
percent level) evidence of herding in the Utilities sector at the high level of market 
concentration; nevertheless the institutional demand over the quarters is insignificant at 
all market concentration levels. 
So far, we have examined the impact that different market states have on the significance 
of herding at both the market and the sector level. Now we will examine whether the 
sector-specific expressions of the same states have an impact over the significance of 
sector herding or not. Again, we will start with the direction of sector-returns, i.e. 
whether herding is more significant when each sector has had positive or negative returns 
over the quarters (table 5.11 shows the results for each sector). As we can see, there is 
significant evidence of quarter-on-quarter institutional demand in four out of the nine 
sectors examined, namely Consumer Services, Financials, Industrials and Technology. 
Starting with Consumer Services, we get to see that the institutional demand over the 
quarters, and herding as well, is significant (5 percent level) during quarters of negative 
sector returns. Compared to the results when testing for the market returns, the sector 
now exhibits significant quarter-on-quarter institutional demand, something that was not 
the case when accounting for market returns; in that case there was only some evidence 
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of significant herding during positive market returns. The Financials sector also exhibits 
significant (5 percent level) institutional demand over the quarters during negative sector 
returns, but this time it is both the coefficients (institutions following themselves and 
institutions following each other) that are significant (5 percent level) during negative 
sector returns; in the case of market returns, it was only the coefficient indicating 
institutions following each other that was significant. 
Table 5.11 - Tests for herding conditional upon sector returns (Positive-Negative) 
Market 
Average Coefficient 
(β) 
Funds following 
their own trades 
Funds following the 
 others' trades 
Average R² 
Positive 
Sector 
Returns 
Negative 
Sector 
Returns 
Positive 
Sector 
Returns 
Negative 
Sector 
Returns 
Positive 
Sector 
Returns 
Negative 
Sector 
Returns 
Positive 
Sector 
Returns 
Negative 
Sector 
Returns 
Basic Materials 
-0,0231 
(0.7080) 
0,0450 
(0.4708) 
-0,0471 
(0.1434) 
-0,0346 
(0.1427) 
0,0240 
(0.6201) 
0,0796 
(0.2576) 0,1132 0,0689 
Consumer Goods 
-0,0033 
(0.9482) 
0,0455 
(0.4942) 
-0,0878 
(0.2746) 
-0,0120 
(0.7045) 
0,0845 
(0.3440) 
0,0575 
(0.2136) 0,0592 0,1123 
Consumer 
Services 
0,0666 
(0.4250) 
0,1540 
(0.0475)* 
-0,0462 
(0.2288) 
-0,0411 
(0.1296) 
0,1128 
(0.1263) 
0,1951 
(0.0112)* 0,1887 0,1405 
Financials 
-0,0142 
(0.7274) 
0,1207 
(0.0224)* 
-0,0337 
(0.1665) 
0,0550 
(0,0922)* 
0,0194 
(0,4782) 
0,0657 
(0,0191)* 0,0491 0,0581 
Healthcare 
0,0390 
(0.7169) 
0,0210 
(0.8674) 
0,0773 
(0.2601) 
0,0641 
(0.3379) 
-0,0383 
(0.6875) 
-0,0430 
(0.7647) 0,3618 0,2799 
Industrials 
0,0341 
(0.3717) 
0,0974 
(0.0490)* 
0,0021 
(0.9219) 
-0,0206 
(0.3627) 
0,0320 
(0.3218) 
0,1179 
(0.0034)* 0,0461 0,0469 
Oil & Gas 
0,0039 
(0.9734) 
-0,1511 
(0.3308) 
0,0169 
(0.7287) 
-0,0352 
(0.0479)* 
-0,0129 
(0.9136) 
-0,1159 
(0.4320) 0,4417 0,4373 
Technology 
0,9857 
(0.0004)** 
0,5978 
(0.0020)* 
-0,0724 
(0.1742) 
-0,1264 
(0.0473)* 
1,0581 
(0.0004)** 
0,7241 
(0,001)* 0,4341 0,4079 
Utilities 
0,0752 
(0.2834) 
0,0342 
(0.7137) 
0,0133 
(0.5038) 
0,0058 
(0.7910) 
0,0618 
(0.3930) 
0,0285 
(0.7226) 0,1459 0,1676 
   *indicates significance at the 5 percent level and **indicates significance at the 1 percent 
level. The p-values are shown in the brackets. 
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The Industrials sector appears to have significant (5 percent level) institutional demand 
over the quarters and herding during negative sector returns. Accounting for market 
returns, the specific sector exhibited significant herding during negative market returns, 
though the overall quarter-on-quarter institutional demand was insignificant. The inverse 
picture surfaces for Oil & Gas; particularly it now appears only the coefficient indicating 
institutions following themselves to be significant (5 percent level) during negative sector 
returns, whereas when accounting for market returns it was both the coefficients 
indicating quarter-on-quarter institutional demand and institutions following themselves 
that were significant during negative market returns. Finally, the Technology sector 
appears to have significant quarter-on-quarter demand and herding during both positive 
and negative sector returns (at 1 percent and 5 percent levels respectively); the results 
here are quite similar to those when accounting for market returns. 
When partitioning the    coefficient according to periods of high, mid and low sector 
returns, we get to see that only the Technology sector exhibits significant institutional 
demand over the quarters (at the 5 percent level for high and low levels and at the 1 
percent level for the mid level) during all levels of sector returns; similarly the herding 
coefficient is also significant (5 percent level) at all levels of sector returns. The 
Industrial sector exhibits significant evidence of herding (5 percent level) during periods 
of low sector returns, though the quarter-on-quarter institutional demand is insignificant 
at all levels of sector returns; exactly the same results we got when accounting for market 
returns. Finally, in the Consumer Services sector we see that both the coefficient 
indicating institutions following themselves and institutions following each other are 
significant (5 percent level) during periods of mid sector returns, though the overall 
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institutional demand over quarters is insignificant at all levels of sector returns. On the 
contrary, when accounting for market returns, both the quarter-on-quarter institutional 
demand and herding were significant (5 percent level) during periods of low market 
returns.  
Table 5.12 - Tests for herding conditional upon sector returns (High-Mid-Low) 
Market 
Average Coefficient 
(β) Funds following their own trades 
Funds following the 
 others' trades 
Average R² 
High 
Sector 
Returns 
Mid 
Sector 
Returns 
Low 
Sector 
Returns 
High 
Sector 
Returns 
Mid 
Sector 
Returns 
Low 
Sector 
Returns 
High 
Sector 
Returns 
Mid 
Sector 
Returns 
Low 
Sector 
Returns 
High 
Sector 
Returns 
Mid 
Sector 
Returns 
Low 
Sector 
Returns 
Basic  
Materials 
-0,0665 
(0.4696) 
0,0559 
(0.4929) 
0,0127 
(0.8381) 
-0,0489 
(0.3180) 
-0,0534 
(0.2060) 
-0,0247 
(0.2006) 
-0,0176 
(0.8275) 
0,1092 
(0.0982) 
0,0374 
(0.5454) 0,1228 0,1077 0,0600 
Consumer  
Goods 
0,0213 
(0.7605) 
0,0088 
(0.8902) 
0,0369 
(0.6777) 
-0,1169 
(0.3212) 
-0,0267 
(0.4262) 
-0,0029 
(0.9452) 
0,1382 
(0.2899) 
0,0355 
(0.3973) 
0,0398 
(0.5348) 0,0768 0,0674 0,1172 
Consumer  
Services 
0,0604 
(0.6039) 
0,1506 
(0.1016) 
0,1022 
(0.2918) 
-0,0411 
(0.5129) 
-0,0733 
(0.0270)* 
-0,0157 
(0.5185) 
0,1015 
(0.2689) 
0,2239 
(0.0229)* 
0,1178 
(0.1899) 0,1909 0,1718 0,1391 
Financials 
-0,0189 
(0.7551) 
0,0520 
(0.3807) 
0,0823 
(0.1512) 
-0,0178 
(0.5932) 
-0,0172 
(0.6495) 
0,0448 
(0.2318) 
-0,0011 
(0.9779) 
0,0691 
(0.0664) 
0,0375 
(0.1701) 0,0541 0,0518 0,0517 
Healthcare 
-0,0033 
(0.9833) 
0,0494 
(0.7364) 
0,0503 
(0.6977) 
0,1298 
(0.3242) 
0,0598 
(0.2425) 
0,0285 
(0.6417) 
-0,1331 
(0.3461) 
-0,0104 
(0.9442) 
0,0218 
(0.8646) 0,3779 0,3535 0,2630 
Industrials 
0,0332 
(0.5825) 
0,0495 
(0.2783) 
0,0893 
(0.0953) 
0,0236 
(0.4867) 
-0,0132 
(0.5579) 
-0,02879 
(0.2449) 
0,0096 
(0.8514) 
0,0627 
(0.0948) 
0,1180 
(0.0074)* 0,0557 0,0354 0,0487 
Oil & Gas 
0,0639 
(0.7274) 
-0,0663 
(0.6672) 
-0,1550 
(0.3223) 
0,0656 
(0.4849) 
-0,0321 
(0.0630) 
-0,0383 
(0.0544) 
-0,0017 
(0.9926) 
-0,0343 
(0.8277) 
-0,1167 
(0.4270) 0,5254 0,4015 0,3957 
Technology 
0,9419 
(0.0084)* 
0,6935 
(0.0007)** 
0,7101 
(0.0279)* 
-0,0359 
(0.3902) 
-0,0726 
(0.3320) 
-0,2000 
(0.0309)* 
0,9778 
(0.0088)* 
0,7661 
(0.0012)* 
0,9101 
(0.0167)* 0,3886 0,4635 0,4250 
Utilities 
0,0627 
(0.5698) 
0,0804 
(0.3162) 
0,0363 
(0.7280) 
0,0164 
(0.5854) 
0,0106 
(0.6632) 
0,0047 
(0.8467) 
0,0463 
(0.6925) 
0,0698 
(0.3765) 
0,0316 
(0.7243) 0,1601 0,1168 0,1866 
 *indicates significance at the 5 percent level and **indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
The p-values are shown in the brackets. 
 
The next state we examine at the sector level is volatility; table 5.13 illustrates our 
results. Similarly to the results accounting for market volatility, the Technology sector 
exhibits significant quarter-on-quarter institutional demand and herding during both 
periods of increasing and decreasing volatility (both significant at the 1 percent level 
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during increasing periods and the 5 percent level during decreasing periods of sector 
volatility). 
Table 5.13 - Tests for herding conditional upon sector volatility (Positive-Negative) 
Market 
Average Coefficient 
(β) 
Funds following 
their own trades 
Funds following the 
 others' trades 
Average R² 
Positive 
Sector 
Volatility 
Negative 
Sector 
Volatility 
Positive 
Sector 
Volatility 
Negative 
Sector 
Volatility 
Positive 
Sector 
Volatility 
Negative 
Sector 
Volatility 
Positive 
Sector 
Volatility 
Negative 
Sector 
Volatility 
Basic Materials 
-0,0698 
(0.0515) 
-0,0173 
(0.5165) 
0,0404 
(0.4811) 
0,0479 
(0.3926) 
0,0404 
(0.4811) 
0,0479 
(0.3926) 0,0869 0,1064 
Consumer Goods 
0,0693 
(0.3619) 
-0,0099 
(0.8388) 
-0,0974 
(0.3223) 
-0,0152 
(0.5171) 
0,1667 
(0.1150) 
0,0053 
(0.8925) 0,1140 0,0683 
Consumer 
Services 
0,1472 
(0.1017) 
0,0564 
(0.4111) 
-0,0717 
(0.08330 
-0,0116 
(0.5854) 
0,2188 
(0.0080)* 
0,0680 
(0,2767) 0,2041 0,1246 
Financials 
0,0848 
(0.1270) 
0,0003 
(0.9938) 
0,0331 
(0.2943) 
-0,0254 
(0.3146) 
0,0518 
(0.1119) 
0,0257 
(0.3095) 0,0688 0,0396 
Healthcare 
0,0419 
(0.7087) 
0,0231 
(0.8489) 
0,0751 
(0.3651) 
0,0698 
(0.2130) 
-0,0333 
(0.7579) 
-0,0467 
(0.6917) 0,3084 0,3554 
Industrials 
0,0214 
(0.6331) 
0,0930 
(0.0211)* 
-0,0250 
(0.2121) 
0,0126 
(0.5975) 
0,0464 
(0.2006) 
0,0804 
(0.0261)* 0,0472 0,0456 
Oil & Gas 
0,0333 
(0.8064) 
-0,1264 
(0.3295) 
-0,0417 
(0.0594) 
0,0317 
(0.5667) 
0,0750 
(0.5667) 
-0,1582 
(0.2222) 0,4144 0,4622 
Technology 
0,5600 
(0.0102)* 
0,8670 
(0.0006)** 
-0,0996 
(0.16720 
-0,1074 
(0.0848) 
0,6596 
(0.0092)* 
0,9744 
(0.0005)** 0,3339 0,4518 
Utilities 
0,0258 
(0.0974) 
0,7159 
(0.2666) 
0,0126 
(0.0084)* 
0,4701 
(0.7352) 
0,0132 
(0,0890) 
0,8428 
(0,3091) 0,1357 0,1734 
*indicates significance at the 5 percent level and **indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
The p-values are shown in the brackets. 
 
The Industrials sector in turn exhibits significant (5 percent level) institutional demand 
over quarters during periods of decreasing sector volatility and the herding coefficient 
also appears to be significant (5 percent level) during periods of decreasing sector 
volatility; as we can see, contrary to the results when accounting for market volatility, 
here the coefficient indicating the quarter-on-quarter institutional demand is significant. 
On the other hand, the results for the Consumer Services sector are similar to those 
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reported for market volatility; particularly, the herding coefficient is significant (5 percent 
level) during periods of increasing sector volatility, though the overall quarter-on-quarter 
institutional demand over quarters is insignificant. Finally, the Utilities sector here 
exhibits evidence of institutions following their own trades (significant at the 5 percent 
level) during periods of increasing sector volatility; however, the institutional demand 
over quarters is insignificant at both periods of increasing and decreasing sector 
volatility. 
The results from partitioning the    coefficient according to periods of high, mid and low 
sector volatility are illustrated in table 5.14.  
Table 5.14 - Tests for herding conditional upon sector volatility (High-Mid-Low) 
Market 
Average Coefficient 
(β) Funds following their own trades 
Funds following the 
 others' trades 
Average R² 
High 
Sector 
Volatility 
Mid 
Sector 
Volatility 
Low 
Sector 
Volatility 
High 
Sector 
Volatility 
Mid 
Sector 
Volatility 
Low 
Sector 
Volatility 
High 
Sector 
Volatility 
Mid 
Sector 
Volatility 
Low 
Sector 
Volatility 
High 
Sector 
Volatility 
Mid 
Sector 
Volatility 
Low 
Sector 
Volatility 
Basic  
Materials 
-0,0015 
(0.9816) 
-0,0056 
(0.9490) 
0,0128 
(0.8795) 
-0,0305 
(0.2125) 
-0,0710 
(0.1013) 
-0,0245 
(0.58770 
0,0290 
(0.7007) 
0,0654 
(0.3890) 
0,0373 
(0.5181) 0,0704 0,1137 0,1060 
Consumer  
Goods 
0,1443 
(0.0856) 
-0,0318 
(0.6129) 
-0,0431 
(0.5458) 
-0,0894 
(0.4596) 
-0,0319 
(0.2696) 
-0,0249 
(0.5191) 
0,2337 
(0.0681) 
0,0000 
(0.9993) 
-0,0181 
(0.7212) 0,1191 0,0632 0,0794 
Consumer  
Services 
0,1345 
(0.0536) 
0,1320 
(0.1937) 
0,0477 
(0.7055) 
-0,0148 
(0.5851) 
-0,0509 
(0.1857) 
-0,0657 
(0.2589) 
0,1494 
(0.0432)* 
0,1828 
(0.0470)* 
0,1134 
(0.3130) 0,1067 0,1571 0,2389 
Financials 
0,0763 
(0.2415) 
0,0209 
(0.6354) 
0,0168 
(0.7913) 
0,0175 
(0.7060) 
-0,0083 
(0.7180) 
-0,0073 
(0.8273) 
0,0589 
(0.0691) 
0,0292 
(0.3324) 
0,0241 
(0.5747) 0,0674 0,0308 0,0607 
Healthcare 
-0,0089 
(0.9352) 
0,0013 
(0.9932) 
0,1068 
(0.5140) 
0,0911 
(0.12440 
0,0561 
(0.6373) 
0,0711 
(0.3003) 
-0,1001 
(0.49550) 
-0,0548 
(0.7082) 
0,0357 
(0.7757) 0,1898 0,3846 0,4182 
Industrials 
0,1054 
(0.0199)* 
0,0695 
(0.2668) 
-0,0040 
(0.9328) 
-0,0192 
(0.3599) 
0,0087 
(0.7273) 
-0,0090 
(0.79680 
0,1246 
(0.0025)* 
0,0608 
(0.2513) 
0,0050 
(0.8866) 0,0351 0,0654 0,0376 
Oil & Gas 
-0,0634 
(0.6752) 
0,0041 
(0.9800) 
-0,1023 
(0.5684) 
-0,0240 
(0.0267)* 
0,0327 
(0.7153) 
-0,0172 
(0.4560) 
-0,0393 
(0.7901) 
-0,0286 
(0.8701) 
-0,0850 
(0.6075) 0,3602 0,4470 0,5127 
Technology 
0,4795 
(0.0008)** 
0,9554 
(0.0123)* 
0,8080 
(0.0204)* 
-0,0052 
(0.8969) 
-0,0247 
(0.5710) 
-0,2831 
(0.0207)* 
0,4847 
(0.0004)** 
0,9801 
(0.0136)* 
1,0911 
(0.0103)* 0,2808 0,3985 0,5384 
Utilities 
0,0241 
(0.7790) 
0,1085 
(0.3264) 
0,0452 
(0.6356) 
-0,0173 
(0.4047) 
0,0129 
(0.4877) 
0,0359 
(0.3187) 
0,0413 
(0.5847) 
0,0956 
(0.3780) 
0,0093 
(0.9248) 0,1247 0,1862 0,1487 
*indicates significance at the 5 percent level and **indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
The p-values are shown in the brackets. 
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Once more, the Technology Sector exhibits significant quarter-on-quarter institutional 
demand at all periods of sector volatility (at the 1 percent level during periods of high 
volatility and the 5 percent level during periods of mid and low sector volatility). The 
sector exhibits similar significance at the levels of herding; what is more, the coefficient 
indicating institutions following themselves is also significant (5 percent level) during 
periods of low sector volatility. These findings are similar to those accounting for market 
volatility. In addition, the Industrials sector exhibits similar results with those found when 
accounting for market volatility. Particularly, the quarter-on-quarter institutional demand 
and herding are both significant (5 percent level) during periods of high sector volatility. 
In the Consumer Services sector we notice that there is evidence of significant herding (5 
percent level) during periods of high and mid sector volatility, though the institutional 
demand over quarters is insignificant; in the case of market volatility, there was no 
evidence of significant herding. Finally, in the Oil & Gas sector, the coefficient indicating 
institutions following themselves is significant (5 percent level) during periods of high 
sector volatility; however the quarter-on-quarter institutional demand is insignificant 
during all periods of sector volatility. 
The next state examined is sector volume. As we can see in table 5.15, the Technology 
sector once more exhibits significant (1 percent level) institutional demand over quarters 
both during periods of increasing and decreasing sector volume. What is more, the 
coefficient indicating institutions following themselves is also significant (5 percent 
level) during periods of decreasing sector volume. Regarding the herding coefficient, the 
latter appears highly significant (1 percent level) during both periods of increasing and 
decreasing sector volume. The Consumer Services sector exhibits significant (5 percent 
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level) herding during periods of increasing sector volume, though the institutional 
demand over quarters is insignificant (in the case of market volume the latter was 
significant). Moving on to the Industrials sector, both the coefficient indicating 
institutions following themselves and the herding coefficient appear significant (5 percent 
level) during periods of decreasing sector volume, though the institutional demand over 
quarters is once more insignificant. The Oil & Gas sector and the Utilities Sector exhibit 
significant (5 percent level) coefficients indicating institutions following themselves 
during periods of decreasing and increasing sector volume respectively. 
Table 5.15 - Tests for herding conditional upon Sector volume (Positive-Negative) 
Market 
Average Coefficient 
(β) 
Funds following their 
own trades 
Funds following the 
 others' trades 
Average R² 
Positive 
Sector 
Volume 
Negative 
Sector 
Volume 
Positive 
Sector 
Volume 
Negative 
Sector 
Volume 
Positive 
Sector 
Volume 
Negative 
Sector 
Volume 
Positive 
Sector 
Volume 
Negative 
Sector 
Volume 
Basic Materials 
-0,0309 
(0.6976) 
0,0297 
(0.5522) 
-0,0545 
(0.1508) 
-0,0323 
(0.2061) 
0,0236 
(0.7131) 
0,0620 
(0.2156) 0,1344 0,0650 
Consumer Goods 
0,0840 
(0.2469) 
-0,0270 
(0.5781) 
-0,0612 
(0.4995) 
-0,0383 
(0.1087) 
0,1452 
(0.1453) 
0,0112 
(0.7649) 0,1145 0,0648 
Consumer 
Services 
0,1126 
(0.1266) 
0,0945 
(0.3155) 
-0,0555 
(0.1119) 
-0,0269 
(0.4007) 
0,1681 
(0.0134)* 
0,1214 
(0.1614) 0,1598 0,1785 
Financials 
0,0200 
(0.6233) 
0,0638 
(0.2482) 
-0,0051 
(0.8494) 
0,0086 
(0.7705) 
0,0251 
(0.3142) 
0,0552 
(0.1015) 0,0469 0,0608 
Healthcare 
-0,0272 
(0.8174) 
0,0969 
(0.3957) 
0,0540 
(0.4664) 
0,0924 
(0.1639) 
-0,0812 
(0.4563) 
0,0045 
(0.9692) 0,3500 0,3123 
Industrials 
0,0672 
(0.1414) 
0,0455 
(0.2371) 
0,0216 
(0.3589) 
-0,0386 
(0.0417)* 
0,0457 
(0.2022) 
0,0841 
(0.0208)* 0,0567 0,0344 
Oil & Gas 
-0,0506 
(0.6893) 
-0,0550 
(0.6949) 
0,0319 
(0.5875) 
-0,0390 
(0.0202)* 
-0,0825 
(0.5121) 
-0,0161 
(0.9071) 0,4133 0,4691 
Technology 
0,6455 
(0.0003)** 
0,8808 
(0.0007)** 
-0,0437 
(0.2293) 
-0,1465 
(0.0333)* 
0,6892 
(0.0003)** 
1,0273 
(0.0005)** 0,4331 0,4232 
Utilities 
0,0286 
(0.1033) 
0,6475 
(0.3076) 
0,0027 
(0.0213)* 
0,8859 
(0.3830) 
0,0259 
(0.0820) 
0,6557 
(0.4211) 0,1107 0,2126 
*indicates significance at the 5 percent level and **indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
The p-values are shown in the brackets. 
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What is next is the illustration of the results according to periods of high, mid and low 
sector volume (table 5.16). Once more, the Technology sector exhibits significant 
institutional demand and herding during all periods of sector volume (at the 5 percent 
level during periods of high and low sector volume and at the 1 percent level during 
periods of mid volume). 
Table 5.16 - Tests for herding conditional upon sector volume (High-Mid-Low) 
Market 
Average Coefficient 
(β) Funds following their own trades 
Funds following the 
 others' trades 
Average R² 
High 
Sector 
Volume 
Mid  
Sector 
Volume 
Low 
Sector 
Volume 
High 
Sector 
Volume 
Mid  
Sector 
Volume 
Low 
Sector 
Volume 
High 
Sector 
Volume 
Mid  
Sector 
Volume 
Low 
Sector 
Volume 
High 
Sector 
Volume 
Mid  
Sector 
Volume 
Low 
Sector 
Volume 
Basic Materials 
0,0655 
(0.4802) 
-0,0337 
(0.6384) 
-0,0245 
(0.7405) 
-0,0998 
(0.0646) 
-0,0020 
(0.9542) 
-0,0283 
(0.1525) 
0,1653 
(0.0500)* 
-0,0317 
(0.5515) 
0,0038 
(0.9548) 0,1293 0,0835 0,0791 
Consumer  
Goods 
0,1906 
(0.0268)* 
-0,1305 
(0.0382)* 
0,0151 
(0.8025) 
-0,0830 
(0.4973) 
-0,0689 
(0.0127)* 
0,0078 
(0.8164) 
0,2736 
(0.0327)* 
-0,0617 
(0.2179) 
0,0073 
(0.8694) 0,1307 0,0719 0,0585 
Consumer  
Services 
0,2362 
(0.0266)* 
0,0403 
(0.6000) 
0,0431 
(0.7125) 
-0,0170 
(0.5086) 
-0,0237 
(0.2512) 
-0,0922 
(0.1725) 
0,2532 
(0.0092)* 
0,0641 
(0.3775) 
0,1354 
(0.2097) 0,1873 0,1100 0,2083 
Financials 
-0,0246 
(0.7030) 
0,0509 
(0.3519) 
0,0860 
(0.1045) 
-0,0195 
(0.5924) 
-0,0141 
(0.7164) 
0,0358 
(0.2037) 
-0,0050 
(0.8946) 
0,0650 
(0.0354)* 
0,0502 
(0.1686) 0,0641 0,0483 0,0454 
Healthcare 
0,0510 
(0.6004) 
0,1245 
(0.4136) 
-0,0836 
(0.6256) 
-0,0061 
(0.8716) 
0,0811 
(0.1214) 
0,1419 
(0.3075) 
0,0571 
(0.4758) 
0,0434 
(0.7772) 
-0,2255 
(0.1708) 0,1506 0,3879 0,4539 
Industrials 
0,0378 
(0.4866) 
0,0629 
(0.2118) 
0,0706 
(0.2047) 
-0,0072 
(0.8488) 
0,0198 
(0.2770) 
-0,0327 
(0.1532) 
0,0450 
(0.3361) 
0,0431 
(0.2966) 
0,1033 
(0.0263)* 0,0442 0,0422 0,0530 
Oil & Gas 
0,0423 
(0.8066) 
-0,0046 
(0.9702) 
-0,1987 
(0.3049) 
-0,0096 
(0.2801) 
0,0671 
(0.4339) 
-0,0681 
(0.0389)* 
0,0519 
(0.7600) 
-0,0718 
(0.5941) 
-0,1305 
(0.4784) 0,4783 0,2567 0,5960 
Technology 
0,6911 
(0.0035)* 
0,5422 
(0.0000)** 
1,1355 
(0.0120)* 
-0,565 
(0.1023) 
-0,0729 
(0.3358) 
-0,1790 
(0.0627) 
0,476 
(0.0031)* 
0,6151 
(0.0001)** 
1,3145 
(0.0082)* 0,3940 0,3516 0,5487 
Utilities 
-0,0282 
(0.7736) 
0,1222 
(0.1785) 
0,0829 
(0.4304) 
0,0026 
(0.9239) 
0,0401 
(0.1401) 
-0,0128 
(0.5738) 
-0,0308 
(0.7575) 
0,0821 
(0.3884) 
0,0957 
(0.2937) 0,1586 0,1420 0,1616 
*indicates significance at the 5 percent level and **indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
The p-values are shown in the brackets. 
 
The Consumer Goods sector exhibits significant (5 percent level) evidence of quarter-on-
quarter institutional demand during periods of high and mid sector volume, though the 
coefficient indicating funds following others is only significant (5 percent level) during 
periods of high sector volume, whereas the coefficient indicating institutions following 
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their own trades is significant (5 percent level) during periods of mid sector volume. 
Significant herding at the 5 percent level is documented for the Consumer Services 
during periods of mid sector volume, the Financials Sector during mid levels of sector 
volume and the Industrials sector during mid levels of sector volume; however, in all 
cases, the institutional demand over quarters is insignificant at all levels of sector volume. 
Finally, the coefficient indicating institutions following themselves in the Oil & Gas 
sector is significant at the 5 percent level during periods of low sector volume, though 
once more the institutional demand over quarters is insignificant. 
The last state examined is sector concentration; table 5.17 illustrates our findings. 
Particularly, we get to see that the Technology sector is the only sector that exhibits 
significant (1 percent level) quarter-on-quarter institutional demand during periods of 
increasing and decreasing periods of sector concentration. The coefficient indicating 
institutions following themselves is significant (5 percent level) during periods of 
decreasing sector concentration, whereas herding is significant (1 percent level) during 
both periods of increasing and decreasing sector concentration.  
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Table 5.17 - Tests for herding conditional upon Sector Concentration (Positive-Negative) 
Market 
Average Coefficient 
(β) 
Funds following their 
own trades 
Funds following the 
 others' trades 
Average R² 
Positive  
Sector 
Conc/tion 
Negative 
Sector 
Conc/tion 
Positive  
Sector 
Conc/tion 
Negative 
Sector 
Conc/tion 
Positive  
Sector 
Conc/tion 
Negative 
Sector 
Conc/tion 
Positive  
Sector 
Conc/tion 
Negative 
Sector 
Conc/tion 
Basic  
Materials 
-0,0417 
(0.5986) 
0,0390 
(0.4372) 
-0,0563 
(0.1462) 
-0,0307 
(0.2114) 
0,0146 
(0.8167) 
0,0697 
(0.1709) 0,1338 0,0655 
Consumer  
Goods 
0,0840 
(0.2469) 
-0,0270 
(0.5781) 
-0,0612 
(0.4995) 
-0,0383 
(0.1087) 
0,1452 
(0.1453) 
0,0112 
(0.7649) 0,1145 0,0648 
Consumer  
Services 
0,0871 
(0.2196) 
0,1301 
(0.1819) 
-0,0641 
(0.0708) 
-0,0164 
(0.60160 
0,1512 
(0.0235)* 
0,1465 
(0.0965) 0,1441 0,1991 
Financials 
0,0173 
(0.6660) 
0,0703 
(0.2159) 
-0,0085 
(0.7461) 
0,0148 
(0.6262) 
0,0258 
(0.2879) 
0,0555 
(0.1145) 0,0473 0,0609 
Healthcare 
-0,0661 
(0.5676) 
0,1310 
(0.2577) 
0,0215 
(0.7990) 
0,1235 
(0.0196)* 
-0,0876 
(0,4072) 
0,0076 
(0,9496) 0,3271 0,3367 
Industrials 
0,0755 
(0.0946) 
0,0342 
(0.3696) 
0,0249 
(0.2785) 
-0,0454 
(0.0153)* 
0,0506 
(0.1490) 
0,0796 
(0.0334)* 0,0596 0,0297 
Oil & Gas 
0,0022 
(0.9859) 
-0,1120 
(0.4381) 
0,0322 
(0.5837) 
-0,0393 
(0.0190)* 
-0,0301 
(0.8045) 
-0,0727 
(0.6097) 0,3832 0,5016 
Technology 
0,6455 
(0.0003)** 
0,8808 
(0.0007)** 
-0,0437 
(0.2293) 
-0,1465 
(0,0333)* 
0,6892 
(0.0003)** 
1,0273 
(0.0005)** 0,4331 0,4232 
Utilities 
0,0016 
(0.9787) 
0,1341 
(0.1819) 
0,0013 
(0.9461) 
0,0223 
(0.3492) 
0,0003 
(0.9954) 
0,1118 
(0.2669) 0,0966 0,2259 
*indicates significance at the 5 percent level and **indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
The p-values are shown in the brackets. 
 
Furthermore, significant herding (5 percent level) is reflected in the Consumer Services 
sector during periods of increasing sector concentration and the Industrial sector during 
periods of decreasing sector concentration. The latter sector also exhibits significant (5 
percent level) evidence of institutions following themselves during periods of decreasing 
sector concentration. Finally, the coefficient indicating institutions following themselves 
is significant (5 percent level) in the Healthcare and the Oil & Gas sectors during periods 
of decreasing sector concentration.  
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What is next, is the illustration of the results according to periods of high, mid and low 
sector concentration (table 5.18). 
Table 5.18 - Tests for herding conditional upon sector Concentration (High-Mid-Low) 
Market 
Average Coefficient 
(β) Funds following their own trades 
Funds following the 
 others' trades 
Average R² 
High  
Sector 
Conc/tion 
Mid 
Sector 
Conc/tion 
Low 
Sector 
Conc/tion 
High  
Sector 
Conc/tion 
Mid 
Sector 
Conc/tion 
Low 
Sector 
Conc/tion 
High  
Sector 
Conc/tion 
Mid 
Sector 
Conc/tion 
Low 
Sector 
Conc/tion 
High  
Sector 
Conc/tion 
Mid 
Sector 
Conc/tion 
Low 
Sector 
Conc/tion 
Basic  
Materials 
0,0269 
(0.7774) 
-0,0681 
(0.3274) 
0,0507 
(0.4874) 
-0,0817 
(0.0542) 
-0,0632 
(0.0723) 
0,0186 
(0.6199) 
0,1086 
(0.2016) 
-0,0049 
(0.9423) 
0,0321 
(0.5496) 0,1275 0,0849 0,0794 
Consumer  
Goods 
0,1652 
(0.0425)* 
-0,0951 
(0.1839) 
0,0031 
(0.9596) 
-0,0981 
(0.4216) 
-0,0570 
(0.0487)* 
0,0104 
(0.7529) 
0,2632 
(0.0355)* 
-0,0381 
(0.5237) 
-0,0073 
(0.8615) 0,1134 0,0873 0,0596 
Consumer  
Services 
0,1688 
(0.0992) 
0,1040 
(0.2219) 
0,0431 
(0.7125) 
-0,0319 
(0.3198) 
-0,0097 
(0.3273) 
-0,0922 
(0.1725) 
0,2007 
(0.0248)* 
0,1137 
(0.1758) 
0,1354 
(0.2097) 0,1582 0,1375 0,2083 
Financials 
-0,0246 
(0.7030) 
0,0497 
(0.3626) 
0,0872 
(0.0998) 
-0,0195 
(0.5924) 
-0,0087 
(0.8204) 
0,0301 
(0.2989) 
-0,0050 
(0.8946) 
0,0584 
(0.0490)* 
0,0571 
(0.1290) 0,0641 0,0479 0,0458 
Healthcare 
0,0974 
(0.3456) 
-0,0156 
(0.9162) 
0,0184 
(0.9154) 
-0,0009 
(0.9812) 
0,1114 
(0.0901) 
0,1046 
(0.4314) 
0,0983 
(0.2583) 
-0,1270 
(0.4476) 
-0,0862 
(0.5585) 0,1727 0,3613 0,4599 
Industrials 
0,0400 
(0.4760) 
0,0387 
(0.4345) 
0,0940 
(0.0832) 
-0,0014 
(0.9671) 
0,0146 
(0.5372) 
-0,0331 
(0.1536) 
0,0414 
(0.3990) 
0,0241 
(0.5460) 
0,1271 
(0.0037)* 0,0503 0,0367 0,0527 
Oil & Gas 
0,0891 
(0.5833) 
-0,0544 
(0.6917) 
-0,1927 
(0.3153) 
-0,0098 
(0.2688) 
0,0741 
(0.3845) 
-0,0753 
(0.0245)* 
0,0989 
(0.5342) 
-0,1285 
(0.3865) 
-0,1174 
(0.5151) 0,4276 0,3153 0,5848 
Technology 
0,8837 
(0.0159)* 
0,8171 
(0.0024)* 
0,6257 
(0.0083)* 
-0,0641 
(0.2298) 
-0,0664 
(0.3990) 
-0,1790 
(0.0320)* 
0,9478 
(0.0204)* 
0,8835 
(0.0025)* 
0,8047 
(0.0039)* 0,4183 0,4819 0,3741 
Utilities 
-0,0209 
(0.8310) 
0,1153 
(0.2064) 
0,0829 
(0.4304) 
-0,0117 
(0.6480) 
0,0537 
(0.0554) 
-0,0128 
(0.5738) 
-0,0092 
(0.9261) 
0,0616 
(0.5242) 
0,0957 
(0.2937) 0,1582 0,1423 0,1616 
*indicates significance at the 5 percent level and **indicates significance at the 1 percent level. 
The p-values are shown in the brackets. 
 
As we can see, the Technology sector exhibits significant (1 percent level) quarter-on-
quarter institutional demand and herding during all periods of sector concentration; the 
coefficient indicating institutions following themselves is also significant (5 percent 
level) during periods of low sector concentration. The Consumer Goods sector also 
exhibits significant (5 percent level) quarter-on-quarter institutional demand and herding 
during periods of high sector concentration; what is more, the coefficient indicating 
institutions following themselves is also significant (5 percent level) during periods of 
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mid sector concentration. Here, we should notice that in the case of market concentration, 
this sector did not exhibit significant institutional demand over quarters. On the contrary, 
it was the Consumer Services sector when accounting for market concentration that 
exhibited significant quarter-on-quarter institutional demand; however, in the case of 
sector concentration, this sector does not exhibit significant institutional demand over the 
quarters but only some evidence of herding (significant at the 5 percent level) during 
periods of high sector concentration. Furthermore, we also find significant (5 percent 
level) evidence of herding in the Financials sector during periods of mid sector 
concentration and the Industrials sector during periods of low sector concentration; in 
addition, the coefficient indicating institution following themselves is significant (5 
percent level) in the Oil & Gas sector during periods of low sector concentration. 
However, in all three previous sectors there is significant evidence of institutional 
demand over quarters. 
 
5.6 Further discussion of the results 
In this section we will provide a synthesis of our results from tables 5.1-5.18 and further 
attack the question whether industry herding in the Spanish stock market on behalf of the 
fund managers is more reflected through market or sector conditions. So far, the only 
research, to our knowledge, that examined the intent of fund managers to herd is that of 
Holmes et al. (2011), under the premises of the Portuguese market.  
257 
 
Table 5.19 - Conditions affecting Institutional Industry Herding 
  Market Conditions affecting Institutional Industry Herding 
  Market Returns Market Volatility Market Volume Market Concentration 
Sector (+)ve (-)ve High Mid Low (+)ve (-)ve High Mid Low (+)ve (-)ve High Mid Low (+)ve (-)ve High Mid Low 
Basic Materials   - - - - - - - √ - - - √ - - - - - - - 
Consumer Goods - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Consumer Services √ - - - √ √ - - - - √ - - - - √ - - √ - 
Financials - √ - - √ - - √ - - - - √ - - - - - - √ 
Healthcare - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Industrials - √ - - √ - √ √ - - - - - - - - - - - √ 
Oil & Gas - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Technology √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Utilities - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
                                          
  Sector Conditions affecting Institutional Industry Herding 
  Sector Returns Sector Volatility Sector Volume Sector Concentration 
Sector (+)ve (-)ve High Mid Low (+)ve (-)ve High Mid Low (+)ve (-)ve High Mid Low (+)ve (-)ve High Mid Low 
Basic Materials - - - - - - - - - - - - √ - - - - - - - 
Consumer Goods - - - - - - - - - - - - √ - - - - √ - - 
Consumer Services - √ - √ - √ - √ √ - √ - √ - - √ - √ - - 
Financials - √ - - - - - - - - - - - √ - - - - √ - 
Healthcare - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Industrials - √ - - √ - √ √ - - - √ - - √ - √ - - √ 
Oil & Gas - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Technology √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Utilities - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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However, in that case, the authors examined whether fund managers intentionally herd at 
the market level and whether their herd behavior was reflected through various market 
conditions (market returns, market volatility, and regulatory environment); their results 
indicated the presence of herd intent on behalf of the Portuguese fund managers and the 
authors attributed this phenomenon to professional reasons. In our case, instead of 
examining the intent of fund managers to herd at the market level, we examine herding 
intent at the sector level; what is more, we use several conditions (returns, volatility, 
volume, concentration) not only at the market level but at the sector level as well. By 
doing so, we can identify whether herding intent at the industry level is more reflected 
through market or sector conditions.  
Starting with the aggregate market results, these indicated that there is significant herding 
on behalf of the Spanish fund managers. Moving to the sector level, we found evidence 
of significant herding in the Consumer Services, Industrials, and Technology sectors. In 
addition, we examined the interaction between institutional industry herding and a series 
of conditions, both at the market and sector level; these were returns, volatility, volume 
and concentration of trading. Our results indicated that there is significant herding in 
behalf of fund managers in the Spanish market primarily during periods where the overall 
market or the sector examined is characterized by underperformance, rising/high 
volatility and high volume. 
In the case of underperformance, the sectors where institutional herding is reflected more 
during quarters of decreasing and/or low market/sectors returns are the Consumer 
Services, Financials, and Industrials; this phenomenon can be attributed to professional 
reasons. In periods of declining prices trading is more likely to generate losses, as such 
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less experienced fund managers who are assessed relatively to the performance of the 
institutional investment sector may choose to copy the trades of their more experienced 
peers. By doing so, they can “share the blame” by claiming that even though they made 
good investment decisions (as the more experienced fund managers) the adverse 
conditions prevailing in the market was the reason of this underperformance. 
In the case where institutional herding was more reflected during periods of rising/high 
volatility in the Consumer Services, Financials, and Industrials sectors, this phenomenon 
could be attributed to informational considerations. During periods of high/rising 
volatility there is greater uncertainty and complexity on behalf of inexperienced fund 
managers as it may be not that easy to interpret correctly the large flow of information 
during those periods; as such they may resort to herd on the trades of their more 
experienced peers. 
In the where institutional herding was more reflected mostly during periods of high 
volume in the Basic Materials, Consumer Goods and Consumer Services sectors, this 
phenomenon could be attributed to informational/professional considerations. High 
trading volume allows “good” fund managers to trade more easily on their information 
[Romano (2007)], whereas in the case of low trading volume that would be more difficult 
since there would be higher liquidity risk. As such, the increased trading activity of the 
“good” fund managers increases their visibility to the inexperienced fund managers who 
can copy the trades of the former ones more easily.  
When we controlled for market/sector trading concentration we did not identify any 
pattern on the significance of herding, though there has been some scant evidence of 
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herding in some sectors. What we should emphasize at this point is that the most extreme 
cases of insignificant herding were met in the smallest sectors of our samples. The 
Healthcare, Oil & Gas and the Utilities sectors showed no evidence of herding 
irrespectively of any market condition controlled for. On the other hand, there was 
overwhelming evidence of herding in the Technology sector in all the conditions 
examined. This could be due to the fact that the specific sector consists of relatively small 
stocks, which fund managers perceive as riskier; thus, they resort to herding in order to 
minimize the perceived risk. In addition, since the majority of the assets held by firms in 
the Technology sector are intangible, this could increase the difficulty for investors to 
analyze the perspectives of these stocks, thus leading them to herd on their peers’ actions.   
Concluding, our results indicate that fund managers in the Spanish market industry herd, 
with their herd behavior interacting with several market and sector conditions. The 
sectors where the presence of herding is more evident are the Consumer Services and the 
Industrials and to lesser extent the Financials, the Basic Materials and the Consumer 
Goods sectors. The fact that institutional investors are found to herd more on the 
Consumer Services and the Industrials sectors is quite interesting as these two sectors 
comprise almost three quarters of the Spanish Economy’s GDP35. As such, bad decisions 
made by fund managers in these sectors would indicate bad understanding of the 
economy’s fundamental sectors; hence, lower skills. This finding is in line with the study 
by Zhou and Lai (2009), which found that herding is more pronounced on the Financials 
and the Property & Construction sectors, the two dominants sectors of Hong Kong.  
These results support our hypothesis that fund managers’ industry herding is driven by 
                                                          
35
 Source: Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy, Bank of Spain. 
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intent and this can be attributed to the informational and professional concerns of the 
fund managers.    
5.7 Conclusion         
The question on what alters institutional investors’ intent to herd has not been examined 
in depth.  The only research so far, to our knowledge, that examines this issue is that of 
Holmes et al. (2011), which examined this issue under the premises of the Portuguese 
market. More specifically, the authors found that the intent of fund managers to herd at 
the aggregate market level is reflected through differences in various market conditions 
examined in their paper. The gap that we found in the relevant literature and we 
examined in this chapter is whether the intent of institutional investors to industry herd is 
more reflected through market or sector conditions; an issue that has not been examined 
before. As market and sector conditions reflect different informational sets, it is important 
to know which of the two alters the intent of fund managers to herd. In order to do so, we 
used data from the Spanish mutual fund industry. More specifically, we used quarterly 
portfolio holdings for a period of fourteen years, namely from June 1995 till September 
2008. To test whether the herd behavior found in the sectors examined is intentional or 
not, we controlled for a series of conditions (returns, volatility, volume, and concentration 
of trading) at both the market and sector level. Our results indicate that the fund managers 
in the Spanish market herd significantly not only at the aggregate market level but at the 
industry level as well since we documented interactions of their herd behavior in each 
sector with the market/industry states controlled for. This was primarily the case for the 
Consumer Services, Financials, and the Industrials sectors and to a lesser extent for the 
Basic Materials and the Consumer Goods sectors. In the above mentioned sectors, fund 
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managers were found to significantly herd during periods of market/sector 
underperformance, rising/high volatility, and high volume. Our results suggest that fund 
managers do industry herd and that this behavior is driven by intent motivated by 
informational and professional reasons. 
Concluding, our results contribute to the literature by providing supporting evidence to 
the research of Holmes et al. (2011) who found that institutional investors herd 
intentionally at the market level, this reflected through differences in various market 
conditions, and that this herd behavior is driven by professional and informational 
reasons; however, our study takes a further step finding that fund managers intentionally 
herd at the industry level and that this herd behavior is not only influenced by market 
conditions but by industry-specific conditions as well. The findings of our study can have 
important implications for both the investment community and regulatory authorities. In 
the first case, it is important for the investors to know the impact of the market/sector 
conditions on the levels of industry herding, as it could potentially affect their investment 
strategies, especially those that engage in sector investing styles. In the latter case, it is 
important for the regulatory authorities to focus on the reasons that drive institutional 
investors to industry herd intentionally and try to minimize its impact, as herding is found 
to have a destabilizing effect on the stock prices.  
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Chapter 6 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
 
This thesis aims to contribute to the existing literature of Behavioral Finance by 
examining two concepts of collective behavior, namely herding and feedback trading. 
Both of these topics are very important as if such phenomena are widespread, this could 
lead to the destabilization of asset prices and the increase of the systemic risk of the 
markets. The first issue addressed is whether market concentration has an impact over the 
relationship between style investing and herding. As style investing has been found to 
promote institutional herding in a series of large and developed markets, we examine 
what is the case under the context of a highly concentrated market. What is next is the 
examination whether the introduction of the Exchange Traded Funds has a beneficial role 
towards the market efficiency and whether they depress or not noise trading in the 
markets these have been introduced to. Finally, the last issue examined in this thesis is 
whether institutional investors herd intentionally at the industry level and which are the 
conditions they interact the most with herding, the market or sector conditions? 
After providing an extended literature review in Chapter 2 about herding and feedback 
trading, chapter 3 focuses in the first research question of this thesis, which is identifying 
the impact of market concentration over the relationship between style investing and 
herding. As there is an established relationship between style investing and herding in 
large markets, we explore the possibility that the trading dynamics produced in a 
concentrated market may have a different impact over the relationship between style 
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investing and herding than those observed in large markets. By testing our hypothesis in a 
highly concentrated market such as that of Portugal we find that institutional demand 
over time appears highly significant in the Portuguese fund industry and it is due to funds 
following the trades of other funds (herding). Furthermore, we find that in the context of 
a highly concentrated market, style investing does not affect the persistence of 
institutional demand; the latter remaining significant throughout all tests carried out. 
More specifically, the herding levels found are quite high and remain robust when we 
account for various investment styles (consensus analysts’ recommendations, momentum, 
size, value/growth, volatility, and volume). As such, our results indicate that style 
investing does not constitute a common practice in highly concentrated markets and that 
it does not have any impact over the significance of herding among fund managers in 
such kind of market environments. 
Our results may have important implications for the professional fund managers and their 
clients as they are applicable to concentrated markets. A possible idea for further research 
could be to test for the profitability of the investing styles used in this research and test 
whether these are of any use for institutional investors when they invest in concentrated 
markets. In addition, a re-examination of the relationship between style investing and 
institutional herding after the end of the ongoing credit crisis would be useful as to 
examine whether there should be any significant difference on the findings of our 
research. 
In chapter 4 we examine the impact of the introduction of the ETFs on the markets these 
have been introduced to. More specifically, using a sample of eight European markets, 
we test whether the introduction of the ETFs in these markets depress the level of noise 
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trading or not. Our findings indicate that the launch of the ETFs do have a beneficial role 
in the markets these have been introduced to, as we find evidence that the level of noise 
trading declined during the period following the ETF introduction. Or results bear 
important implications for both the market regulators and the investing community. More 
specifically, since our sample consisted of developed markets, our findings can be of 
great importance to the regulatory authorities of emerging or relatively new established 
markets as the introduction of ETFs in these markets could contribute in a great extent to 
the completion of these markets. Regarding, the investment community, our results 
indicate that the ETFs are efficiently priced and they have no destabilizing effect on the 
spot prices; as such these products can be successfully used as hedging tools on behalf of 
the investors. 
Finally, in chapter 5 we focus on the behavior of institutional investors when investing at 
the industry level. More specifically, we examine whether fund managers industry herd 
intentionally and also shed light on the conditions that underlie their intent to herd at the 
industry level; we test our hypothesis under the context of the Spanish fund industry. Our 
findings support our hypothesis as we find that fund managers do herd at the industry 
level in the Spanish market and that this herd behavior is intentional driven by 
professional and informational reasons. In addition, we find that it is both the market and 
sector conditions that affect fund managers’ intent to industry herd. Our findings have 
important implication for both the investment community and the regulatory authorities. 
On the investors’ side, it is important for them to know the impact of the market/sector 
conditions on the levels of industry herding, as it could potentially affect their investment 
strategies, especially those engaging in sector investing styles. In the case of market 
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regulators, our results suggest that the later should devise ways to encourage institutional 
investors to effectively diversify their sector investments; one possible solution would be to 
compare the correlations of the funds’ equity investments (both at the market and sector level) 
and release this information to the public. In this way, investors will have a better insight of the 
extent of institutional herding and they could factor this information when they select funds to 
invest in. A possible idea for further research would be to examine which are the leading and 
following fund managers in the market, as this would provide the investors with an insight on the 
quality and skills of the managers that manage their investments.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Bibliography: 
267 
 
 
Ackert, L. F. and Tian, Y. S. (2008). "Arbitrage, Liquidity, and the Valuation of Exchange 
Traded Funds." Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, Vol. 17 (5), pp.: 331-362. 
Aguirre, M. and Saidi, R. (1999). "Feedback trading in exchange-rate markets: Evidence from 
within and across economic blocks." Journal of Economics and Finance, Vol. 23 (1), pp.: 
1-14. 
Allen, F. and Gale, D. (1992). "Stock-Price Manipulation." The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 
5 (3), pp.: 503-529. 
Andergassen, R. (2005). "Rational destabilizing speculation and the riding of bubbles." ICFAI 
Journal of Behavioral Finance, Vol. 2  pp.: 69-83. 
Andronikidi, A. and Kallinterakis, V. (2010). "Thin trading and its impact upon herding: the case 
of Israel." Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 17 (18), pp.: 1805 - 1810. 
Antoniou, A., Ergul, N. and Holmes, P. (1997). "Market Efficiency, Thin Trading and Non-linear 
Behaviour: Evidence from an Emerging Market." European Financial Management, Vol. 
3 (2), pp.: 175-190. 
Antoniou, A., Ergul, N., Holmes, P. and Priestley, R. (1997). "Technical analysis, trading volume 
and market efficiency: evidence from an emerging market." Applied Financial 
Economics, Vol. 7 (4), pp.: 361-365. 
Antoniou, A., Galariotis, E. C. and Spyrou, S. I. (2005). "Contrarian Profits and the Overreaction 
Hypothesis: the Case of the Athens Stock Exchange." European Financial Management, 
Vol. 11 (1), pp.: 71-98. 
Antoniou, A., Koutmos, G. and Pericli, A. (2005). "Index futures and positive feedback trading: 
evidence from major stock exchanges." Journal of Empirical Finance, Vol. 12 (2), pp.: 
219-238. 
Ariel, R. A. (1990). "High Stock Returns before Holidays: Existence and Evidence on Possible 
Causes." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 45 (5), pp.: 1611-1626. 
Badrinath, S. G. and Wahal, S. (2002). "Momentum Trading by Institutions." The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 57 (6), pp.: 2449-2478. 
Balbina, M. and Martins, N. (2002). The Analysis of Seasonal Return Anomalies in the 
Portuguese Stock Market. E. R. Department, Banco de Portugal: 1-29. 
Ball, R. and Brown, P. (1968). "An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers." 
Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 6 (2), pp.: 159-178. 
Banerjee, A. V. (1992). "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior." The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 107 (3), pp.: 797-817. 
Banz, R. W. (1981). "The relationship between return and market value of common stocks." 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 9 (1), pp.: 3-18. 
Barber, B. M. and Odean, T. (2008). "All That Glitters: The Effect of Attention and News on the 
Buying Behavior of Individual and Institutional Investors." Review of Financial Studies, 
Vol. 21 (2), pp.: 785-818. 
Barber, B. M., Odean, T. and Zhu, N. (2009). "Do Retail Trades Move Markets?" Review of 
Financial Studies, Vol. 22 (1), pp.: 151-186. 
Barber, B. M., Odean, T. and Zhu, N. (2009). "Systematic noise." Journal of Financial Markets, 
Vol. 12 (4), pp.: 547-569. 
Barberis, N., Huang, M. and Santos, T. (2001). "Prospect Theory and Asset Prices." The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 116 (1), pp.: 1-53. 
Barberis, N. and Shleifer, A. (2003). "Style investing." Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 68 
(2), pp.: 161-199. 
Barberis, N., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1998). "A model of investor sentiment." Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 49 (3), pp.: 307-343. 
268 
 
Barberis, N. and Thaler, R. (2003). Chapter 18 A survey of behavioral finance. Handbook of the 
Economics of Finance. M. H. G.M. Constantinides and R. M. Stulz, Elsevier. Volume 1, 
Part 2: 1053-1128. 
Basu, S. (1977). "Investment Performance of Common Stocks in Relation to Their Price-Earnings 
Ratios: A Test of the Efficient Market Hypothesis." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 32 (3), 
pp.: 663-682. 
Basu, S. (1983). "The relationship between earnings' yield, market value and return for NYSE 
common stocks : Further evidence." Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 12 (1), pp.: 
129-156. 
Berk, J. B., Green, R. C. and Naik, V. (1999). "Optimal Investment, Growth Options, and 
Security Returns." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 54 (5), pp.: 1553-1607. 
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D. and Welch, I. (1992). "A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and 
Cultural Change as Informational Cascades." The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 100 
(5), pp.: 992-1026. 
Bikhchandani, S. and Sharma, S. (2001). "Herd Behavior in Financial Markets." IMF Staff 
Papers, Vol. 47 (3), pp.: 279-310. 
Black, F. (1972). "Capital Market Equilibrium with Restricted Borrowing." The Journal of 
Business, Vol. 45 (3), pp.: 444-455. 
Black, F. (1986). "Noise." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 41 (3), pp.: 529-543. 
Blasco, N. and Ferreruela, S. (2008). "Testing Intentional Herding in Familiar Stocks: An 
Experiment in an International Context." Journal of Behavioral Finance, Vol. 9 (2), pp.: 
72 - 84. 
Bohl, M. T. and Reitz, S. (2006). "Do Positive Feedback Traders Act in Germany's Neuer 
Markt?" Quarterly Journal of Business & Economics, Vol. 45 (1/2), pp.: 3-14. 
Boyd, M. (2001). "On Ignorance, Intuition, and Investing: A Bear Market Test of the Recognition 
Heuristic." Journal of Psychology and Financial Markets, Vol. 2 (3), pp.: 150-156. 
Brav, A. and Heaton, J. B. (2002). "Competing Theories of Financial Anomalies." Review of 
Financial Studies, Vol. 15 (2), pp.: 575-606. 
Brennan, M. J. and Cao, H. H. (1997). "International Portfolio Investment Flows." The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 52 (5), pp.: 1851-1880. 
Brock, W., Lakonishok, J. and LeBaron, B. (1992). "Simple Technical Trading Rules and the 
Stochastic Properties of Stock Returns." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 47 (5), pp.: 1731-
1764. 
Brown, N. C., Wei, K. D. and Wermers, R. R. (2009). "Analyst Recommendations, Mutual Fund 
Herding, and Overreaction in Stock Prices." SSRN eLibrary, Vol. 
Brown, S. J. and Goetzmann, W. N. (1997). "Mutual fund styles." Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 43 (3), pp.: 373-399. 
Brunnermeier, M., K. and Nagel, S. (2004). "Hedge Funds and the Technology Bubble." The 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 59 (5), pp.: 2013-2040. 
Buckner, H. T. (1965). "A Theory of Rumor Transmission." The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 
29 (1), pp.: 54-70. 
Busse, J. (1999). "Volatility timing in mutual funds: evidence from daily returns." Review of 
Financial Studies, Vol. 12 (5), pp.: 1009-1041. 
Busse, J. A., Green, T. C. and Jegadeesh, N. (2008). "Stock Selection Skills and Career Choice: 
Buy Side vs. Sell Side." SSRN eLibrary, Vol. 
Calvo, G., A.  and Mendoza, E., G. (1997). Rational herd behavior and the globalization of 
securities markets. D. P. I. f. E. M. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. 
Calvo, G. A. and Mendoza, E. G. (2000). "Rational contagion and the globalization of securities 
markets." Journal of International Economics, Vol. 51 (1), pp.: 79-113. 
269 
 
Campbell, J. Y. and Hentschel, L. (1992). "No news is good news: An asymmetric model of 
changing volatility in stock returns." Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 31 (3), pp.: 
281-318. 
Cao, H. H. and Hirshleifer, D. (1997). "Limited observability, reporting biases, and informational 
cascades." Working paper, Vol. 
Caparrelli, F., D'Arcangelis, A. M. and Cassuto, A. (2004). "Herding in the Italian Stock Market: 
A Case of Behavioral Finance." Journal of Behavioral Finance, Vol. 5 (4), pp.: 222 - 
230. 
Caporale, G., Maria, Economou, F. and Philippas, N. (2008). "Herding behaviour in extreme 
market conditions: the case of the Athens Stock Exchange." Economics Bulletin, Vol. 7 
(17), pp.: 1-13. 
Chan, L. K. C., Chen, H.-L. and Lakonishok, J. (2002). "On Mutual Fund Investment Styles." The 
Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 15 (5), pp.: 1407-1437. 
Chan, L. K. C., Hamao, Y. and Lakonishok, J. (1991). "Fundamentals and Stock Returns in 
Japan." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 46 (5), pp.: 1739-1764. 
Chang, C. (2010). "Herding and the role of foreign institutions in emerging equity markets." 
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 18 (2), pp.: 175-185. 
Chang, E. C., Cheng, J. W. and Khorana, A. (2000). "An examination of herd behavior in equity 
markets: An international perspective." Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 24 (10), pp.: 
1651-1679. 
Chau, F., Holmes, P. and Paudyal, K. (2008). "The Impact of Universal Stock Futures on 
Feedback Trading and Volatility Dynamics." Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 
Vol. 35 (1-2), pp.: 227-249. 
Chen, A.-S. and Hong, B.-S. (2006). "Institutional ownership changes and returns around 
analysts' earnings forecast release events: Evidence from Taiwan." Journal of Banking & 
Finance, Vol. 30 (9), pp.: 2471-2488. 
Chen, G.-m., Firth, M. and Rui, O. M. (2001). "The Dynamic Relation Between Stock Returns, 
Trading Volume, and Volatility." Financial Review, Vol. 36 (3), pp.: 153-174. 
Chen, X. and Cheng, Q. (2005). "Institutional Holdings and Analysts' Stock Recommendations." 
SSRN eLibrary, Vol. 
Chen, Y. F., Yang, S. Y. and Lin, F. L. (2012). "Foreign institutional industrial herding in Taiwan 
stock market." Managerial Finance, Vol. 38 (3), pp.: 325 - 340. 
Chiang, T. C., Li, J. and Tan, L. (2010). "Empirical investigation of herding behavior in Chinese 
stock markets: Evidence from quantile regression analysis." Global Finance Journal, 
Vol. 21 (1), pp.: 111-124. 
Chin, J. Y. F., Prevost, A. K. and Gottesman, A. A. (2002). "Contrarian Investing in a Small 
Capitalization Market: Evidence from New Zealand." Financial Review, Vol. 37 (3), pp.: 
421-446. 
Choe, H., Kho, B.-C. and Stulz, R. M. (1999). "Do foreign investors destabilize stock markets? 
The Korean experience in 1997." Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 54 (2), pp.: 227-
264. 
Choi, N. and Sias, R. W. (2009). "Institutional industry herding." Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 94 (3), pp.: 469-491. 
Chordia, T. and Swaminathan, B. (2000). "Trading Volume and Cross-Autocorrelations in Stock 
Returns." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 55 (2), pp.: 913-935. 
Christie, W. G. and Huang, R. D. (1995). "Following the Pied Piper: Do Individual Returns Herd 
around the Market?" Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 51 (4), pp.: 31-37. 
Conrad, J. and Kaul, G. (1998). "An Anatomy of Trading Strategies." The Review of Financial 
Studies, Vol. 11 (3), pp.: 489-519. 
Crouch, R. L. (1970). "The Volume of Transactions and Price Changes on the New York Stock 
Exchange." Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 26 (4), pp.: 104-109. 
270 
 
Curcio, R. J., Lipka, M. J. and Thornton, J. H. (2004). "Cubes and the Individual Investor." 
Financial Services Review, Vol. 13  pp.: 123-138. 
Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D. and Subrahmanyam, A. (1998). "Investor Psychology and Security 
Market under- and Overreactions." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 53 (6), pp.: 1839-1885. 
Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D. and Teoh, S. H. (2002). "Investor psychology in capital markets: 
evidence and policy implications." Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 49 (1), pp.: 
139-209. 
De Long, B., Shleifer, A., Summers, L. and Waldmann, R. (1990a). "Positive Feedback 
Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation." The Journal of Finance, 
Vol. 45 (2), pp.: 379-395. 
De Long, J. B., Shleifer, A., Summers, L. H. and Waldmann, R. J. (1990b). "Noise Trader Risk in 
Financial Markets." The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98 (4), pp.: 703-738. 
DeBondt, W. F. M. and Thaler, R. (1985). "Does the Stock Market Overreact?" The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 40 (3), pp.: 793-805. 
DeBondt, W. F. M. and Thaler, R. H. (1987). "Further Evidence on Investor Overreaction and 
Stock Market Seasonality." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 42 (3), pp.: 557-581. 
Demirer, R. and Kutan, A. M. (2006). "Does herding behavior exist in Chinese stock markets?" 
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Vol. 16 (2), pp.: 
123-142. 
Demirer, R., Kutan, A. M. and Chen, C.-D. (2010). "Do investors herd in emerging stock 
markets?: Evidence from the Taiwanese market." Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, Vol. 76 (2), pp.: 283-295. 
Demirer, R. and Lien, D. (2005). "Correlation and return dispersion dynamics in Chinese 
markets." International Review of Financial Analysis, Vol. 14 (4), pp.: 477-491. 
Deville, L. (2008). Exchange Traded Funds: History, Trading, and Research Handbook of 
Financial Engineering. C. Zopounidis, M. Doumpos and P. M. Pardalos, Springer US. 18: 
67-98. 
Do, V., Guo-Sze Tan, M. and Westerholm, P. J. (2008). "Correlated Trading in Concentrated 
Market." Journal of International Finance and Economics, Vol. 8 (4). 
Dorn, D., Huberman, G. and Sengmueller, P. (2008). "Correlated Trading and Returns." The 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 63 (2), pp.: 885-920. 
Edwards, W. (1968). Conservatism in human information processing. Formal Representation of 
Human Judgment. B. Kleinmutz. New York, Wiley: 17-52. 
Epps, T. W. (1975). "Security Price Changes and Transaction Volumes: Theory and Evidence." 
The American Economic Review, Vol. 65 (4), pp.: 586-597. 
Falkenstein, E. G. (1996). "Preferences for Stock Characteristics as Revealed by Mutual Fund 
Portfolio Holdings." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 51 (1), pp.: 111-135. 
Fama, E. F. (1970). "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work." The 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 25 (2), pp.: 383-417. 
Fama, E. F. (1998). "Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance." Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 49 (3), pp.: 283-306. 
Fama, E. F. and Blume, M. E. (1966). "Filter Rules and Stock-Market Trading." The Journal of 
Business, Vol. 39 (1), pp.: 226-241. 
Fama, E. F., Fisher, L., Jensen, M. C. and Roll, R. (1969). "The Adjustment of Stock Prices to 
New Information." International Economic Review, Vol. 10 (1), pp.: 1-21. 
Fama, E. F. and French, K. R. (1992). "The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns." The 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 47 (2), pp.: 427-465. 
Fama, E. F. and French, K. R. (1993). "Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds." 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 33 (1), pp.: 3-56. 
Feng, L. and Seasholes, M. S. (2004). "Correlated Trading and Location." The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 59 (5), pp.: 2117-2144. 
271 
 
Fernández-Rodríguez, F., González-Martel, C. and Sosvilla-Rivero, S. (2000). "On the 
profitability of technical trading rules based on artificial neural networks:: Evidence from 
the Madrid stock market." Economics Letters, Vol. 69 (1), pp.: 89-94. 
Festinger, L. (1957). A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Stanford University Press. 
Forner, C. and Marhuenda, J. (2003). "Contrarian and Momentum Strategies in the Spanish Stock 
Market." European Financial Management, Vol. 9 (1), pp.: 67-88. 
French, K. R. (1980). "Stock returns and the weekend effect." Journal of Financial Economics, 
Vol. 8 (1), pp.: 55-69. 
French, K. R., Schwert, G. W. and Stambaugh, R. F. (1987). "Expected Stock returns and 
Volatility." Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 19  pp.: 3-29. 
Fu, T., Lin, Monli (2010). "Herding in China Equity Market." International Journal of 
Economics and Finance, Vol. 2 (2), pp.: 148-156. 
Fung, W. and Hsieh, D. A. (2000). "Measuring the market impact of hedge funds." Journal of 
Empirical Finance, Vol. 7 (1), pp.: 1-36. 
Galariotis, E. C., Holmes, P. and Ma, X. S. (2007). "Contrarian and momentum profitability 
revisited: Evidence from the London Stock Exchange 1964-2005." Journal of 
Multinational Financial Management, Vol. 17 (5), pp.: 432-447. 
Galbraith, J. (1994). A Short History of Financial Euphoria, Penguin (Non-Classics). 
Gastineau, G. L. (2004). "The Benchmark Index ETF Performance Problem." The Journal of 
Portfolio Management, Vol. 30 (2), pp.: 96-103. 
Gervais, S., Kaniel, R. and Mingelgrin, D. H. (2001). "The High-Volume Return Premium." The 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 56 (3), pp.: 877-919. 
Gervais, S. and Odean, T. (2001). "Learning to be overconfident." Review of Financial Studies, 
Vol. 14 (1), pp.: 1-27. 
Glosten, L. R., Jagannathan, R. and Runkle, D. E. (1993). "On the Relation between the Expected 
Value and the Volatility of the Nominal Excess Return on Stocks." The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 48 (5), pp.: 1779-1801. 
Gompers, P. A. and Metrick, A. (2001). "Institutional Investors and Equity Prices*." Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 116 (1), pp.: 229-259. 
Goodfellow, C., Bohl, M. T. and Gebka, B. (2009). "Together we invest? Individual and 
institutional investors' trading behaviour in Poland." International Review of Financial 
Analysis, Vol. 18 (4), pp.: 212-221. 
Goodhart, C., Hartmann, P., Llewellyn, D., Rojas-Suarez, L. and Weisbrod, S., Eds. (1998). 
Financial regulation: why, how and where now?, Routledge: London. 
Gorton, G. B. and Pennacchi, G. G. (1993). "Security Baskets and Index-Linked Securities." The 
Journal of Business, Vol. 66 (1), pp.: 1-27. 
Graham, J. R. (1999). "Herding among Investment Newsletters: Theory and Evidence." The 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 54 (1), pp.: 237-268. 
Grinblatt, M. and Keloharju, M. (2000). "The investment behavior and performance of various 
investor types: a study of Finland's unique data set." Journal of Financial Economics, 
Vol. 55 (1), pp.: 43-67. 
Grinblatt, M., Titman, S. and Wermers, R. (1995). "Momentum Investment Strategies, Portfolio 
Performance, and Herding: A Study of Mutual Fund Behavior." The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 85 (5), pp.: 1088-1105. 
Harper, J. T., Madura, J. and Schnusenberg, O. (2006). "Performance comparison between 
exchange-traded funds and closed-end country funds." Journal of International Financial 
Markets, Institutions and Money, Vol. 16 (2), pp.: 104-122. 
Harris, L. (1986). "A transaction data study of weekly and intradaily patterns in stock returns." 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 16 (1), pp.: 99-117. 
272 
 
Harris, R. D. F. and Pisedtasalasai, A. (2006). "Return and Volatility Spillovers Between Large 
and Small Stocks in the UK." Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 33 (9-10), 
pp.: 1556-1571. 
Haugen, R. A. and Lakonishok, J. (1987). The incredible January effect : the stock market's 
unsolved mystery. Homewood, Ill., Dow Jones-Irwin. 
Henker, J., Thomas Henker and Mitsios, A. (2006). "Do investors herd intraday in Australian 
equities?" International Journal of Managerial Finance, Vol. 2 (3), pp.: 196 - 219 
Hill, J. and Teller, S. (2010). "Hedging with Inverse ETFs: A primer." Journal of Indexes, Vol.   
pp.: 18-24. 
Hirshleifer, D. (2001). "Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 56 
(4), pp.: 1533-1597. 
Hirshleifer, D. and Teoh, S., Hong (2003). "Herd Behaviour and Cascading in Capital Markets: a 
Review and Synthesis." European Financial Management, Vol. 9 (1), pp.: 25-66. 
Hirshleifer, D. and Teoh, S. H. (2003). "Limited attention, information disclosure, and financial 
reporting." Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 36 (1-3), pp.: 337-386. 
Holmes, P., Kallinterakis, V. and Ferreira, M. P. L. (2011). "Herding in a Concentrated Market: a 
Question of Intent." European Financial Management, Vol.   pp.: no-no. 
Hong, H., Lim, T. and Stein, J. C. (2000). "Bad News Travels Slowly: Size, Analyst Coverage, 
and the Profitability of Momentum Strategies." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 55 (1), pp.: 
265-295. 
Huberman, G. (2001). "Familiarity Breeds Investment." Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 14 (3), 
pp.: 659-680. 
Hung, W., Lu, C.-C. and Lee, C. F. (2010). "Mutual fund herding its impact on stock returns: 
Evidence from the Taiwan stock market." Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 18 (5), 
pp.: 477-493. 
Hwang, S. and Salmon, M. (2004). "Market stress and herding." Journal of Empirical Finance, 
Vol. 11 (4), pp.: 585-616. 
James, F. E., Jr. (1968). "Monthly Moving Averages--An Effective Investment Tool?" The 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 3 (3), pp.: 315-326. 
Jares, T. E. and Lavin, A. M. (2004). "Japan and Hong Kong Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs): 
Discounts, Returns, and Trading Strategies." Journal of Financial Services Research, 
Vol. 25 (1), pp.: 57-69. 
Jegadeesh, N. and Titman, S. (1993). "Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: 
Implications for Stock Market Efficiency." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 48 (1), pp.: 65-
91. 
Jegadeesh, N. and Titman, S. (2001). "Profitability of Momentum Strategies: An Evaluation of 
Alternative Explanations." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 56 (2), pp.: 699-720. 
Jensen, M. C. (1968). "The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964." The Journal 
of Finance, Vol. 23 (2), pp.: 389-416. 
Jeon, J. Q. and Moffett, C. M. (2010). "Herding by foreign investors and emerging market equity 
returns: Evidence from Korea." International Review of Economics & Finance, Vol. 19 
(4), pp.: 698-710. 
Ji, X. and Giannikos, C. I. (2010). "The profitability, seasonality and source of industry 
momentum." Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 20 (17), pp.: 1337-1349. 
Johnson, W., B., Magee, R. P., Nagarajan, N. J. and Newman, H. A. (1985). "An analysis of the 
stock price reaction to sudden executive deaths : Implications for the managerial labor 
market." Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 7 (1-3), pp.: 151-174. 
Kacperczyk, M. and Seru, A. (2007). "Fund Manager Use of Public Information: New Evidence 
on Managerial Skills." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 62 (2), pp.: 485-528. 
273 
 
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1973). "On the psychology of prediction." Psychological Review, 
Vol. 80 (4), pp.: 237-251. 
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979). "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk." 
Econometrica, Vol. 47 (2), pp.: 263-291. 
Kallinterakis, V. and Kratunova, T. (2007). "Does Thin Trading Impact Upon the Measurement 
of Herding? Evidence from Bulgaria. ." Ekonomia, Vol. 10 (1), pp.: 42-65. 
Kaminsky, G., Lyons, R. K. and Schmukler, S. L. (2004). "Managers, investors, and crises: 
mutual fund strategies in emerging markets." Journal of International Economics, Vol. 
64 (1), pp.: 113-134. 
Kayali, M. (2007). "Pricing Efficiency of Exchange Traded Funds in Turkey: Early Evidence 
from the Dow Jones Istanbul 20." International Research Journal of Finance and 
Economics, Vol.  (10), pp.: 14-23. 
Keim, D. B. (1983). "Size-related anomalies and stock return seasonality : Further empirical 
evidence." Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 12 (1), pp.: 13-32. 
Keim, D. B. and Stambaugh, R. F. (1984). "A Further Investigation of the Weekend Effect in 
Stock Returns." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 39 (3), pp.: 819-835. 
Kim, Kenneth A. and Nofsinger, John R. (2005). "Institutional Herding, Business Groups, and 
Economic Regimes: Evidence from Japan." The Journal of Business, Vol. 78 (1), pp.: 
213-242. 
Kim, W. and Wei, S.-J. (2002a). "Foreign portfolio investors before and during a crisis." Journal 
of International Economics, Vol. 56 (1), pp.: 77-96. 
Kim, W. and Wei, S.-J. (2002b). "Offshore investment funds: monsters in emerging markets?" 
Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 68 (1), pp.: 205-224. 
Koutmos, G. (1997). "Feedback trading and the autocorrelation pattern of stock returns: further 
empirical evidence." Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 16 (4), pp.: 625-
636. 
Koutmos, G. and Saidi, R. (2001). "Positive feedback trading in emerging capital markets." 
Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 11 (3), pp.: 291 - 297. 
Kramer, C. (1994). "Macroeconomic Seasonality and the January Effect." The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 49 (5), pp.: 1883-1891. 
Kumar, A. and Lee, C. M. C. (2006). "Retail Investor Sentiment and Return Comovements." The 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 61 (5), pp.: 2451-2486. 
Kurov, A. A. and Lasser, D. J. (2002). "The effect of the introduction of Cubes on the Nasdaq-
100 index spot-futures pricing relationship." Journal of Futures Markets, Vol. 22 (3), pp.: 
197-218. 
Kyle, A. S. (1985). "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading." Econometrica, Vol. 53 (6), pp.: 
1315-1335. 
Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1992). "The impact of institutional trading on 
stock prices." Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 32 (1), pp.: 23-43. 
Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1994). "Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, 
and Risk." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 49 (5), pp.: 1541-1578. 
Lamoureux, C. G. and Sanger, G. C. (1989). "Firm Size and Turn-of-the-Year Effects in the 
OTC/NASDAQ Market." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 44 (5), pp.: 1219-1245. 
Le Bon, G. (1895). The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind. London. 
Lee, C. M. C. and Swaminathan, B. (2000). "Price Momentum and Trading Volume." The 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 55 (5), pp.: 2017-2069. 
Lee, Y.-S. (2010). Representativeness and Style Investing: Evidence from Value Trading 
Strategy. Midwest Finance Association. 
Li, W. and Wang, S. S. (2010). "Daily institutional trades and stock price volatility in a retail 
investor dominated emerging market." Journal of Financial Markets, Vol. 13 (4), pp.: 
448-474. 
274 
 
Liao, T.-L., Huang, C.-J. and Wu, C.-Y. (2011). "Do fund managers herd to counter investor 
sentiment?" Journal of Business Research, Vol. 64 (2), pp.: 207-212. 
Ligon, J. A. (1997). "A Simultaneous Test of Competing Theories Regarding the January Effect." 
Journal of Financial Research, Vol. 20 (1), pp.: 13-32. 
Lin, A. Y. and Swanson, P. E. (2008). "Foreigners' perceptions of U.S. markets: Do foreigners 
exhibit herding tendencies?" Journal of Economics and Business, Vol. 60 (3), pp.: 179-
203. 
Lin, C.-C., Chan, S.-J. and Hsu, H. (2006). "Pricing efficiency of exchange traded funds in 
Taiwan." Journal of Asset Management, Vol. 7 (1), pp.: 60-68. 
Lintner, J. (1965). "The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock 
Portfolios and Capital Budgets." The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 47 (1), 
pp.: 13-37. 
Loughran, T. and Ritter, J. R. (1995). "The New Issues Puzzle." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 50 
(1), pp.: 23-51. 
Madura, J. and Richie, N. (2004). "Overreaction of Exchange-Traded Funds During the Bubble of 
1998-2002." Journal of Behavioral Finance, Vol. 5 (2), pp.: 91-104. 
Malkamäki, M. (1999). "Are There Economies of Scale in Stock Exchange Activities?" SSRN 
eLibrary, Vol. 
Miffre, J. (2007). "Country-specific ETFs: An efficient approach to global asset allocation." 
Journal of Asset Management, Vol. 8 (2), pp.: 112-122. 
Montier, J. (2003). Behavioural finance : insights into irrational minds and markets. Chichester, J. 
Wiley. 
Moskowitz, T. J. and Grinblatt, M. (1999). "Do Industries Explain Momentum?" The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 54 (4), pp.: 1249-1290. 
Mun, J. C., Vasconcellos, G. M. and Kish, R. (1999). "Tests of the Contrarian Investment 
Strategy Evidence from the French and German stock markets." International Review of 
Financial Analysis, Vol. 8 (3), pp.: 215-234. 
Nofsinger, J. R. and Sias, R. W. (1999). "Herding and Feedback Trading by Institutional and 
Individual Investors." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 54 (6), pp.: 2263-2295. 
O'Brien, P. C. and Bhushan, R. (1990). "Analyst Following and Institutional Ownership." Journal 
of Accounting Research, Vol. 28 (ArticleType: research-article / Issue Title: Studies on 
Judgment Issues in Accounting and Auditing / Full publication date: 1990 / Copyright © 
1990 Accounting Research Center, Booth School of Business, University of Chicago), 
pp.: 55-76. 
O'Neal, E. S. (2000). "Industry Momentum and Sector Mutual Funds." Financial Analysts 
Journal, Vol. 56 (4), pp.: 37-49. 
Odean, T. (1998). "Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses?" The Journal of Finance, 
Vol. 53 (5), pp.: 1775-1798. 
Olivares, J. A. (2008). "Rear-view-mirror driving in defined contribution systems: the strange 
formula of the Chilean pension funds." Applied Economics, Vol. 40 (15), pp.: 2009 - 
2019. 
Pagano, M. (1989). "Trading Volume and Asset Liquidity." The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 104 (2), pp.: 255-274. 
Park, T. H. and Switzer, L. N. (1995). "Index participation units and the performance of index 
futures markets: Evidence from the Toronto 35 index participation units market." Journal 
of Futures Markets, Vol. 15 (2), pp.: 187-200. 
Peng, L. and Xiong, W. (2006). "Investor attention, overconfidence and category learning." 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 80 (3), pp.: 563-602. 
Petkova, R. and Zhang, L. (2005). "Is value riskier than growth?" Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 78 (1), pp.: 187-202. 
275 
 
Pindyck, R. S. (1984). "Uncertainty in the Theory of Renewable Resource Markets." The Review 
of Economic Studies, Vol. 51 (2), pp.: 289-303. 
Porta, R. L., Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1997). "Good News for Value Stocks: 
Further Evidence on Market Efficiency." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 52 (2), pp.: 859-
874. 
Poterba, J. M. and Summers, L. H. (1986). "The Persistence of Volatility and Stock Market 
Fluctuations." The American Economic Review, Vol. 76 (5), pp.: 1142-1151. 
Prast, H. M. (2000). Herding and Financial Panics: a Role for Cognitive Psychology? Research 
Memorandum WO & E No. 611,Netherlands Central Bank,Econometric Research and 
Studies Department 
Reinganum, M. R. (1981). "Misspecification of capital asset pricing : Empirical anomalies based 
on earnings' yields and market values." Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 9 (1), pp.: 
19-46. 
Reinganum, M. R. (1983). "The anomalous stock market behavior of small firms in January : 
Empirical tests for tax-loss selling effects." Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 12 (1), 
pp.: 89-104. 
Ritter, J. R. (1988). "The Buying and Selling Behavior of Individual Investors at the Turn of the 
Year." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 43 (3), pp.: 701-717. 
Ritter, J. R. (1991). "The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings." The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 46 (1), pp.: 3-27. 
Roll, R. (1983). "On computing mean returns and the small firm premium." Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 12 (3), pp.: 371-386. 
Romano, M. G. (2007). "Learning, Cascades, and Transaction Costs." Review of Finance, Vol. 11 
(3), pp.: 527-560. 
Ross, S. A. (1989). "Information and Volatility: The No-Arbitrage Martingale Approach to 
Timing and Resolution Irrelevancy." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 44 (1), pp.: 1-17. 
Rouwenhorst, K. G. (1998). "International Momentum Strategies." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 
53 (1), pp.: 267-284. 
Rozeff, M. S. and Kinney, W. R. (1976). "Capital market seasonality: The case of stock returns." 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3 (4), pp.: 379-402. 
Säfvenblad, P. (2000). "Trading volume and autocorrelation: Empirical evidence from the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange." Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 24 (8), pp.: 1275-
1287. 
Salm, C. A. and Schuppli, M. (2010). "Positive feedback trading in stock index futures: 
International evidence." International Review of Financial Analysis, Vol. 19 (5), pp.: 
313-322. 
Samuelson, P. (1965). "Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly." Industrial 
Management Review, Vol. 6  pp.: 41-49. 
Scharfstein, D. S. and Stein, J. C. (1990). "Herd Behavior and Investment." The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 80 (3), pp.: 465-479. 
Schindler, M. (2007). Rumors in Financial Markets: Insights into Behavioral Finance John Wiley 
& Sons Ltd. 
Schultz, P. (1983). "Transaction costs and the small firm effect : A comment." Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 12 (1), pp.: 81-88. 
Schwert, G. W. (1989). "Why Does Stock Market Volatility Change Over Time?" The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 44 (5), pp.: 1115-1153. 
Seelenfreund, A., Parker, G. G. C. and Horne, J. C. V. (1968). "Stock Price Behavior and 
Trading." The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 3 (3), pp.: 263-281. 
276 
 
Sentana, E. and Wadhwani, S. (1992). "Feedback Traders and Stock Return Autocorrelations: 
Evidence from a Century of Daily Data." The Economic Journal, Vol. 102 (411), pp.: 
415-425. 
Sharma, V., Easterwood, J. and Kumar, R. (2006). Institutional herding and the internet bubble. 
Unpublished working paper, University of Michigan-Dearborn and Virginia Tech. 
Sharpe, W. F. (1964). "Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions 
of Risk." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 19 (3), pp.: 425-442. 
Shefrin, H. and Statman, M. (1985). "The Disposition to Sell Winners Too Early and Ride Losers 
Too Long: Theory and Evidence." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 40 (3), pp.: 777-790. 
Shiller, R. J., Kon-Ya, F. and Tsutsui, Y. (1996). "Why Did the Nikkei Crash? Expanding the 
Scope of Expectations Data Collection." The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 78 
(1), pp.: 156-164. 
Shin, S. and Soydemir, G. (2010). "Exchange-traded funds, persistence in tracking errors and 
information dissemination." Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Vol. 20 (4-
5), pp.: 214-234. 
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W. (1997). "The Limits of Arbitrage." The Journal of Finance, Vol. 
52 (1), pp.: 35-55. 
Shukla, R. K. and van Inwegen, G. B. (1995). "Do locals perform better than foreigners?: An 
analysis of UK and US mutual fund managers." Journal of Economics and Business, Vol. 
47 (3), pp.: 241-254. 
Sias, R. W. (2004). "Institutional Herding." The Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 17 (1), pp.: 
165-206. 
Sirri, E. R. and Tufano, P. (1998). "Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows." The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 53 (5), pp.: 1589-1622. 
Smirlock, M. and Starks, L. (1986). "Day-of-the-week and intraday effects in stock returns." 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 17 (1), pp.: 197-210. 
Statman, M. (1999). "Behaviorial Finance: Past Battles and Future Engagements." Financial 
Analysts Journal, Vol. 55 (6), pp.: 18-27. 
Stoll, H. R. and Whaley, R. E. (1983). "Transaction costs and the small firm effect." Journal of 
Financial Economics, Vol. 12 (1), pp.: 57-79. 
Swinkels, L. (2002). "International industry momentum." Journal of Asset Management, Vol. 3 
(2), pp.: 124-141. 
Switzer, L. N., Varson, P. L. and Zghidi, S. (2000). "Standard and Poor’s depository receipts and 
the performance of the S&P 500 index futures market." Journal of Futures Markets, Vol. 
20 (8), pp.: 705-716. 
Tan, L., Chiang, T. C., Mason, J. R. and Nelling, E. (2008). "Herding behavior in Chinese stock 
markets: An examination of A and B shares." Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 16 (1-
2), pp.: 61-77. 
Trivers, R. (1991). Deceit and self-deception. Man and Beast Revisited. a. L. T. R. Robinson. 
Washington DC, Smithsonian Press. 
Trueman, B. (1994). "Analyst forecasts and herding behavior." Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 
7 (1), pp.: 97-124. 
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1971). "Belief in the law of small numbers." Psychological 
Bulletin, Vol. 76 (2), pp.: 105-110. 
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1974). "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases." 
Science, Vol. 185 (4157), pp.: 1124-1131. 
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1983). "Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction 
fallacy in probability judgment." Psychological Review, Vol. 90 (4), pp.: 293-315. 
Vives, X. (1993). "How Fast do Rational Agents Learn?" The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 
60 (2), pp.: 329-347. 
277 
 
Von Neumann, J. and Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 
Princeton University Press. 
Voronkova, S. and Bohl, M. T. (2005). "Institutional Traders’ Behavior in an Emerging Stock 
Market: Empirical Evidence on Polish Pension Fund Investors." Journal of Business 
Finance & Accounting, Vol. 32 (7-8), pp.: 1537-1560. 
Wachtel, S. B. (1942). "Certain Observations on Seasonal Movements in Stock Prices." The 
Journal of Business of the University of Chicago, Vol. 15 (2), pp.: 184-193. 
Walter, A. and Weber, M., Friedrich (2006). "Herding in the German Mutual Fund Industry." 
European Financial Management, Vol. 12 (3), pp.: 375-406. 
Watanabe, T. (2002). "Margin requirements, positive feedback trading, and stock return 
autocorrelations: the case of Japan." Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 12 (6), pp.: 395 - 
403. 
Weber, M. and Camerer, C. F. (1998). "The disposition effect in securities trading: an 
experimental analysis." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 33 (2), pp.: 
167-184. 
Welch, I. (2000). "Herding among security analysts." Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 58 
(3), pp.: 369-396. 
Wermers, R. (1999). "Mutual Fund Herding and the Impact on Stock Prices." The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 54 (2), pp.: 581-622. 
Wilson, R. (1997). "Islamic finance and ethical investment." International Journal of Social 
Economics, Vol. 24 (11), pp.: 1325-1342. 
Wong, W.-K., Manzur, M. and Chew, B.-K. (2003). "How rewarding is technical analysis? 
Evidence from Singapore stock market." Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 13 (7), pp.: 
543. 
Wylie, S. (2005). "Fund Manager Herding: A Test of the Accuracy of Empirical Results Using 
U.K. Data." The Journal of Business, Vol. 78 (1), pp.: 381-403. 
Zhou, R. T. and Lai, R. N. (2009). "Herding and information based trading." Journal of Empirical 
Finance, Vol. 16 (3), pp.: 388-393. 
Zhou, X. and Li, M. (2009). "Analysis on investment behavior deviation." WSEAS Trans. Info. 
Sci. and App., Vol. 6 (1), pp.: 116-125. 
 
 
